Implementation of tariff rate quotas in the Philippines by Manzo, Preceles Hernandez
  
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TARIFF RATE QUOTAS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
PRECELES HERNANDEZ MANZO 
 
 
 
B.S., University of the Philippines at Los Baños, Philippines, 1984 
M.S., University of Gent, Belgium, 1998 
 
 
 
 
AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
College of Agriculture  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
 
 
2007 
 
 Abstract 
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) are one of the most widely used trade policy instruments in 
agricultural trade. The issue of whether TRQs are efficient trade policy instruments for 
improving market access has been widely debated. Some believe that TRQs impose an extra 
barrier to trade, circumvent the reforms sought under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) and may not be as attractive as initially 
envisioned. Others believe that the TRQs are useful and facilitate trade and liberalization. Any 
expansion in quota, or decrease in tariffs, or combinations of the two, has the potential to 
liberalize trade in a specific industry. There is strong clamor for continued reforms in the conduct 
of agricultural trade – including the implementation of TRQs. The purpose of this study is to 
increase the understanding of TRQs, and determine the impact of their implementation on the 
Philippine corn market. Specifically, the study will estimate the quantities of supply, demand, 
imports, domestic equilibrium prices, and border prices under different TRQ liberalization 
regimes.  
In this study, an existing TRQ model was utilized to determine how effective TRQs are 
as a trade policy instrument for trade liberalization and increasing market access. The results 
reveal that the Philippine corn market was restricted by the out-quota tariff. De facto 
liberalization of the TRQ at the level of the out-quota rate (50%) or even at 35% (in-quota rate), 
does not completely liberalize the corn market. Progressively reducing both tariffs liberalizes the 
market and leads to increases in surpluses. The lower tariffs, however, lead to less government 
revenues. The smaller the gap between the in-quota and out-quota, the smaller the quota rents 
become. Increasing the quotas has no significant impact in liberalizing the corn market, and the 
increase in imports decrease producer surplus in all cases.  
The TRQ model of the Philippine corn sector reveals that changing the components of the 
TRQ would lead to different impacts on supply, demand, consumer, producer and net surplus, 
and government revenues. Knowledge of the regime in which the country is trading can 
determine which individual policy instrument of the TRQ, the in-quota and out-quota tariff and 
the quota, should be used to increase market access or address the concerns of stakeholders in the 
 corn sector. It is thus important for policy makers to find a workable tariff level that would serve 
the interest of all stakeholders in the sector.  
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and government revenues. Knowledge of the regime in which the country is trading can 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) are one of the most widely used trade policy instruments in 
agricultural trade. They are used in 45 World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries and 
implemented in well over 1,400 individual tariff lines (WTO, 2006a). TRQs were 
institutionalized in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) as a trade instrument 
to provide market access for sensitive commodities. One overriding reason for this was that 
World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries were worried that the tariffication exercise, 
i.e., the conversion of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) into their tariff equivalents, would lead to 
extremely high tariffs and defeat its intended purpose of maintaining or improving market access 
(Abbott and Morse, 2001 and 2004; Mönnich, 2003a; Moschini). 
Skully (1999a and 1999b) describes a tariff rate quota (TRQ) as a two-tiered tariff 
system. There are three main components of a TRQ: 1) the lower first-tier tariff or the in-quota 
tariff; 2) the higher second-tier tariff or the out-of-quota tariff; and 3) the quota that sets the limit 
up to which quantity the lower in-quota tariff is applied. During a given period, the lower in-
quota tariff is applied to imports up to the last unit of the quota and then the higher out-of-quota 
tariff is applied to all subsequent imports. A fourth component – TRQ administration, is 
concerned with how the quotas are allocated and who gets the economic rents (Meilke, et al., 
2001). More detailed discussions on the workings of the TRQ are available from Rae; Abbott; de 
Gorter and Sheldon, Mönnich (2003b), Skully (1999a and 2001a), and the World Trade 
Organization Secretariat (WTO, 2002a and 2002b). 
The issue of whether TRQs are efficient trade policy instruments for improving market 
access has been discussed at length by many authors. The widely-held opinion is that the 
administration of tariff rate quotas imposes an extra barrier to trade (de Gorter and Sheldon; 
Mönnich, 2003b). High transaction and administrative costs prevent the actual liberalization of 
agricultural markets and carry on the practice of rent seeking in trade (Abbott and Paarlberg). 
They further argued that the use of TRQs circumvented the reforms sought under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the conversion of NTBs into TRQs during the 
Uruguay Round may not be as attractive as initially envisioned. Tariffication is the process of 
converting non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as quotas, absolute bans, and prohibitions into their 
 2 
bound tariff equivalents. Bound tariffs essentially meant that once these tariffs are set, they 
cannot be raised, and are subject to reductions over time as agreed to in the URAA. The 
unintended effect of tariffication was that nations were allowed to effectively re-impose a quota 
if it maintains a very high out-of-quota tariff. Transparency was not improved and quota rents 
may remain. 
However, some authors (Tsigas and Ingco; Pearce and Sharma; Bureau and Tangermann; 
Matthews and Dupraz; and Barichello), believe that the tariffication package included something 
more than simply converting the quotas into tariffs. The tariffication process ensured that the 
quantities that were imported before the UR agreement took effect could continue to be imported 
and guaranteed that quantities that were considered ‘new access’ were charged non-prohibitive 
tariff rates. As tariff rate quotas are continuously applied, any expansion in quota, a decrease in 
out-of-quota tariffs, or the combination of the two, has the potential to liberalize trade in a 
specific industry.  
With agricultural trade firmly in place within the multilateral trading system, many 
WTO-member countries demanded continued reforms in the conduct of agricultural trade at the 
WTO Doha Round negotiations in 2001. Among the reform areas include the presently 
administered system of TRQs (WTO, 2004). Several years later, countless proposals, drafts, and 
deadlines have come and passed, but positions remained wide apart and there has been little 
consensus on the proposed drafts or on how to modify it (WTO, 2004).  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of potential changes in TRQ 
implementation and liberalization in the Philippines. The Philippines currently has 14 
agricultural products under a TRQ system. This study will look specifically at the impact of TRQ 
implementation on the corn market. The ongoing discussion on the efficiency of TRQs as a 
means to enhance market access will serve as the backdrop. The general objectives for this 
research are to increase the understanding of tariff-rate quotas, determine the impact of tariff rate 
quota implementation on corn, an important food and feed ingredient in Philippine agriculture, 
and to estimate the dollar (and peso) value of the impacts. The analysis of the TRQ regime will 
be developed using a simple trade model for the Philippines under a small importing country 
assumption. The specific objectives of this study are to estimate the supply – demand situation, 
imports, domestic equilibrium prices, and border prices under different TRQ liberalization 
regimes. The per-unit quota rents will be computed, as well as consumer, producer, and net 
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surplus and total government revenue under the different TRQ regimes. The hypothesis is that 
the TRQ has an impact on the market and welfare for the corn sector. Several key issues that also 
need to be answered as a result of the implementation of TRQs in corn trade in the Philippines: 
(a) is the TRQ an appropriate transition mechanism to liberalize the corn market? (b) What is the 
dominant trade policy component in the present TRQ system? (c) To what magnitude is the TRQ 
liberalizing corn trade? (d) What are the effects of the TRQ on welfare?  
Quite a number of papers have been written about tariff-rate quotas, with a majority of 
these qualitative, or descriptive, in nature. Some empirical studies on TRQs that provide 
evidence of the effects and costs of this trade policy instrument are made on large or aggregate 
economies on either very specific or on aggregated agricultural commodities. A brief discussion 
of these studies is in the review of literature section of this paper. The economic contribution of 
this study is that it presents the effects of TRQs on a small net-importing agricultural country 
such as the Philippines. The study by Abbott and Paarlberg was closely followed and their model 
serves as the basis for the model described in this study. Abbott and Paarlberg present one of the 
few empirical studies made on small developing countries. Their study offers specific 
quantitative results for a small net-importing agricultural country, and provides an application of 
the theory behind TRQ implementation. 
This paper is made up of six chapters: (1) the introduction; (2) agricultural and trade 
policy in the Philippines; (3) review of literature; (4) the conceptual model; (5) results and 
discussion, and (6) the conclusion and recommendations. 
 
 4 
 
CHAPTER 2 - Agricultural and Trade Policy in the Philippines 
The Philippine economy and its agricultural sector have undergone many upheavals as 
well as reforms over the last four decades. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the readers 
with an idea of the importance and performance of the corn sector to the Philippine economy. 
The general trade policy and agricultural trade policy reforms, and the Philippines’ TRQ 
implementation are also discussed at some length in the following sections.  
Importance of the Corn Sector to the Philippine Economy 
Corn, or maize, was chosen for this study because of its importance to the Philippine’s 
agriculture and economy. Next to rice, corn is the second most important staple and feed crop in 
the Philippines. About a third of all farmers grow corn, and about a quarter of the population 
consumes corn as food. The corn sub-sector contributes about 7% to total agricultural gross 
value added (GVA). As a major feed ingredient, the corn sub-sector has strong linkages with the 
livestock and poultry sectors, both high growth areas for Philippine agriculture (de Dios). The 
Philippines has been self-sufficient in white corn for food but not in yellow corn for use as feed. 
Some 60% of total corn production is used as feed for the livestock and poultry industry. 
Production of corn has been increasing overall over the period 1995 – 2005 at an annual 
growth rate of close to 2.4% per year. There are, however, years where declines have been noted, 
particularly during the El Niño years of 1997 and 2002. Area planted, on the other hand, has 
been declining by an average of 1% per year as farmers move in and out of corn production, 
depending on the levels of profitability among crops (e.g. between corn, sugarcane, tobacco and 
root crops). Marked improvements in yields have been noted with growth rates at over 3% per 
year over the last ten years (Table 2.1). 
The demand for corn has been increasing largely due to population growth and increased 
demand for feed from the livestock and poultry sectors. About 60% of total corn supply 
(production and imports) goes into feeds, some 23% goes directly into food and another 12% 
goes into industrial/food processing (Table 2.2). Per capita consumption of corn over the period 
1995 – 2005 has hovered close to 15 kilograms per year, down from over 17 kilograms per year 
in the period 1985 – 1994. Imports, on average, have accounted for about 5% of total supply, but 
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there have been record years when imports account for as high as 8% to 10% in years when 
production was down. 
Government intervention has also been substantial in the corn sub-sector. Most of the 
policies up to the early 1990s have consisted mostly of: (a) trade measures – import licensing and 
a 20% import tariff; (b) grains stabilization program through regulations on entry and domestic 
operations; and (c) corn and livestock production programs (de Dios). The National Food 
Authority (NFA), directly intervenes in the domestic grains market to stabilize supply and 
demand for rice and corn. The NFA undertakes this through its mandate of buying paddy (or 
unhusked) rice and corn when the domestic price was lower than a support price in order to help 
farmers recover their production costs (WTO, 2002a). 
The Philippines historically banned the imports of corn to protect producers from 
outlying islands which face huge cost disadvantages in inter-island shipping (Gonzales and 
Perez). Before the mid-1980s the NFA was the sole importer of corn and after some policy 
changes in the NFA’s operations, any entity with an import permit was allowed to import. In 
1994, prior to the Philippines ratification of the GATT Agreement, this licensing function was 
given to the Philippine Department of Agriculture. When the Philippines ratified the GATT 
agreement in 1994 to become part of the WTO, it laid down the framework for implementing its 
commitments to the world body by the following year. The implementation of TRQs starting in 
1995 has allowed imports to enter at levels comparable to those from earlier periods. The NFA 
also participates as an importer of corn to shore up its buffer stock and to cater to the needs of 
small livestock and poultry producers. Abbott and Morse (2004) noted that this is an example in 
which the TRQ instrument permits a country to pursue a post-Uruguay Round regime similar to 
earlier regimes while also allowing some rise in imports. 
Philippine Trade Policy and Agricultural Trade Reforms 
The Philippines, like many other developing countries, pursued protectionist policies 
from the 1950s to the 1970s. Trade policy reforms began in the 1960s and continue up to this 
time. There have been several attempts at liberalizing trade in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it 
was only in the early 1980s that a serious effort at liberalization was initiated. A detailed 
discussion of these events can be found in Cororaton and Cuenca, Manasan and Querubin, and 
de Dios. The 1980’s trade liberalization package included (a) a Tariff Reform Program (TRP) 
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that entailed compression of the tariff rate structure from a 0 – 100% range to a 10% – 50% 
range from 1981 to 1985, and (b) an Import Liberalization Program (ILP) that was aimed at 
lifting quantitative restrictions on imports. The ILP, however, was abandoned in 1983 due to a 
balance-of-payment crisis coupled with economic instability and political unrest. It was resumed 
in 1986 when the Aquino government assumed power where it achieved far more success (Hasan 
and Chen).  
In the 1990s, there were three major developments in the area of foreign trade in the 
Philippines: (1) a series of unilateral trade reform programs of the government; (2) the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA); and (3) the GATT-UR/WTO in 1995 (Cororaton and Cuenca). The 
following sections provide a short discussion of these developments. 
Tariff Reform Program in the 1990s 
Despite the strong overall trade liberalization efforts in the late 1980s, most major 
importable agricultural commodities with any significant domestic production remain subjected 
to quantitative trade restrictions (QRs), particularly those protected by laws passed by Congress 
(David, 1997 and 2002). In 1991, the government enacted a second tariff reform program (TRP 
II) whereby tariff rates would be further compressed to a 10% – 30% range. However, there were 
a number of exceptions granted so that about 10 percent of commodity lines in 1995 were still 
subject to tariff rates between 0-5% and 30% and 50%. In 1992, quantitative restrictions were 
converted into tariff equivalents for a variety of agricultural and manufactured goods. In a 
number of cases, the tariff rates on these liberalized goods were set fairly high, some by as much 
as 100% of their pre-liberalization levels, albeit with a built-in 5-year phase-down of these tariff 
rates. The process of tariffication also entailed some reversal in 1993 with the re-imposition of 
quantitative restrictions through legislation on various items, mainly concentrated among 
agricultural goods.1 The result was that while only 164 commodities were subject to quantitative 
restriction by the end of 1992, the number had increased to 257 by 1993 (Hasan and Chen, 
                                                 
1 Efforts to remove QRs were pre-empted by the passage of the Magna Cam of the Small Farmers (or 
Republic Act 7607) in 1991 which provided, among other things, blanket authority for restricting agricultural 
imports competing with domestic production. The implementing guidelines and list of covered commodities were 
issued in 1993. RA 7607 also made the process of implementing quantitative trade restrictions more cumbersome by 
requiring government consultations with farmers and other affected sectors. 
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Manasan and Querubin, Cororaton and Cuenca). Table 2.3 provides a summary of the tariff 
reform programs of the Philippines from 1981 – 2000. 
Substantial reforms were implemented under the third tariff reform program (TRP III) in 
1994 - 1997. Measures under the TRP included a reduction of tariff rates on a number of 
manufactured items including capital equipment and machinery, textiles, garments, and chemical 
inputs among others (Philippine Tariff Commission). There was also some reduction of tariffs on 
“non-sensitive” agricultural goods. In general, the TRP III focused on developing a four-tier 
tariff schedule: 3% or 10% for raw materials and capital equipment depending on whether these 
were available locally or not; 20% for intermediate goods; and 30% for finished goods. There 
was also a liberalization of all import restrictions as a result of the need to comply with WTO 
commitments; some products were however allowed to have tariff rates above the ceiling of 
30%.  
The fourth tariff reform program (TRP IV) was implemented from 1998 – 2000, with the 
objective of enhancing the country’s global competitiveness. TRP IV basically provided for a 
more flexible 3%-5%-7%-10%-15%-20%-25%-30% structure replacing the 3%-10%-20%-30% 
tariff structure. The outcome was that average nominal tariff declined from 13% to 8% over that 
period (Philippine Tariff Commission). 
ASEAN Free Trade Area 
The Philippines is a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), along with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. The ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) was initiated by the ASEAN at the Fourth ASEAN Leaders Summit held in 
Singapore in January 1992 (ASEAN Secretariat). The AFTA laid out a comprehensive program 
of regional tariff reduction, to be carried out in phases through the year 2008. However, this 
deadline was subsequently moved forward in 1994 to 2003 after the GATT-UR/WTO were 
ratified in order to maintain its relevance and importance. Over the course of the last several 
years, the program of tariff reductions was broadened and accelerated, and a host of "AFTA 
Plus" activities were initiated, including efforts to eliminate non-tariff barriers and quantitative 
restrictions, and harmonize customs nomenclature, valuation, and procedures, and develop 
common product certification standards. The ASEAN later on signed a series of framework 
agreements for the intra-regional liberalization of trade in services, and for regional IPR 
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cooperation. An industrial complementation scheme designed to encourage intra-regional 
investment was approved, and discussions were held on creating a free investment area within 
the region (ASEAN Secretariat). 
The Common Effective Preferential Tariff or CEPT is the mechanism by which tariffs on 
goods traded within the ASEAN region that meet a 40% ASEAN content requirement, were 
reduced to 0-5% by the year 2002/2003 for the six original ASEAN member countries (2006 for 
Vietnam, 2008 for Laos and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia). The tariff reductions move 
forward in two tracks – the "fast" and "normal" tracks. Tariffs on goods in the fast track were 
mostly reduced to the 0-5% range by 2000. Tariffs on goods in the normal track were reduced to 
this level by 2002, or 2003 for a small number of products. Currently, about 81% of ASEAN's 
tariff lines are covered by either the fast or normal track (ASEAN Secretariat).  
ASEAN members have the option of excluding products from the CEPT in three cases: 1) 
temporary exclusions; 2) sensitive agricultural products; and 3) general exceptions. Products in 
the temporary exclusions list refer to commodities for which tariffs will ultimately be lowered to 
0-5%, but which are being protected temporarily by a delay in tariff reductions. This is 
permissible under the AFTA agreement, and is spelled out under a Protocol Regarding the 
Implementation of the CEPT Scheme Temporary Exclusion List. For a small number of sensitive 
agricultural products whose integration into the CEPT scheme was extended, 2010 serves as a 
deadline. The CEPT scheme will cover nearly 98 percent of all tariff lines in ASEAN by the year 
2003; by then, the only products not included in the CEPT Scheme will be those in the General 
Exceptions category and sensitive agricultural products. 
The Philippine GATT-UR/WTO Commitments 
The Philippines is a founding member of the WTO. In 1995, after its Senate ratified the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. As a member of the WTO, 
the Philippines participate in the pursuit of several policy reform areas in agriculture. Among 
these are in increasing or enhancing market access, abolition of domestic support and export 
subsidies (WTO, 2002a, 2006b; David, 1997).  
Specifically, the Philippines was committed to the following under market access: 1) 
Removal of Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) and conversion of QRs into their tariff equivalents – 
also known as tarrification; 2) Reduction of tariffs on agricultural products. As a developing 
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country, the Philippines committed to reduce average tariffs by 24% with a minimum 10% cut 
per tariff lines from 1995 to 2004; 3) Implement a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system or on several 
agricultural products locally referred to as the Minimum Access Volume (MAV) system. A more 
detailed discussion of the Philippine TRQ is in the next section; 4) Tariff bindings – the 
Philippines agreed to bind almost all of her tariff lines in agriculture to specified rates at levels 
beyond which no further increases will be imposed; 5) Prohibition of additional non-tariff 
measures. The Philippines committed itself to the principle that no new non-tariff measures, such 
as import licensing, variable import levies, import quotas, and import bans may be imposed 
(WTO, 2002a, 2006b). The Philippines was also granted an exemption from the removal of 
quotas on rice imports in 1995 under Annex 5 of the WTO agreement. This exemption was to 
expire in mid 2005, but an extension was negotiated for a new deadline of 2012. 
In the area of abolishing domestic support, the Philippines agreed to the reduction of 
production subsidies. For developing countries, this calls for a reduction of trade-distorting 
domestic subsidies by 13% from 1995 to 2004. The Philippines, however, falls under the “de 
minimis” principle of the agreement, which refers to the situation where no reductions are 
required because its level of domestic support is not more than 10%. The Philippines also agreed 
to a reduction of export subsidies. However, it does not provide such support to its exporters. 
The Philippines as a signatory to the WTO agreed to put in place as system for plant variety 
registration and protection under a patent or the ‘sui generis’ system or both.2 
                                                 
2 This section is covered by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). Under the TRIPS Agreement, member states are not obliged to provide for patent protection for plants and 
animals. However, they do have to implement some form of intellectual property protection for plant varieties 
(Seiler). Member states can either provide patent protection for plant varieties, or by implementing a sui generis 
system (a system of its own kind), or by any combination thereof. In general, developing countries can choose 
among the following policy options: a) To make provisions for the patent protection of plant varieties; b) To join the 
International Union for the Protection of new Varieties of Plants (UPOV) in either of both variants (UPOV 78 or 
91); c) To provide for comparable plant variety protection (PVP) without formally joining the UPOV Convention; 
or d) To devise a sui generis system which is better designed to suit national interests and to take into account the 
protection demands of informal and local communities. 
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Current Directions of Philippine Agricultural Trade Policy 
Intense reforms of the Philippines tariff structure were observed over the period 2000 – 
2005. The original tariff schedule for 2001 – 2004 required a tariff band of 0 to 5%, with 
exemptions for some agricultural commodities by 2004. However, in 2002 the implementation of 
these proposed tariff rates was put on hold by the Philippine government because of fiscal 
concerns. By 2003, the government policy was to slow down the pace of tariff reform committed 
to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and World Trade Organization (WTO) to the minimum 
and the country was taking full advantage of all allowed windows of exception. The effort to 
decelerate the pace of reforms was very apparent from 2003 onwards. The simple average of the 
tariff rates started to rise from this period such that by 2005, the average tariff rate (7.5 per cent) 
is only about 0.5 percentage point lower than the overall average for 2000 (Rodriguez and 
Cabalu). The government also provided for higher tariffs on selected agricultural commodities.  
TRQ Implementation in the Philippines 
The Philippines is one of many developing countries with significant implementation of 
TRQs (Elbehri, et. al., 2004). By implementing the Uruguay Round results, the Philippines 
converted all quantitative restrictions on agricultural products, except on rice, into tariffs. The 
Philippines currently implements a system of TRQs or more commonly referred to as minimum 
access volumes (or MAV) for a number of agricultural products that include live animals (HS 
headings 01.01, 01.03-01.05) except live bovine animals (HS 01.020), pork (HS02.03), sheep or 
goat meat (HS02.04), poultry meat (HS02.07), potatoes (HS07.01), coffee (HS09.01), corn or 
maize (HS10.05), and sugar (HS17.01).3 The size of the quotas for agricultural products covered 
under the TRQ mechanism is based on the Philippine’s commitments made during the Uruguay 
Round. Table 2.4 provides a complete list of products, tariffs and quantities under tariff rate 
quotas for the Philippines as submitted to the WTO Secretariat. The Philippines invoked special 
                                                 
3 The HS or the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) of tariff nomenclature is an 
internationally standardized system of names and numbers for classifying traded products developed and maintained 
by the World Customs Organization (WCO). Almost 200 countries and economic or customs unions, representing 
about 98% of world trade, use the HS as a basis for customs tariffs and extension of preferences, collection of taxes 
and statistics, monitoring of controlled goods, trade negotiations (i.e., in the WTO, regional free trade areas) and 
rules of origin, among others (WCO). 
 11 
safeguard provisions for rice (HS10.06) under Annex 5 of the UR Agreement on Agriculture that 
delayed the lifting of quantitative restriction until a later date.4 The National Food Authority 
(NFA), a state trading enterprise (STE), is tapped to manage imports of the staple. Until the end 
of 1997, the Philippines also maintained tariff quotas for live bovine animals and meat of bovine 
animals (HS 0201, 0202) (WTO, 2002a).  
The Philippines is also one of a few countries that use lower in-quota tariff rates in 
addition to its MFN rates (Abbott and Morse, 2004). The system for administering tariff quotas 
still remains complex, and this may deter imports. A substantial number of tariff quotas are 
regularly unfilled (WTO, 2005b); more recently there have been no imports of live goats 
(HS 0104) and beef (HS 0201), and utilization for live poultry (HS 0105), pork (HS 0203), goat 
meat (HS 0204), poultry (HS 0207) has been less than three quarters. Fill rates for rice and sugar 
have been 100%, while that for corn have been high for most years. Abbott and Morse (2004) 
noted TRQ underfill is common for meat products although substantial volumes of out-of-quota 
imports exist. Except for goats, imports of most commodities under the TRQ system have 
increased. Table 2.5 presents the TRQ fill rate of products for the Philippines from 1995 – 2003.  
When the Philippines first informed the WTO about its TRQ implementation, it reported 
that it was going to use direct licensing and state trading enterprises (STEs) in the 
implementation of its commitments. A few months later, in a change of heart, policy makers 
revised the TRQ importation guidelines into a system using historical importers for most 
products. As a result, the Philippines has received a substantial amount of criticism for its use of 
producer groups to implement TRQs for certain commodities, as these groups have not always 
imported committed quantities. The Philippine government has continually updated procedures 
to ensure that the quotas are filled up. Abbott and Morse (2004) noted that it is apparent that the 
Philippines’ objective in the implementation of its TRQ seeks to ensure that rents from TRQs 
accrue to domestic agents and that this is also why a country may find it difficult to ensure that 
both quotas are filled and rents accrue to domestic agents. However, they noted that as Philippine 
                                                 
4 The Special Treatment for rice technically expired last June 30, 2005. The Philippine government formally 
filed its Notification for the Extension of Special Treatment for Rice Under Annex 5 in 29 March 2004 through the 
Philippine’s Permanent Mission in Geneva, Switzerland. However, approval on the Philippine’s bid to extend the 
Special Treatment for rice is subject to negotiations. During the negotiations, other countries (Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, China, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Thailand, and the USA) requested for concessions in exchange for the 
Philippines’ Request for Extension of the Special Treatment for Rice.  
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MFN tariff rates are reduced from base to bound levels and approach the lower in-quota tariff 
rate levels, the rents become less of an issue and growing demand in the Philippines would likely 
boost imports of these TRQ commodities. 
The following paragraphs describe the TRQ procedure as it has evolved after the initial 
submission of the Philippines on its TRQ implementation to the WTO Secretariat. The detailed 
and official submissions of the Philippines on this matter with the WTO Secretariat were used as 
basis for this part of the report (WTO, 1995, 1996a 2002a) 
The Philippine TRQ system or MAV system was first introduced in July 1996 covering 
the agricultural products committed by the Philippines during the Uruguay Round, and included 
catching-up provisions concerning Philippine tariff quota commitments for 1995. The current 
rules and regulations for the administration of the MAV are contained in Department of 
Agriculture Administrative Order (A.O.) 8 of 1997 as amended by A.O. 1 of 1998. An MAV 
Management Committee (MMC), chaired by the Secretary of Agriculture, implements the MAV 
system and issues MAV licences to importers. The MMC is advised by the MAV Advisory 
Council, composed of private sector representatives appointed by the MMC. 
Application procedures and eligibility for quota licences differ between the first year of 
implementation of the MAV system and subsequent years. In the first year of implementation for 
each MAV applicable product, the product was defined and classified as either Type ‘A’ or 
Type ‘B’ depending on the imported amount in the three years immediately preceding the first 
year of implementation. Type ‘A’ products are those considered to have been imported regularly 
and in substantial volumes; Type ‘B’ products are those irregularly or scarcely imported during 
the period. Frozen meat of bovine animals, corn (maize), rice, and cane or beet sugar and 
chemically pure sucrose were defined as regularly imported products; all other MAV products 
were defined as irregularly imported (Section I.E.1.a of the A.O. 8.). 
Allocation of licences for regularly imported products is based on the import shares of 
applicants and for irregularly imported products allocation is based on the local output share of 
applicants. Potential importers eligible for MAV licences for a Type ‘A’ product are those that 
have imported the product during the representative period. Those entities eligible for MAV 
licences for a Type ‘B’ product are users or sellers of the product during the period. Subsequent 
entrants are accepted on the basis of past imports. 
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For subsequent years, the allocations from the previous year are carried over, in addition 
to incremental volumes arising from annual quota increases, recalls, and cancellations, through a 
systematic distribution procedure (SDP). A typical tariff-rate quota year runs from February to 
January of the following year. Tariff quotas are allocated twice during the quota year – in 
February and again in July; this is an effort by the Philippine government to increase the 
likelihood of filling up the quota. In February, the incremental quota for the quota year, the 
allocation of the prior quota year, which has been recalled, and any portion of the quota not taken 
up during the prior quota year are put together in a Beginning Year Pool (BYP), and these are 
apportioned to license holders and new entrants. In July, the allocations surrendered or 
relinquished by licensees by end-May are put together in a Mid-Year Pool (MYP), and these are 
reallocated to other qualified applicants. The BYP and MYP are allocated as follows: (a) priority 
access is given to licensees who have not surrendered any of their previous year quota, and have 
utilized at least 80% of their allocation (for BYP) and 30% by the last working day of May (for 
MYP), and qualified entrants; and (b) any volume remaining in the BYP and MYP is distributed 
to interested applicants on a first-come-first-served-basis.  
If the incremental volumes are less than the sum of all the volume requests made by 
licensees qualified to apply for the incremental volumes, the incremental volumes are allocated 
first to the MAV eligible applicants5 and that they have imported the minimum import volume, 
defined in the Annex II of A.O. 8, for the product at any time during the immediately preceding 
twelve months. If the incremental volumes exceed the sum of the requested volume, the 
remaining quota is allocated on a first-come-first-served basis to other legal entities that have 
neither operated a business involving a MAV product nor imported the minimum volume of the 
product. 
The rules of the Philippine MAV system articulated that the MAV Management 
Committee may permanently cancel a licence on the grounds of misrepresentation of vital 
information, submission of spurious or falsified documents, commission of technical smuggling 
or other act of deceit by the applicant. A licensee that decides not use its licence may voluntarily 
surrender the licence as provided in the A.O. 8.  Licensees that surrender or underutilize quotas 
may be penalized; for example, licensees utilizing less than 80% of their net allocations, regular 
                                                 
5 MAV eligible applicants are any legal entities that have operated a business involving the product concerned 
as of the start of the prior year. 
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and additional allocations minus surrendered volumes accepted, may have part of such 
allocations recalled for purposes of determining allocations in the following year (details of 
penalties are found in Section I.H of A.O. 8). 
The list of licensees and their corresponding allocations must be published in two local 
newspapers of national circulation. The time allowed for submitting applications for licences is 
usually up to the end of the authorized period. The authorities estimate that an application for a 
licence, if complete in all respects can normally be granted within two weeks. 
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Table 2.1. Philippines: Corn Production, Area Planted and Yield, 1985 – 2005. 
Year Production (000 MT) Area Planted (000 Ha) Yield (MT/Ha) 
1985 3,862.8 3,510.9 1.10 
1986 4,090.7 3,595.0 1.14 
1987 4,278.1 3,682.6 1.16 
1988 4,428.0 3,745.1 1.18 
1989 4,522.2 3,689.2 1.23 
1990 4,853.9 3,819.6 1.27 
1991 4,655.0 3,589.5 1.30 
1992 4,618.9 3,331.4 1.39 
1993 4,798.0 3,149.3 1.52 
1994 4,519.2 3,005.8 1.50 
1995 4,128.5 2,692.3 1.53 
1996 4,151.3 2,735.7 1.52 
1997 4,332.4 2,725.9 1.59 
1998 3,823.2 2,354.2 1.62 
1999 4,584.6 2,642.2 1.74 
2000 4,511.1 2,510.3 1.80 
2001 4,525.0 2,486.6 1.82 
2002 4,319.0 2,395.5 1.80 
2003 4,616.0 2,409.8 1.92 
2004 5,413.0 2,527.1 2.14 
2005 5,253.0 2,441.8 2.15 
Growth Rates 1985 – 
1994 (in %) 
1.76 -1.71 3.50 
Growth Rates 1995 – 
2000 (in %) 
1.79 -1.39 3.30 
Growth Rates 1995 – 
2005 (in %) 
2.44 -0.97 3.47 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Philippines. 
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Table 2.2. Philippines – Corn supply and utilization, 1995 – 2005. 
Year Beg. 
Stocks 
Pro- 
duction 
Imports Gross 
Supply 
Exports Seeds Feeds/ 
Waste 
Pro- 
cessing 
Food 
Use 
Ending 
Stocks 
1985 182.00 3863.00 281.00 4326.00 0.27 70.00 2631.00 194.00 999.73 431.00 
1986 431.00 4091.00 0.20 4522.20 0.14 72.00 3036.00 205.00 968.06 241.00 
1987 241.00 4278.00 56.00 4575.00 0.24 74.00 3039.00 214.00 1017.76 230.00 
1988 230.00 4428.00 25.00 4683.00 0.07 75.00 3067.00 221.00 1026.93 293.00 
1989 293.00 4522.00 173.00 4988.00 0.08 74.00 3195.00 231.00 1349.92 138.00 
1990 138.00 4854.00 345.50 5337.50 0.09 76.00 3434.00 244.00 981.61 601.80 
1991 601.80 4655.00 0.32 5256.82 20.70 71.79 3365.00 247.12 1090.49 461.72 
1992 461.72 4618.00 0.62 5080.34 0.04 66.63 3002.25 616.00 1161.59 233.83 
1993 233.83 4797.90 0.65 5033.65 0.02 62.99 3118.70 640.04 1004.31 207.59 
1994 207.59 4519.30 0.89 4727.89 0.04 60.12 2937.55 602.87 910.01 217.30 
1995 217.30 4128.52 208.02 4553.84 0.07 53.85 2683.54 550.74 1076.15 189.49 
1996 189.49 4151.30 405.44 4746.23 0.02 55.48 2698.35 553.78 1180.08 258.52 
1997 258.52 4332.42 307.59 4898.53 0.02 54.52 2816.07 577.94 1130.95 319.03 
1998 319.03 3823.18 462.12 4604.33 0.17 47.08 2485.07 510.01 1079.77 482.23 
1999 482.23 4584.59 149.46 5216.28 0.08 52.84 2978.98 611.58 1334.66 238.14 
2000 238.14 4511.10 446.43 5195.67 0.25 50.21 2932.22 601.78 1421.00 190.21 
2001 190.21 4525.00 172.00 4887.21 0.04 50.00 2941.00 604.00 1115.00 177.17 
2002 177.17 4319.00 278.00 4774.17 0.07 48.00 2807.00 576.00 1107.00 236.10 
2003 236.10 4616.00 100.00 4952.10 0.09 48.00 3000.00 616.00 1077.00 211.01 
2004 211.01 5413.39 23.00 5647.40 0.17 51.00 3518.00 722.00 1165.00 191.24 
2005 191.24 5253.15 71.00 5515.39 0.12 49.00 3414.00 701.00 1147.00 204.26 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Philippines. 
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Table 2.3. Philippine Tariff Reform Programs, 1981 – 2000. 
TRP-I  Period: 1981-1985  
Objective: Export promotion  
Action: Tariff band narrowed from 10%-100% to 10%-50%;  
Outcome: Average nominal tariff fell from 42% in 1981 to 28% at the end of 
TRP-I; Reduction and evening out of effective protection rates (EPRs) with 
primary and agricultural industries receiving a low EPR of 3% and 
manufacturing industries declining from 66% to 36%.  
TRP-II  Period: 1991-1995  
Objective: Global competitiveness  
Action: Final tariff rates cluster around four levels – 3% (for raw materials and 
capital equipment not locally available), 10% (for raw materials and capital 
equipment locally available), 20% (for intermediate goods), 30% (for finished 
goods);  
Outcome: Average nominal tariff fell from 28% to 20%; Average EPR level fell 
from 25% to 19%  
TRP-III  Period: 1994-1997  
Objective: Global competitiveness  
Action: Continued with the basic 3%-10%-20%-30% tariff structure with more 
than 95% of total tariff lines dutiable at any of these four tariff levels;  
Outcome: Average nominal tariff declined from 20% to 13% 
TRP-IV  Period: 1998-2000  
Objective: Global competitiveness  
Action: Provided for a more flexible 3%-5%-7%-10%-15%-20%-25%-30% 
structure replacing the 3%-10%-20%-30% structure;  
Outcome: Average nominal tariff declined from 13% to 8% 
Source: Philippine Tariff Commission.   
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Table 2.4. Philippine schedule of tariff-rate quotas. 
Initial Quota Final Quota Products 
(Units) 
Tariff 
Item 
Numbers Quantity Tariff 
Rate (%) 
Quantity Tariff 
Rate (%) 
Implementation 
Period 
Other 
Terms and 
Conditions 
Horses 
(Heads) 
0101 57.00 30 57.00 40   
Cattle (000 
Heads) 
0102 12.20 30 20.34 40   
Live Swine 
(Heads) 
0103 2,570.00 30 2,570.00 40   
Live Goats 
(000 Heads) 
0104 49.37 30 82.29 40   
Live Poultry 
(000 Heads) 
0105 5,708.12 40 9,513.54 40   
Beef 
(000MT) 
0201 4.00 30 5.57 30   
Pork 
(000MT) 
0203 32.50 30 54.21 30   
Goat Meat 
(000MT) 
0204 0.67 30 1.12 40   
Poultry Meat 
(000MT) 
0207 14.09 50 23.49 40   
Potatoes 
(MT) 
0701 930.00 50 1,550.00 40   
Coffee (MT) 0901 5.90 50 5.90 40   
Corn or 
Maize 
(000MT) 
1005 130.16 35 216.94 35   
Rice 
(000MT) 
1006 59.73 50 119.46 50 1995-1999 NFA* 
Rice 
(000MT) 
1006 119.46 50 238.94 50 2000-2004 NFA* 
Sugar 
(000MT) 
1701 38.43 50 64.05 50 1995-2004  
*The National Food Authority (NFA) has the first right to import these TRQs in accordance with food security 
policies of the Philippines. 
Source: Schedule LXXV, WTO (1994) 
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Table 2.5. Philippines TRQ Fill-rates (in Percent), 1995 – 2003. 
Commodity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Horses 100 100 100 11 100 100 93 100 100 
Cattle 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Live Swine 95 89 0 39 100 49 84 53 7 
Live Goats 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 
Live Poultry 36 29 0 14 25 23 28 30 20 
Beef 1 52 9 100 100 0 0 33 0 
Pork 3 8 21 16 44 45 19 18 19 
Goat Meat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 42 
Poultry Meat 10 6 10 16 91 63 60 82 93 
Potatoes 15 100 2 7 38 82 95 100 100 
Coffee 100 21 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Corn (Maize) 100 100 99 100 99 99 73 100 48 
Rice 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sugar 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Average 54 58 45 50 71 63 61 69 59 
Source: WTO, 2005b.
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CHAPTER 3 - Literature Review 
This literature review is subdivided into four major sections. The first sub-section is a 
brief background on the WTO and TRQs. In this section, a brief history of how TRQs came 
about within the framework of the WTO is discussed. The second section dwells on the 
administration of TRQs. The third section focuses on TRQ implementation. The fourth section 
provides a discussion about TRQ liberalization.  
A Brief Background on the WTO and TRQs 
Before the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), agriculture was for the most part exempted from most of the disciplines set forth in the 
trade agreement. The GATT rules were ineffective in providing discipline in the key aspects of 
agricultural trade (WTO, 2004). The original GATT agreement allowed countries to use a 
number of trade-restricting measures whose use were subject to some conditions (e.g. use of 
import quotas only when it was necessary to enforce measures to effectively limit domestic 
production), exceptions and specific-country derogations like grandfather clauses, waivers and 
protocols. Many of these non-tariff border restrictions were applied without merit and any 
apparent justification such that the result was a proliferation of impediments to agricultural trade 
(WTO, 2006b). Among these measures were import bans, minimum import quotas, variable 
import levies, and use of state trading enterprises (STEs).  
In the negotiations leading up to the Uruguay Round, it became evident that there was a 
need to instigate reforms in the measures that affect world agricultural trade – market access, 
domestic support, export subsidies, and use of sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations. The UR 
negotiations on agriculture were considered difficult because of its scope and political sensitivity 
(WTO, 2006b). In fact, it took the UR several years (1986-1994) to be completed as considerable 
time was required to reach compromises on the new rules and additional technical work was 
needed in order to establish modalities to formalize commitments in key policy areas. 
When member countries ratified the GATT 1994 Agreement protocol in Marrakesh, they 
established the World Trade Organization, which came into being on January 1, 1995 (Bowen, 
Hollander and Viaene). The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 protocol was 
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supplemented with several other agreements – agriculture, textiles and clothing, rules of origin, 
safeguards, and on such issues as trade in services, sanitary and plant health measures, trade-
related aspects of intellectual property, and technical barriers to trade. It also established a new, 
more efficient and legally binding means of dispute resolution (WTO, 2006c). 
The UR Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) set off a wave of reforms in major trade-
related measures aimed at more liberalized agricultural trade that included among other things 
the lifting of import bans and the removal of quotas on agricultural imports under the so-called 
pillar of market access. The reforms under market access required that members convert their 
non-tariff measures to equivalent bound tariffs or “tariffication” plus reduction commitments on 
these bound tariffs. There are other reform measures covered by Market Access aside from 
“tariffication.” It was agreed that tariffs on agricultural products were to be reduced by an 
average of 36 per cent in the case of developed countries and 24 per cent in the case of 
developing countries. Minimum reductions for each tariff line of 10 percent were also required. 
The reductions were to be undertaken over six years in the case of developed countries and over 
ten years in the case of developing countries. Least-developed countries were not required to 
reduce their tariffs (WTO, 2006c). 
The URAA, however, did not require the conversion of the bans and quotas into tariffs 
overnight as the Agreement allowed these to be converted into tariff-rate quotas or TRQs 
(Skully, 2001a). Negotiators at the Uruguay Round essentially agreed to implement a 2-tier 
tariff-rate import quota or tariff-rate quota (TRQ) scheme as an interim transition tool to more 
liberalized agricultural trade, to increase market access, and at the same time provide protection 
to agricultural markets (Boughner and de Gorter; de Gorter; Li). Some authors were also of the 
opinion that the TRQs were institutionalized in the Uruguay Round (UR) as a compromise 
solution to the threat of closing some markets due to high most favored nation (MFN) tariffs 
resulting from the tariffication process (de Gorter and Sheldon; Matthews and Dupraz).  
The tariffication process was based on 1986-1988 prices when world agricultural prices 
were low such that member countries had considerable discretion over the conversion of non-
tariff barriers into their tariff equivalents (de Gorter and Sheldon). High levels of protection were 
perpetuated by “putting water in tariffs” and in so doing, only some tariff-rate quotas increased 
market access for imports compared to earlier levels (Mönnich, 2003a). Many of the TRQs that 
were instituted merely preserved pre-WTO agreement levels of protection (OECD). It was also 
 22 
noted that requirements for the allocation of minimum access commitments were not specified in 
the Modalities Agreement of the GATT, and so the allocation and administration of TRQs has 
become a contentious issue (Meilke, et al., 2001). 
Some authors believe that the functioning of this trade instrument is not properly 
understood and that it requires a closer look at the available literature. A starting point is to look 
at the three major facets of TRQs: administration, implementation, and liberalization. The 
following sections provide some views on the topics and provides basis for moving forward in 
the paper. 
TRQ Administration 
There are a number of administrative methods for TRQs that are permitted by the WTO. 
Among these are applied tariffs, licenses on demand, first-come first-served, auctioning, 
historical importers, state trading, producer groups and other miscellaneous categories (WTO, 
2002a and 2002b; de Gorter and Sheldon; Skully, 2001a).  
In the applied tariffs regime, no quota shares are allocated to importers and unlimited 
imports are allowed into the importing country’s territory at the in-quota tariff or lower. For 
licenses on demand, the importer’s shares are generally allocated, or licenses issued, in relation 
to quantities demanded. This is often done prior to the start of the import period before the 
physical arrival of the imports. Licenses may, however, be issued on a first-come first-serve 
basis; and in cases where the quantities demanded are higher than the quota, the allocation is pro-
rated based on the actual quota (Boughner; de Gorter and Sheldon; WTO, 2002a and 2002b). 
Under first-come first-served, no shares are allocated to importers. Imports coming in at the in-
quota tariff rate are permitted up to the quota; then the higher out-quota tariff rate is applied. The 
physical arrival of the importation determines the order and application of the appropriate tariff 
rate. In auctioning, import shares are determined through competitive bids. Historical importers 
– here importers’ shares are allocated in relation to past imports of the concerned product. 
Imports covered by state trading are allocated mainly to a state trading entity which imports or 
have direct control of imports undertaken by the importing WTO-member country. Producer 
groups import shares are allocated entirely or mainly to a producer group or association which 
imports the product concerned. Imports falling under the other miscellaneous categories do not 
fall in any of the aforementioned regimes.  
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The administrative method used by the importing country government determines to a 
large extent the level of transparency, efficiency and distribution of trade (Skully, 2001a; 
Mönnich, 2003a). There are three broad objectives of TRQ administration that are deemed 
important – 1) full utilization of the TRQ, meaning the aggregate TRQ should be fully allocated 
to willing importers and that these importers should fully use their allocation as well; 2) 
allocation of TRQs to the most efficient firms, this is to ensure that those importers receiving the 
quota are the most efficient producers in terms of net profit; and 3) an efficient TRQ operating 
system, one that is simple to operate, with clear rules for entry or participation, and one that 
minimizes uncertainty (de Gorter and Sheldon). Skully (1999a), on the other hand, elaborated on 
the rules governing TRQ administration in the GATT/WTO and argued that GATT Article XIII 
evaluates TRQ administration by two criteria: non-discrimination and quota fill. The above 
issues have been the subject reforms of the ongoing negotiations on market access and some of 
these would be discussed in the section on TRQ Liberalization. 
Mönnich (2003a) used a censored regression technique to answer the question of which 
factors determine the fill rates of TRQs. Her results showed that the coefficients for qualitative 
variables for the principal methods of quota administration were significant and had sizeable 
partial effects. Therefore, in the European Union (EU), administration matters and affects TRQ 
fill rates. Although this result was not surprising, it did not follow theoretical expectations – for 
instance, historical allocations, while it tends to limit competition, and export certification were 
found not to cause quota under fill. Of all the administration methods employed by the EU, the 
poorest performance was turned in by licenses-on-demand. It was suggested that the resulting 
reduction of uncertainty and the ability to establish stable business relationships are dominant for 
overall effect. 
Another interesting finding from Mönnich (2003a) was that the in-quota tariff and the 
wedge between domestic and import prices does not have a significant impact on TRQ fill rates 
while the out-quota and the quota limits do. It was noted that in the EU, TRQs are used primarily 
to supplement varying domestic supply, leading to varying import demand that faces an upward 
sloping supply curve. The analysis also shows the interaction of two areas where the WTO rules 
apply – i.e., domestic support and market access. 
Barichello looked at TRQ administration in Canada, where a total of 21 TRQs were 
administered for agricultural commodities. Most Canadian TRQs were allocated to private firms, 
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and its administration imposes minimal burden on importers. Canada allocates import quotas 
mostly on the basis of licenses granted to importing firms which have imported the products 
historically, while provisions are made for new entrants. Although allocating quotas to firms 
with historical market share may not be the most efficient method, Barichello noted that Canada 
has started to make progress towards transferability of quotas on a permanent basis, with quotas 
now being traded in many categories. Overall, Barichello took notice that Canada’s TRQ regime 
has been successful in maintaining transparency, and minimizing costs to importers. Additional 
gains may be made through further simplification of quota administration, and trading or renting 
of quotas within a particular year in all product categories. 
Li looked into agricultural TRQs and their impacts on market access for the period 1995 
– 2000 covering 28 WTO member countries. The findings suggest that agricultural TRQs were 
underutilized by a significant margin and no significant improvement in market access over the 
study period was observed. The econometric results of the study showed that reducing the in-
quota tariffs significantly improve market access, while the effect of reductions on the out-quota 
tariff were marginal. The results also showed that alternative administrative methods reduce 
market access in varying degrees. Such is the case when the applied tariffs method is used – this 
has the least negative impact on market access and it is determined primarily by the size of the 
tariff, the domestic demand, and the world price. This method generated the highest quota fill 
rate, emphasized the need for increased transparency in administration and implied that in order 
to increase market access in agriculture, TRQs should be converted to their tariff equivalents. 
 
TRQ Implementation 
In this section, some studies on how TRQs were implemented are presented. It should be 
noted that quite a number of papers were more of the qualitative nature that spans a myriad of 
agricultural products in a number of countries.  
There are currently over 1,400 individual tariff-rate quotas that have been specified in the 
schedules of some 45 WTO member countries (WTO, 2006a). Although these individual TRQs 
account for only a small portion of total individual tariff lines, they play an important role in 
agricultural trade protection (Burfisher; Skully, 2001c; Gibson, et. al., 2001).   
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Bureau and Tangermann examined how the European Union (EU) implemented its TRQ 
system on 87 agricultural products. They found that about 60 percent of the TRQs related to 
minimum access, while the remainder related to current access. The TRQ usually provides 
continued access on a bilateral basis for exporters who in the past have enjoyed preferential 
access to the EU. The authors noted that the EU chose to administer its TRQs in a way that 
neither discouraged imports nor improved economic efficiency. The most common methods of 
TRQ administration were licenses on demand, historical allocation, and first-come first-served 
basis. It was noted that fill rates have been quite high for most TRQs, and there was no evidence 
that the EU managed TRQs in such a way as to discourage market access. The TRQ system 
accounted for most of the increased access to the EU market after the URAA. Bureau and 
Tangermann concluded that in terms of further trade liberalization, increasing quota volumes in 
the EU would likely result in more gains than reductions in tariffs. 
In the U.S. there are some 57 TRQs covering 7 product categories that have been notified 
to the WTO. These TRQs include beef (1), canesugar (1) and sugar containing products (11), 
tobacco (1), peanuts (2) and peanut butter (1), green olives (4) and satsumas in airtight 
containers, cotton (7), and dairy products (25). Skully (2001b) investigated the TRQs covering 
sugar, peanuts, and cotton, while Coleman and Boughner examined TRQs for dairy products. 
The TRQs for these products originated from quotas that were designed to maintain U.S. 
domestic price support programs. Most of these TRQs were allocated based on the basis of 
historical market share, and once allocated, were unlikely to be redistributed in accordance with 
changing comparative advantage. Coleman and Boughner noted that the U.S. dairy TRQ regime 
was highly effective in limiting imports of dairy products during the period of 1995 – 1999. In 
general, this was due to prohibitive out-of quota tariff rates, coupled with complicated and costly 
TRQ administration procedures that made it virtually impossible for ‘new’ trade to occur on 
either side of the market. The administration of U.S. dairy TRQs has proven to be extremely 
complicated, burdensome, and non-transparent.  
Abbott and Morse (2001 and 2004) assessed the implementation of tariff rate quotas in 14 
developing countries. Their assessment was based on their examination of GATT offers and 
required reports to WTO by those 14 developing countries. Those reports on implementation 
mechanisms and quota fulfillment were compared to trends in actual imports – revealing only a 
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few cases where this instrument acts like a binding quota and generates rents. Where institutions 
exist to allocate rents, they generally seek to distribute those rents to domestic agents.  
GATT tariff bindings and applied tariffs were also compared in light of declared 
implementation mechanisms for TRQs. Abbott and Morse (2001 and 2004) observed that applied 
tariffs are often low, and in many cases most favored nation (MFN) applied tariffs were below 
commitments for in-quota tariffs. This evidence reveals that in many cases, the concept of dirty 
tariffication is relevant to understanding market outcomes, and that it is pursued for policy 
flexibility of governments and not for increased protection of their agricultural sectors. Dirty 
tariffication works in a number of ways – it could possibly moderate the effects of TRQs on 
trade liberalization when the 2nd tier tariff is redundant or it can be used on the tariffs of less 
sensitive commodities in meeting tariff reduction commitments. Boughner and de Gorter defined 
dirty tariffication as the “purposeful manipulation of domestic consumption calculations in 
setting the CA and MAC.” The computation of current access or CA and minimum access or 
MAC is covered by the Modalities Agreement in the GATT-UR but there are some ambiguities 
in some areas such that countries were given wide latitude for implementation. 
Trade data for the developing countries that report using TRQs suggest substantial 
liberalization of trade and in many instances acceleration of imports beyond historical trends 
were noted. However, the Abbott and Morse (2001 and 2004) cautioned that it would be a 
mistake to credit this expansion of trade solely on the TRQ mechanism since in most cases where 
imports were growing the TRQ was operating more like a pure tariff than a true TRQ. In other 
cases, government commitments to meet GATT obligations have led to increased imports. 
Fill rates for market access commitments of developing countries were low in some 
cases, but not because complex institutions have emerged to maintain protection. Low demand 
elasticities for these commodities and high transportation costs to what may be unattractive 
markets means under-fill of the TRQ was more likely even when formerly closed trade regimes 
were substantially reformed. Overfill was as common as under-fill as well and reflects the extent 
of liberalization achieved. 
Abbott and Morse (2001 and 2004) noted that serious problems can arise when 
developing countries face a TRQ system for their exports. Implementation mechanisms have the 
effect of limiting export potential, discouraging investment for export expansion, necessitating 
the expansion of state trading enterprises to negotiate with importing country agents, and 
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encouraging complex domestic agricultural policy to share rents among stakeholders and interest 
groups. It can also turn a country into an exporter of a commodity for which it has no 
comparative advantage when a preferential trade arrangement is in force. 
The potential problems most often identified with TRQs – high transactions and 
administrative costs that prevent the actual liberalization of agricultural markets and the regime 
of rent seeking in trade policy – were expected to increase in the future unless the next Trade 
Round reforms (or better still eliminates) this market access instrument. Abbott and Morse (2001 
and 2004) concluded that the reduction of MFN tariffs and the elimination of non-tariff barriers 
to trade would be a far more effective way to liberalize markets than through the expansion of 
minimum access commitments or reductions of in-quota tariffs for a few privileged exporters. 
Choi and Sumner reviewed the implementation of TRQs in Korea and Japan and 
suggested that TRQs for all agricultural imports were established following the URAA, 
specifically on 67 tariff lines for Korea and 19 tariff lines in the case of Japan. Korea administers 
its TRQ through licenses on demand, first-come first-served, auctioning, and through STEs, 
while Japan uses both licenses and STEs. The state trading enterprises in these two countries 
have the highest fill rates. Choi and Sumner noted that access for some commodities, such as 
rice, were less open than would have been the case if quota amounts were made available on a 
commercial basis. As a result, they conclude that consumer benefits were reduced, and allocation 
across import suppliers has been affected. 
TRQ Liberalization 
Tariffs and import quotas have the effect of raising the domestic price of a product to the 
consumer and form a wedge between the domestic price and the world price. Tariffs generally 
raise revenues for the importing country’s government while an import quota generates quota 
rents for the importer and/or the exporter (Grimwade). Countries apply tariffs primarily to 
protect domestic industries by imposing a cost on all products that cross a border, thus raising 
prices within the country that imposes the tariff. Higher prices in turn affect supplies as farmers 
respond by increasing output and this eventually affect demand as consumers buy less due to 
higher prices (Gibson, et.al., 2001).  
There are several combinations of tariffs and import quotas that can arise, and based upon 
their attributes, the policy instrument can be classified as either effective or redundant. A policy 
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instrument can be considered effective when it directly determines the level of the domestic and 
world prices and is redundant when the domestic market price is determined by one of the other 
two instruments. Only one policy instrument, the import quota or one of the two tariffs can be 
effective at a time, rendering the other two as redundant. TRQs have inherent characteristics of 
both quantitative restrictions (QRs) and tariffs, either one of which can prevail depending on the 
particular market setting (Herrmann, Kramb, and Mönnich). Tariff rate quotas, or TRQs, were 
intended to serve two purposes – first, to ensure that there is no deterioration of market access or 
that pre-existing market access opportunities are preserved and second, to create new, minimum 
market access (Abbott and Paarlberg; de Gorter and Sheldon; Hathaway).  
Boughner looked into the implications of implementing the TRQ on the United States 
dairy industry. A trade policy model of the US dairy industry was developed in this study to 
analyze the economics of a TRQ scheme. The effects of the quota and each tariff line were 
isolated to show the implications of each policy instrument under different trade policy 
liberalization schemes. The empirical results of the study showed that reducing the second tier 
(or out-quota) tariff had a greater impact on increasing market access than increases in the quota 
levels. 
Mielke, et. al., (2001) and Abbott noted that the liberalization of a TRQ can involve 
changes in any combination of the three components: the amount of the quota, in-quota tariff 
and/or out-quota tariff. Any change in market access depends on which of the three elements is 
currently constraining imports and how much each is changed. Abbott noted that the only 
liberalization approach with any hope in achieving the long run goals of tariffication is the 
outright reduction of the MFN tariffs over time. Not only would the process determine the 
marginal suppliers, but the liberalization effects would be felt more widely in the economy and it 
has the potential to lead to more open markets in the long run. 
Elbehri, et. al., (2000) examined the consequences of liberalizing the sugar TRQ import 
regime using an applied general equilibrium model that explicitly accounted for the mechanisms 
of the TRQ. A striking feature of the model used was the bilateral treatment of the TRQs and the 
readjustment of the quota rents between importers and exporters. The latter feature is critical 
because in the sugar sector, many quota-holding exporters also benefit from preferential access 
to the US market and they capture the associated economic rents that result from the much higher 
domestic prices compared to domestic prices. They considered three sets of policy experiments – 
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1) US sugar TRQ liberalization only; 2) EU sugar liberalization only; and 3) multilateral sugar 
trade liberalization with or without the TRQ regime. The US TRQ sugar liberalization was 
analyzed for three cases: a) out-quota tariff reduction of one-third; b) TRQ quota expansion by 
one-third; and c) a combination of both. The same cases were also used for the EU TRQ sugar 
liberalization. 
The results showed that reducing the US out-quota tariff by one-third would result in net 
welfare gain for the US, but a net income loss for exporting countries because of the erosion of 
quota rents become larger than the gains from expanded exports. The analysis showed that in the 
case of sugar TRQs, the welfare implications of partial trade liberalization are determined by the 
interplay of economic rents and the changes in the volume of trade. If the US expands its quotas 
by one-third, net welfare gains would be realized by the quota-holding exporters while the US 
shows a net income loss from reduced tariff revenues. The results of the combined reduction in 
out-quota tariffs and quota expansion resulted in welfare gains for both the US and exporting 
countries. The same results were noted for the EU unilateral sugar liberalization exercise. 
However, since the EU is the biggest player in world sugar trade and it is a significant producer 
as well, the impact on world sugar trade and regional welfare was larger when compared with 
liberalization of the US sugar sector itself. The authors noted that their results highlight the 
complexity of the TRQ mechanism and that the modalities in reforming the TRQs can be critical 
in determining the distribution of gains from trade liberalization between exporters and 
importers. 
Gao, Fox and Li investigated the effects of liberalizing the Japanese rice market by 
increasing the quota level and decreasing the out-quota tariffs. Results from the study shows that 
even a small decrease in the out-quota tariff (i.e. 0.33%) or a small increase in the quota level 
will make the other policy instrument ineffective and have the effect of opening up Japan’s rice 
market. Since Japanese and world rice supply are inelastic, the liberalization of Japan’s rice 
market will have substantial impact on the world rice market. A 10% change in Japan‘s rice 
import quota or in the out-quota tariff will cause a 30% increase in world rice prices and a 
decrease in tariff of more than 0.33% will have more impact than any increase in quota. 
Liberalization would benefit Japanese consumers and rice exporters to Japan, with lower 
domestic prices and higher world rice prices. Full liberalization (free trade conditions) would 
increase the net welfare of Japanese economy by 120.8 billion yen or $0.97 billion. Most of the 
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rent and revenues are collected by the Japanese food agency and these may be used to 
compensate rice farmers affected by liberalization. 
The WTO Secretariat provided a compilation of the different proposals from WTO-
member countries for reforming the TRQ system (WTO, 2004). Most of these papers contained 
the objectives and proposals of each, also the concerns of the Member countries. The United 
States, for example, proposed that all tariff-rate quotas should be subjected to “substantial 
increases through progressive implementation of annual commitments over a fixed period” and 
that “disciplines to improve the functioning of TRQs, including specific mechanisms that trigger 
when tariff rate quota fill remains below a fixed level” should be established (WTO, 2000b). The 
ASEAN proposal called for a clarification of the continuation of TRQs, and if this is so, non-
discriminatory allocation and administration of tariff quotas must be ensured (WTO, 2000c). The 
Cairns Group proposal was of a similar nature with the US and they called for “substantial tariff 
quota volume expansion consistent with the levels which would have been required if the 
Uruguay Round reform process had continued at the same pace” (WTO, 2000d). The European 
Community has proposed that a set of rules and disciplines should be defined to increase the 
transparency, the reliability and the security of the management of TRQs such that the 
concessions granted result in real trade opportunities (WTO, 2000e). A group of 12 developing 
countries jointly called upon developed countries to enhance market access, simplify the 
administration of their TRQs, and promote greater transparency and equitability (WTO, 2000f).  
Mönnich (2003a) provided some approaches to liberalizing TRQs that would result in 
greater market access or eventual trade liberalization in agriculture. It was emphasized that 
reforming the present TRQ system is high on the WTO agenda and that there are numerous 
proposals on how to do it. The reforms in the TRQ system can be achieved by instituting changes 
in the components of a TRQ: 1) reductions in the out-quota tariffs; 2) increases in the quota 
levels and country-specific allocations; and 3) reductions in the in-quota tariffs. The other areas 
include: 4) the eventual phase-out of TRQs; and 5) TRQ administration – more transparency, 
predictability and abstention from rules that restrict market access. While there are merits 
associated with reform in each one, Mönnich provided some ideas by which to proceed – e.g. the 
choice of the right instrument, quota administration, transparency, eventual phase out, and the 
impact of these on developing countries.  
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The following chapter provides a detailed discussion of the conceptual model used in this 
study, the data used and the simulations or policy experiments that were carried out. 
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CHAPTER 4 - The Conceptual Model 
 In this chapter, the conceptual model of a TRQ is defined and developed. A graphical 
description of a TRQ is also developed. Recall from above that there are three main components 
of a TRQ: 1) the lower first-tier or the in-quota tariff; 2) the higher second-tier or the out-of-
quota tariff; and 3) the quota that sets the limit up to which quantity the lower in-quota is 
applied. During a given period, the lower in-quota tariff is applied to imports up to the last unit 
of the quota and then the higher out-of-quota tariff is applied to all subsequent imports. These 
three characteristics alter the export supply function and determine, together with the import 
demand function, whether the quota is binding, i.e., whether the main economic effect of the 
TRQ is that of a quantitative restriction or QR (Herrmann, Kramb, and Mönnich).  
A Graphical Description of a TRQ 
Figure 4.1 panel (a) represents the domestic market of an importing country. In this 
representation, the domestic supply S(pd) and demand D(pd) are shown, where pe
d is the 
equilibrium domestic price. An autarky price pa determines the vertical intercept of the importing 
country’s excess demand curve (ED) which we find in panel (b) represented by the world 
market. The excess demand curve ED is defined as {D(pd) – S(pd)}.  
The effect of a tariff rate quota on the excess supply curve faced by a small importing 
country is illustrated in panel (b).6 A series of excess supply curves are shown in panel (b), 
where ESo
f is the relevant excess supply curve if no tariff were applied by the importing country 
(free trade condition), ESti is the excess supply curve with the in-quota tariff (ti), and ESto is the 
excess supply curve with the out-quota tariff (to). Both tariffs (ti and to) are considered to be ad 
valorem. The result of the two-tiered tariff imposed by the importing country is a discontinuity or 
a kink between ESti and ESto, in the excess supply curve at the quantity Qmin. The height of this 
segment is determined by the difference between the in-quota (ti) and out-quota tariffs (to) at a 
                                                 
6 In a large country case, an upward sloping supply function can be assumed. In the small open-economy 
case, the supply is assumed to be totally elastic since the demand of a small country is small compared to world 
supply, hence the step-up shape of the supply curve (Monnich, 2003a).   
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given level of market access (Morath and Sheldon; Monnich, 2003a). Altogether, the effective 
excess supply curve with a TRQ is the bold broken line in panel (b) – the combination of ESti for 
import levels below the minimum access quantity Qmin, and by ES
to for import levels above the 
minimum access levels.  
Economics of Tariff Rate Quotas 
As discussed above and earlier, TRQs have three main components – the in-quota (or 
first-tier) tariff (ti), the quota (or minimum access quantity) Qmin, and the out-quota (or second-
tier) tariff (to). Depending on how these three parameters behave in relation to import demand 
and supply, three fundamentally different outcomes are likely to transpire (Monnich, 2003a). 
Either one of the following would be binding – the in-quota tariff or the quota or the out-quota 
tariff. In simple terms, either one of these parameters would determine the market equilibrium 
while the other two becomes redundant. The alternative tariff rate quota equilibrium conditions 
are discussed in the following section and are shown in Figure 4.2. 
When the Quota is Binding 
When the observed Qmin lies between the minimum and maximum level of imports, it is 
assumed that the TRQs have fill rates of 100 percent, and the common conclusion is that the 
quota is binding (Monnich, 2003a). As illustrated in Figure 4.2, shown with the excess demand 
curve ED1, it intersects the excess supply curve in the inelastic (or discontinuous) portion of the 
kinked supply curve. Under these conditions, the out-quota tariff is deemed prohibitive to allow 
imports, with quantity at the level of the minimum access Qmin (at this point, let Qmin=q1), 
identical to a pure quota (Hermann, Kramb and Monnich). The economic conditions in the 
importing country can cause the excess demand curve to shift up or down over the entire range 
of the vertical segment of the excess supply curve, depending on the size of the over-quota tariff 
without affecting imports or the world price (Meilke and Lariviere). It follows that the domestic 
price p1
d would adjust to a level between p2
d = pw*(1+ti) and p3
d = pw*(1+to) (Morath and 
Sheldon). 
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When the In-quota Tariff is Binding 
In the case when the in-quota tariff is binding, ED2 intersects ES
ti which is below the 
minimum access level Qmin, so that there is a partial fill of the TRQ at q2. The equilibrium 
domestic price, inclusive of the tariff ti is p2
d, i.e. p2
d = pw*(1+ti), such that the in-quota tariff rate 
is binding. In some situations where the in-quota tariff is zero, the domestic price is equal to the 
world price, p2
d = pw. Under this scenario the tariff rate quota is not trade distorting (Meilke and 
Lariviere). 
When the Out-quota Tariff is Binding 
When the out-quota tariff is binding, the excess demand curve ED3 intersects ES
to
, and 
the quantity imported, q3 is larger than Qmin (or q1) – i.e., there are out-quota imports and the 
equilibrium price, inclusive of the out-quota tariff to is p3
d, i.e. p3
d = pw*(1+to). 
A fourth condition discussed by Morath and Sheldon is the case where the excess demand 
curve, say ED4, does not intersect the excess supply at all. The price at autarky p
a = p4
d is lower 
than the border price inclusive of the in-quota tariff. There are no imports in this case and hence, 
there is zero fill of the TRQ. 
The Theoretical Model 
The TRQ regime can be analyzed using the basic excess supply-demand curves under 
different market conditions. We use a simple trade model for a small importing country adapted 
from Abbott and Paarlberg and Skully (2001c). Recall from earlier that a tariff rate quota regime 
has three components: First, there is the quota (Qmin), which is the minimum access commitment 
in the URAA. There is the “low” (in-quota) tariff (ti) that the country levies on import quantities 
below that quota, and there is the above quota “higher” (out-quota) tariff (to) that apply to 
quantities imported above the minimum access commitment (Qmin) or the quota.
7 Both tariffs are 
treated as ad valorem tariffs, and depending on supply and demand in the domestic market, 
imports may be at, above or below Qmin. 
The mathematical model to analyze the economic impacts of this trade regime is set up 
using linear supply (S) and demand (D) functions: 
(1.1) S = S0 + [Esp* S0 /Pd0(Pd - Pd0)] + GsS0T    
                                                 
7 In the Philippines, this is called the minimum access volume (MAV). 
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(1.2)  D = D0(1+Gn)
T
*[1- Edp*(Pd - Pd0)/Pd0 + Edy*(1+Gy)
T
-1] 
where Pd is the domestic price, Esp and Edp are the domestic supply and demand 
elasticities. Dynamic forces are introduced in Equations (1.1) and (1.2) and these include growth 
rate in supply (Gs), growth rate in population (Gn), growth rate in per capita income (Gy), and a 
time index (T). It is necessary to establish a benchmark for this model by estimating the initial 
equilibrium (S0, D0 and Pd0) for equations (1.1) and (1.2). 
Imports (M) are the difference between the demand and supply at the market equilibrium 
price: 
(2.1) M = D – S        
From (2.1) a net import demand function may be specified:  
(2.2) M(Pd) = D(Pd) – S (Pd) 
The border price (Pb) is calculated based on a fixed world price (Pw), the exchange rate 
(ε), and any tariff (t): 
(3.0) Pb = ε* Pw(1 + t) 
The Philippines is a “small nation” in most agricultural markets in the world – that is, it is 
unable to affect the prices of goods in world markets, hence world prices can be assumed as 
exogenous. We assume that initial total quantity demanded and supplied are equal and prices are 
set competitively with zero transactions costs among markets. 
Depending on the policy regime in place, we can solve for market equilibrium prices. In 
the case of a policy of quantitative restriction, imports equal the quota level (Qmin), and the 
domestic price is equal to domestic supply plus imports.  
(4.0)  M = Qmin = D(Pd) – S(Pd)      
Equation (4.0) occurs when net import demand intersects excess supply at Qmin. The 
equilibrium domestic price, Pd, adjusts to a price level determined between one that is subject to 
the lower in-quota tariff (i.e., p2
d = ε*pw*(1+ti)) and one subject to the higher out-quota tariff 
(i.e., p3
d = ε* pw*(1+to)). A quota rent (R), shown in equation (5.0) below, accrues if the quota is 
binding and as long as the domestic price is higher than the border price: 
(5.0) R = Pd – Pb = Pd – ε* Pw(1 + t); Pd > Pb    
In a quota regime, the rent is computed as the difference between the domestic and border 
price. In a mixed policy regime, such as the TRQ, part of the potential rent is captured as tariff 
revenue by the government of the importing country. It is assumed that the quota rent accrue to 
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importing trading companies or exporting country firms. Skully (1999a) noted that in practice, 
who gets the rents depends on the quota allocation mechanism in place. As long as a rent is 
generated under a TRQ, some allocation mechanism will exist (either implicitly or explicitly). 
Static impacts 
In this section, the static impacts of tariff-rate quotas are discussed under the three 
different cases under the TRQ regime (Figure 4.3) The first case is when imports are equal to the 
minimum access commitment, the TRQ behaves like a pure quota and a per unit quota rent (R) is 
earned: 
(6.0) TRQ = D(Pd) – S(Pd); R = Pd – Pb    
The government of the importing country collects a tariff revenue, tir = ti×Qmin that in 
effect reduces the rent (Figure 4.3 (a)). A rent is derived if Pb = ε* Pw(1+t
i
) < Pd for imports at 
the QR. The TRQ is similar to the case where a tariff is levied in addition to a quota and it allows 
the government of the importing country to appropriate some of the rent through the 
administration of the TRQ itself. 
The second case occurs when imports are less than the minimum access commitment the, 
in-quota tariff (ti) is the effective policy instrument: 
(7.0) Pd = Pb = ε* Pw(1 + t
i
); M = D(Pd) – S(Pd) < Qmin  
Equation (7.0) applies when the excess demand intersects the excess supply curve to the 
left (the quota or total imports are less than the minimum access). In this case, the TRQ 
mechanism allocates all of the rents to the importing country's government as tariff revenue and 
the TRQ acts like a pure tariff (Figure 4.3 (b)). 
In the third case, imports exceed the minimum access (Qmin) level, the higher out-quota 
tariff (to) is applied and it occurs when ED intersects the excess supply function (Figure 4.3 (c)). 
The rent in this case is the difference between the equilibrium domestic price and the price with 
in-quota tariffs (i.e. world price plus the lower in-quota tariff (ti)). The rent is only earned on 
below quota imports: 
(8.0) Pd = ε* Pw(1 +t
o
); M = D(Pd) – S(Pd); R = Pd – ε* Pw(1 + t
i
)   
The importing country government earns tariff revenues on quantities below the quota 
(ti×QR) and from import quantities above the quota (to×(M−QR)). Therefore total rent paid 
R×Qmin = (Pd− ε* Pw(1+ t
i
))×QR, since the rent only accrues to the below-quota imports (or to 
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whomever has the rights to bring in the minimum access commitment). The equilibrium 
domestic market price associated with the above quota imports is Pd = ε* Pw(1 + t
o
). Abbott and 
Paarlberg observed that the TRQ allows for larger imports than does a pure quota, but there is a 
rent to firms because the tariff revenue does not obtain the full value of the rent arising from the 
intervention. In rapidly growing markets, this rent can become quite small, but will not 
disappear, requiring whatever institution which allocates that rent to remain (Abbott and 
Paarlberg). 
Skully (1999a) noted further that if a particular TRQ is in fact a quota, rents would 
typically accrue, and since the underlying cause of these rents is from supply rationing, the 
problem that arises is how the resulting excess demand is to be administered.   
Consumer, Producer and Net Surpluses 
Government-imposed policies have a way of affecting prices such that the quantities 
supplied by producers and demanded consumers or firms change. In general, producers would 
not be willing to supply as much of a good at lower prices and consumers or firms would want to 
buy more goods at lower prices. By understanding how, and in what direction, government 
interventions such as trade policy (tariff protection) make different domestic agents better off or 
worse off, we are able to appreciate the motives for different groups to favor or oppose such 
interventions. For us to be able to answer these questions, we need a way to measure the gains 
and losses from government interventions and the changes in market prices and quantities that 
such intervention causes.  
The method that we use is to calculate the changes in consumer and producer surplus that 
result from the government intervention. Consumer surplus measures the welfare that consumers 
derive from their consumption of goods and services, or the benefits that they derive from the 
exchange of goods in a competitive market (Pindyck and Rubinfeld). Consumer surplus is the 
difference between what consumers are willing to pay for a good or service (as indicated by the 
position of the demand curve) and what they actually pay (the market price). In graphical terms, 
the level of consumer surplus is shown by the area under the demand curve and above the ruling 
market price. Producer surplus is the net benefit or difference between the amount that producers 
actually receive and the minimum amount that they would have to receive in order to supply the 
given level of output (Pindyck and Rubinfeld). On a graph, producer surplus can be shown as the 
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area above the supply curve and below the prevailing market price. Panel (a) of Figure 4.4 
illustrates the domestic market with the corresponding areas for consumer and producer surplus. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates some of the important effects of trade policy on production, 
consumption and price. In panel (a), under autarky or absence of trade, the price of say corn in 
the Philippines is at Pa while in the rest of the world, the price is Pw, and quantity supplied is 
equal to qe.  The price difference provides an incentive for trade to proceed, such that when it 
does occur, demand and supply between each country or region interact to determine the world 
price of corn and the quantities produced, consumed, and traded. In this illustration, the world 
price of corn would be traded at Pw, mf would be exported from the rest of the world (see panel 
(b)), and df – qf quantities of corn would be imported by the Philippines. Using these parameters, 
the domestic supply, demand and export supply for the rest of the world can be estimated and 
from there consumer, producer and net surpluses can be computed under different trade policy 
scenarios.  
Starting from a condition of no trade (autarky), consumer surplus is equal to that of area 
‘c’, and producer surplus is represented by areas ‘a’ + ‘e’. Under free trade, consumers in the 
Philippines generate surpluses equal to the areas ‘a’ + ‘b’ + ‘c’ + ‘d’ (for a net gain of ‘a’ + ‘b’ + 
‘d’), while producer surplus decline to that of area labeled as ‘e’ (or a loss of ‘a’). As a whole 
(producers and consumers combined) under no trade the surplus is equal to area ‘a’ + ‘c’ + ‘e’, 
with trade the surplus is ‘a’ + ‘b’ + ‘c’ + ‘d’ + ‘e’, and the net effect is equal to ‘b’ + ‘d’ (Figure 
4.4). To operationalize the computation of these surpluses, we consider the assumptions 
discussed in the next paragraphs. 
It is reasonable to assume linear relationships between supply- demand quantities and 
prices at the equilibrium point. Alston, Norton and Pardey noted that using linear supply-and-
demand curves make it simpler and easier to calculate the geometric areas of surplus using linear 
algebra. These authors have pointed out flaws in the use of linear curves (e.g., when the function 
is inelastic at the supply-demand equilibrium, if one were to extrapolate back to the origin, the 
intercept at the price axis would be negative and thus imply that positive quantities would be 
supplied even at negative prices). They also pointed out that other types of functional forms (e.g., 
supply and demand curves of constant elasticity and the constant elasticity form with positive 
intercept) have issues as well. The implications of choosing a linear form versus the other forms 
 39 
depend on the approximating formula being used. Accordingly, what is important is that the 
functional form chosen is an adequate approximation for the purpose. 
In this study, we consider that the domestic demand Yd, domestic supply Ys, for corn in 
the Philippines and world excess supply Yes are linear functions of domestic price Pd and world 
price Pw in the form: 
(9.0)   Domestic Demand  Yd   = a + b*Pd 
(10.0) Domestic Supply  Ys   = c + d*Pd 
(11.0) World Excess Supply:  Yes  = e +  f*Pw 
Given that the price elasticities of these functions are ηd, εs, and εes, respectively, the 
parameters in the domestic demand, domestic supply and world excess supply functions can be 
solved as:   
* ,= =
d
d d d
d
Y
b η a Y - b * P
P
, where dY is domestic demand and dP is domestic 
price; 
* ,= =
s
s s d
d
Y
d ε c Y - d * P
P
, where is sY is domestic supply (or production) and 
dP is domestic price;  
* ,= =
im
es im w
w
Y
f ε e Y - f * P
P
, where is imY is the volume of Philippine corn 
imports and wP is the world price; and  
Yim = (a + c) + (b – d) * Pd is the Philippine corn excess demand function (the difference 
between domestic demand and supply).  
From these equations, using algebra, we can solve for the domestic price and market 
clearing quantities necessary for computing changes in the consumer and producer surplus. Net 
surplus is computed as the sum of the changes in the consumer and producer surplus. A positive 
net surplus implies that the change is welfare enhancing and a negative net surplus means that 
society’s welfare has declined. 
Data Requirements 
The basic data requirements for the models used in the study are presented in Table 4.1. 
The data used in this study are distinguished between real data and simulated data. The real data 
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come from official or published sources and the simulated data are those that have undergone 
calculations using the real data and the equations found in the detailed model structure. Most of 
the information needed is readily available over the internet.  
The real data used in the study are the base year supply, use, and price data are for the 
years 1994 and 2003 – the year before the TRQs were institutionalized and two years before the 
final implementation of the URAA, respectively. Most of the real data were collected from the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation’s FAOSTAT website. FAOSTAT 
website provides time series and cross sectional data relating to food and agriculture for 200 
countries and more than 200 primary products and inputs. Information on the volume and value 
of traded goods were collected from the United Nations AMAD – Agricultural Market Access 
Database. The AMAD is the result of a cooperative effort by Agriculture and AgriFood Canada, 
EU Commission - Agriculture Directorate-General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The 
World Bank (WB), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United 
States Department of Agriculture - Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS). Additional data 
on prices, supply-demand, imports and consumption were collected from the Philippine Bureau 
of Agricultural Statistics (BAS). 
Information on tariffs and quotas were taken from the Philippines GATT offer – i.e., 
Schedule LXXV of the GATT 1994 (WTO, 1994) and from the reports on the Philippine’s Trade 
Policy Review made by the WTO Secretariat (WTO, 2002a). The annual quota volumes used in 
the simulation model came from the various notification reports of the Philippines to the WTO 
Secretariat (WTO, 1996b, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2002d, 2005a, and 2006d).  
A number of income and demand elasticities that may be used in the domestic demand 
equations were collected from several studies on food demand in the Philippines (Quisumbing 
1986a and 1986b; Ingco, 1991; David, 1993; Bouis, 1982 and 1991). A summary of the reported 
demand elasticities from the cited studies can be found in Table 4.2. Ingco (1991) evaluated food 
demand in the Philippines from 1965-1990 using the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) model. 
The demand system consisted of rice, corn, wheat, fish, meat, fruits and vegetables and the 
income elasticities of demand, and the individual demand and cross-price elasticities for each 
commodity were computed in the paper.  
 41 
Bouis (1982 and 1991) provided some estimates of elasticities for income and demand in 
two studies, one looking at cereals and the other looking at corn in relation to food and livestock 
demand in urban and rural areas at different income quartiles. The study by Quisumbing (1986b) 
looked at food demand in relation to nutrition and government intervention. Demand and income 
elasticities in Quisumbing (1986b) were computed for different income quartiles as well for 
several food items aside from corn. 
The choice of which demand elasticity to use in the model depends on two factors: first 
whether the sign (positive or negative) conforms to economic theory, and second, whether the 
elasticity is relatively elastic or inelastic. The correct sign is important because it is expected that 
for a normal good, the own-price elasticity of demand would be negative – i.e., as we increase 
the price, the demand for the good declines. It is assumed that corn is a normal good and the 
expected own-price demand elasticity is negative. In general, the expected elasticity for a staple 
or food item is that it is relatively inelastic (0 < η < 1), this is because people need food so that 
for even relatively large changes in its price, the quantity demanded will not significantly 
change. It is also worth noting that in most economics literature the minus sign is often omitted 
and the elasticity is given as an absolute value or positive value (Case and Fair; McEachern). 
There was no readily available up-to-date supply price elasticity for corn in the 
Philippines. A supply price elasticity of 0.2 was used in the model. The supply price elasticity 
can be computed using a simple log-linear regression of domestic price and supply using recent 
data from FAOSTAT, but the results show it to be negative. Askari and Cummings conducted a 
survey of agricultural supply response and they reported a supply price elasticity of negative to 
0.6 for corn in the Philippines from a study by Mangahas, Recto and Ruttan. Shonkwiler and 
Maddala reported a supply elasticity of 0.392 for the US corn market..  
Most of the Philippine’s imports of corn are supplied from the United States and we use 
its own-price supply elasticity as a proxy for export supply price elasticity. Westcott (1998) 
investigated how the US corn sector responded to shocks with changes in the policy setting for 
supply management/planting flexibility and stock policies. The demand adjustments in the study 
were made on the basis of assumed elasticities of -0.30 for feed demand, -0.40 for exports, -0.10 
for food, seed, and industrial use and the supply response was based on an assumed elasticity of 
0.20. In another study cited by Westcott (1997) the estimated corn supply elasticity for the US 
North Central region ranged from a lower bound of 0.27 and an upper bound of 0.47. Westcott 
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also cited Adams’ estimate of the supply elasticity for the same region of 0.37 for the period 
1986-1990. The estimates made by Adams placed the full US corn sector’s supply elasticity 
increased from 0.21 to 0.41 for the period 1986 – 1990. Assuming that changes in regional 
supply elasticities apply at the national level, these increments imply that total US corn supply 
elasticity start from 0.20 to a range of 0.30 to 0.40 (Westcott, 1998). 
The exchange rate – i.e., Philippine pesos per US dollar were collected from the Central 
Bank of the Philippines website (BSP). Information on population growth rate and growth in per 
capita income were also collected from that website. Other sources of social and economic 
statistics for the Philippines are the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) and the 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). The population data came from the PIDS 
and the per capita income data came from the NSCB. 
It is important to keep in mind that there are some simulated data that are used in the 
study to compute for some parameters. These simulated data are the supply, demand, imports, 
and prices generated by the model from 2003 – 2010. These are used in computing for the 
consumer, producer, and net surpluses in the study. 
Description of the Simulation Models 
In what follows, a number of scenarios will be analyzed on the implementation of TRQs 
in the Philippines. The initial procedure was to establish benchmark or baseline figures that can 
be used to compare results from the different policy experiments that would be conducted in the 
study. Several simulations or policy experiments are then conducted wherein the three 
components of the TRQ are altered, individually or in combination, to mimic TRQ liberalization 
scenarios. These are performed to look at the impact of these components on government 
revenues, consumer, producer and net surplus, and quota rents. The models are discussed in 
detail in the following paragraphs. 
The base model of the TRQ 
A ‘base run model’ of the present TRQ was specified to simulate the impact of TRQ 
implementation for the years 1995 - 2004. The purpose of running the ‘base run model’ was to 
see if the model can capture or would mimic actual events that happened during the period. It 
was carried out using 1994 – 2004 data of the actual quota, in-quota and out-quota tariffs and the 
growth rates in population, and income. The specific data used in the model are presented in 
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Table 4.1. The ‘base run model’ computed for the supply, demand, imports and domestic prices 
for a ten-year period representing the years 1995-2004.  
For the ‘base run model’ of the TRQ – imports are allowed, and tariffs – both the in-
quota and out-quota tariffs are applied. Year by year changes in the out-quota and in-quota tariffs 
and in the quota volumes were simulated by changing the pertinent parameter to recreate the 
regime for a TRQ in a particular year. For example, in the first year, the ‘base run model’ is 
provided with the initial TRQ volume, and in-quota and out-quota tariff rates; these are changed 
for each year of simulation to include the changes in the quota and in the out-quota tariffs. Under 
the present TRQ system, the in-quota tariff rate was fixed at 35%. The model is basically driven 
by the demand and income elasticities, and the growth rates established for supply, income and 
population. The model can also be modified to see the impact of movements in world prices and 
supply. These can be simulated through the standard deviation on world prices and supply, and 
introduced as stochastic terms in the supply – demand equations.  
Equations (1.0) to (8.0) make up the simulation model used in this study. The 
simultaneous equation model was set up in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) to 
determine domestic prices, supply and demand, and imports over a period of ten years (1995-
2004) corresponding to the period wherein the TRQs were implemented. The model computes 
for the domestic supply and demand, the market equilibrium price, border price, and the per 
quota unit rent (i.e., market equilibrium price minus the border price) for each year. Each year is 
simulated by changing the year index of the model in Equations (1.1) and (1.2). The level of 
imports is determined using Equation (2.0) and the border price is computed with Equation (3.0) 
based on the small importing country assumption. The corresponding domestic equilibrium price 
is computed depending upon the regime in effect. Recall that there are three cases to consider in 
a TRQ – when imports equal the quota (the quota is binding) use Equation (6); when imports are 
less than the quota (the in-quota tariff is binding) use Equation (7); and when imports are greater 
than the quota (the out-quota tariff is binding) use Equation (8). 
The Simulation/Policy Experiment Models 
After the ‘base run model’ was established, the model was re-calibrated to look at the 
impact of changes in the TRQ’s components for the years 2005 – 2010 which from here on we 
shall call the ‘baseline model.’ The TRQ ‘baseline model’ goes under the assumption of “what if 
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the present TRQ system as carried out until 2010.” The ‘baseline model’ results will be used as 
benchmarks for comparison with other simulations that reflect liberalization of the different TRQ 
components.  
In this part of the study, the ‘baseline model’ TRQ model is modified to look at other 
liberalization scenarios and perform policy experiments by modifying the different components 
of the TRQ model. Various policy experiments are conducted to determine the effects of using 
the TRQ as a policy instrument in liberalizing the corn market in the Philippines. A combination 
of changes in the TRQ components can bring about the four trade policy scenarios: 1) an 
absolute quota – the in-quota and out-quota tariffs are removed; 2) outright liberalization – 
removal of the quota and merging of the in-quota and out-quota tariffs into one ad valorem tariff 
rate – either at the level of the out-quota rate or at the level of the in-quota rate; 3) changes in the 
in-quota and out-quota tariffs while the quota is fixed; and 4) a change in the quota while the in-
quota and the out-quota tariffs are fixed. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the policy experiments 
and summary of the model parameters for the corn TRQ model for years 2005 through 2010. 
The policy experiments (#1) – (#3) are designed to isolate the effects of each policy 
instrument or component to show the impact that each instrument has on the overall corn market. 
To do this, two of the three policy instruments will be eliminated at a time. In (#1) the in-quota 
and out-quota tariffs were eliminated such that an absolute quota exists. The results of this 
simulation are then compared to the benchmark to determine if, and how much, the introduction 
of the TRQ has liberalized the corn market. Eliminating the tariffs will show how the quota 
portion of the TRQ affects the market when it is the sole instrument used to determine domestic 
prices. In policy experiments (#2) and (#3), the effects of liberalizing the market at either the 
level of the out-quota or the in-quota tariffs are analyzed, respectively. In these two experiments, 
the ‘other’ tariff and the quota are eliminated resulting in a de facto or outright tariffication. The 
results would show the changes that would occur from the baseline at the edges of the TRQ 
system. The results of the simulations give us an appreciation of the effects attributable to the in-
quota tariff, the out-quota tariff and the quota itself. 
The next set of policy experiments are combinations of tariffs and quotas and they are 
tiered in such a way that they build upon one another. In experiments (#4) to (#8) the out-quota 
tariffs were reduced in increments of 10 percentage points from their 2005 levels while the in-
quota rates are set to 5%. In (#9) – (#25) the in-quota tariffs are reduced by increments of 5 
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percentage points from their 2005 levels while the out-quota tariffs are kept fixed at different 
levels.  
In policy experiments (#26) – (#37) the effects of increasing the quota are analyzed while 
the in-quota and out-quota tariffs are adjusted downwards. The quota levels are increased to 
three levels: a) by 100,000 MT (simulations (#26) through (#29)); b) raised to 5% of base 
consumption levels (434,000 MT) in simulations (#30) to (#33); and c) raised to 10% of base 
consumption level (651,000 MT) in simulations (#34) to (#37). The last simulation (#38) 
provides results if free market policy is in effect.  
The number of quota to out-quota and in-quota tariff combinations that can be analyzed is 
quite large, but the combinations that are presented in this study provide a good representation of 
possible scenarios that may be considered by policy makers. Table 4.4 provides a summary of 
the policy experiments and summary of the model parameters for the corn TRQ model for years 
2005 through 2010. The results of the different experiments and how they compare to the 
baseline are discussed in the next chapter.  
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Table 4.1. Philippines: Corn TRQ Model Data. 
Parameters (Sources of data) Base model Baseline 
Model 
Scenarios/ 
Experiments 
Supply-Use     
Supply – Production (in ‘000 MT)  (FAOSTAT) 4519 4129 4129 
Demand – Consumption (in ‘000 MT)  (FAOSTAT) 4519 4129 4129 
Imports 0 0 0 
Import Quota 0 0 0 
Prices    
Domestic Price (Pesos/Kg)  (FAOSTAT, BAS) 5.73 8.56 8.56 
World Price ($/Kg)  (FAOSTAT – US #2 Corn) 0.133 0.11 0.11 
Exchange Rate (Pesos/US$)  (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) 25.00 54.20 54.20 
Tariffs    
Base Tariff, before TRQ (%) 30 30 30 
Initial TRQ Quota (in 000 MT)  (WTO, 1994) 130.16 217.00 217.00 – 
651.00 
Final TRQ Quota (in 000 MT)  (WTO, 1994) 216.94 217.00 217.00 – 
651.00 
In-Quota Tariff (%)  (WTO, 1994) 35 35 35-5 
Out-Quota Tariff (%)  (WTO, 1994) 100 50 100-10 
Elasticities     
Supply Price Elasticity (assumed) 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Demand Price Elasticity  (Bouis, 1982) -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 
Demand Income Elasticity  (from Ingco, 1991) -0.2124 -0.2124 -0.2124 
Growth Rates    
Supply (%)  (computed) 0.01973 0.0229 0.0229 
Population growth per annum (%)  (computed from PIDS 
data) 
2.0 - 2.2 2.0 2.0 
Income per capita (%)  (computed from NSCB data) 3.0 - 3.8 3.0 3.0 
 
Table 4.2. Philippines: Selected Income and Demand Elasticities for Corn. 
Source/Study Income Price Demand  
Ingco (1991)   
At the sample means -0.2124 -0.0686 
Average (1987-1990) -0.4545 -0.1142 
Quisumbing (1986b)   
I 1.90 -2.10 
II 1.42 -1.57 
III  0.22 1.51 
IV 0.05 -2.09 
Bouis (1982) -1.34 -0.27 
Bouis (1991) Urban Rural Urban Rural 
I -0.30 -0.40 -1.6 -1.5 
II -0.80 -0.40 -1.5 -1.2 
III -0.60 -0.90 -1.2 -1.1 
IV -0.02 -0.80 -0.9 -1.1 
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Table 4.3. Summary of TRQ model simulations. 
Simulation 
Number 
Parameters 
#1 Absolute quota – no in-quota and out-quota tariffs 
#2 De facto tariffication at the out-quota level (50%); no quota and in-quota tariffs 
#3 De facto tariffication at the in-quota level (35%); no quota and out-quota tariffs 
#4 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 50%; In-quota: 5% 
#5 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 5% 
#6 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 30%; In-quota: 5% 
#7 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 20%; In-quota: 5% 
#8 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 10%; In-quota: 5% 
#9 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 50%; In-quota: 30% 
#10 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 50%; In-quota: 25% 
#11 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 50%; In-quota: 20% 
#12 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 50%; In-quota: 15% 
#13 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 50%; In-quota: 10% 
#14 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 35% 
#15 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 30% 
#16 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 25% 
#17 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 20% 
#18 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 15% 
#19 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 10% 
#20 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 30%; In-quota: 25% 
#21 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 30%; In-quota: 20% 
#22 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 30%; In-quota: 15% 
#23 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 30%; In-quota: 10% 
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Table 4.4. Summary of TRQ model simulations, continued. 
Simulation 
Number 
Parameters 
#24 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 20%; In-quota: 15% 
#25 Quota from 205 KMT – 217 KMT; Out-quota: 20%; In-quota: 10% 
#26 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 317 KMT; Out-quota: 50%; In-quota: 35% 
#27 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 317 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 30% 
#28 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 317 KMT; Out-quota: 30%; In-quota: 20% 
#29 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 317 KMT; Out-quota: 20%; In-quota: 10% 
#30 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 434 KMT; Out-quota: 50%; In-quota: 35% 
#31 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 434 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 30% 
#32 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 434 KMT; Out-quota: 30%; In-quota: 20% 
#33 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 434 KMT; Out-quota: 20%; In-quota: 10% 
#34 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 651 KMT; Out-quota: 50%; In-quota: 35% 
#35 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 651 KMT; Out-quota: 40%; In-quota: 30% 
#36 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 651 KMT; Out-quota: 30%; In-quota: 20% 
#37 Quota increased from 217 KMT – 651 KMT; Out-quota: 20%; In-quota: 10% 
#38 Free Market  
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Figure 4.3. Static impacts under alternative tariff-rate quota equilibria. 
( a )
( b )
 ( c )
Source: Abbott and Paarlberg.
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CHAPTER 5 - Results and Discussion 
The initial task was to conduct preliminary runs of an existing TRQ model to determine 
its applicability on the corn market of the Philippines. These preliminary runs served as the basis 
for developing a simulation of the TRQ system in the Philippine’s corn market. A ‘base run 
model’ – under the assumption of “what if the present tariff-rate quota system was still in place” 
was conducted to establish the benchmark for computing the quota rents of the model under 
different policy scenarios. The base run of the model TRQ was carried out using data for 1994 – 
2004 of the actual quotas, in-quota and out-quota tariffs. The results were used to see if the 
model capture or would mimic actual events that happened during the period. The base run 
model computed for the supply, demand, imports and prices for a ten-year period representing 
the years 1995-2004 using the growth rates in population, income, and the demand and supply 
elasticities for corn as defined in Chapter 4.  
After the base run model was established, the model was re-calibrated to look at the 
impact of changes in the TRQ’s components for the years 2005 – 2010. The simulation scenarios 
or policy scenarios that were discussed in Chapter 4 serve as the basis for the policy experiments 
that were conducted to look at the effects of changing quotas and tariff rates over the experiment 
period, 2005 – 2010. In this chapter, the results of the policy experiments are discussed and 
analyzed and comparisons across different scenarios were carried out. 
The 1994 – 2005 base run model results 
The starting point in understanding the workings of the TRQ model is through the base 
model. How the base run model works is described in Chapter 4, and considering that it is 
primarily driven by the elasticities of supply and demand, the model results track the actual 
supply and demand data fairly well. Graphs of the model results of supply/production and 
demand against actual production and demand are presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The supply 
side equation of the model can be calibrated, or fine tuned, to emulate actual production and this 
can be done by changing the year index (T) in the equation (1.1). The range of possible choices 
for (T) is quite large – from negative to positive continuous numbers. Negative numbers can be 
use to emulate years where declines in production were observed such as in 1998 and 2002, 
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considered as drought years due to the El Niño weather phenomenon. The same procedure can be 
applied for the demand equation (1.2). 
The basic parameters of the base run model TRQ are: quota volumes start from 130,000 
MT (or 3% of consumption in 1986–1988) in the first year increasing to 217,000 MT by the 
tenth year of the model TRQ; the in-quota tariff rate is fixed at 35% throughout the ten years; 
and the out-quota tariff starts at 100% in the first two years and then goes down to 50% by the 
last year. The out-quota tariff for corn was bound at 100% when the URAA was ratified in 1994 
and it is subject to reduction commitments by the Philippines to 50% by 2005. The in-quota 
tariffs however are not subject to reduction commitments but it serves as useful part of the 
overall TRQ mechanism. 
The base run model the simulations indicate a trend where the demand for corn exceeds 
supply, and imports increase as a consequence. The model projected that the quantity of supply, 
or production, of corn will increase by 1.6% over the ten year period, while demand, on the other 
hand was projected to grow by 3.7% over the same period. The base run model solutions of the 
present under TRQ system of supply and demand volumes, net imports, market price, below 
quota price, and per unit quota rent (in Philippine peso and US $ terms per kilogram) are 
presented in Table 5.1.  
The simulations show that in the first three years (1995-1997), total imports would be 
equal to the quota volumes allowed under the TRQ, and in this case, the TRQ acts like a quota. 
In the first two years of the TRQ implementation, the out-quota tariff is 100% (its highest level), 
and in the third year (1997), the out-quota tariff was adjusted down to 80%. At these tariff levels, 
it would imply that it is not profitable to import and this may explain why the imports are equal 
to the TRQ quota volume. The operable market equilibrium price here is determined by the 
model and it shows that the domestic price Pd would adjust to a level between Pd
i = ε*Pw*(1+ti) 
and Pd
o = ε*Pw*(1+to), respectively. The domestic price ranged from Ph5.52 to Ph5.87 per 
kilogram of corn and these lie between the prices with the in-quota tariff (Ph4.49) and the price 
with the out-quota tariff (Ph6.65).  
In the next two years (from year 4 (1998) to year 5 (1999)), the out-quota tariffs were 
maintained at 80% and the model results show that imports would increase beyond the TRQ 
quota. The pronounced difference in growth between demand and supply makes imports 
profitable despite the fact that tariffs are still relatively higher and this is confirmed by the 
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presence of higher per unit quota rents (Ph1.50 per Kg or $0.06 per Kg). The model simulated 
that the equilibrium market price is equal to Pd = ε* Pw(1 +t
o
) since imports are now more than 
the quota. This is the case where the out-quota tariff is binding and prices hold steady ay P5.98 
($0.239) per kilo of corn. The per unit quota rent is determined by R = Pd – ε* Pw(1 + t
i
) from 
equation (5.0) or the domestic price less the price with the in-quota tariff. Figure 5.3 illustrates 
what happens as the out-quota tariff is reduced over time. Note the changes in the size of the 
rent, the revenues from the in-quota tariff and the out-quota tariff that goes to the government. 
The further apart the in-quota and out-quota tariffs, the greater the amount of rents created and 
thus the greater the incentives to seek these rents (Boughner and de Gorter). As the out-quota 
tariffs are reduced, the rents decline; the in-quota tariff revenue remains relatively the same and 
the revenues from the out-quota tariff declines.  
For years 6 and 7 (1999 – 2000), and 8 to 10 (2001 – 2004), the out-quota tariff rates 
were again decreased to 65% and 50%, respectively to simulate the reduction of the out-quota 
tariffs over time. The situation here is almost similar to the previous period, where the only 
difference was that the out-quota tariffs were lower. It should be noted that the effect of the 
decline in the out-quota tariff is that market equilibrium prices declined from Ph 5.98 ($0.239) to 
P5.49 ($0.220) and 4.99 ($0.200) per kilogram, respectively. The per unit quota rents declines 
further from Ph1.49 ($0.059) in year 5 (1999) to Ph0.50 ($0.020) in year 10 (2004). The 
simulation shows that in year 10, the level of imports would be sufficiently large (1.17 million 
MT) and the domestic equilibrium price is close to the in-quota price, Pd = ε Pw(1 + t
i). This can 
be explained by fact that in some cases, over time, the difference between the in-quota tariff and 
the out-quota tariff rates may become very small or is very negligible, in this case down to 15 
percentage points. The out-quota tariff rate is subject to reduction commitments under the 
URAA. It is also worth noting that the out-quota tariff is binding from the fourth to the tenth year 
of corn TRQ model. 
Abbot and Paarlberg observed a similar scenario in their study of the Philippine’s pork 
market. They noted that albeit the TRQ allows a small increase in imports via the minimum 
access, the demand growth relative to domestic supply makes imports profitable even at the 
higher tariff and imports expand greatly over time. In their simulation of the Philippine’s pork 
market, they noticed a leveling off and subsequent decline of the domestic price of pork once the 
import volumes became larger. 
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The corn minimum access volumes are quite small (3% increasing to 5% of consumption 
based on the Modalities Agreement)8 compared to total demand; therefore it is quite 
understandable to consider that its impact on prices, supply and demand in the TRQ model 
should be limited. The discussion in the following section will illustrate this observation. Under 
the present policy, the out-quota tariff that is relatively high in the initial years may be the 
essential policy instrument in determining import volumes and domestic prices in the model for 
corn. The simulations also show that the corn market can be in Case 2 where the TRQ is binding 
(years 1 to 3) and then move into Case 3 where the out-quota tariff is binding (years 4 through 
10). 
Results of the Policy Experiments 
The TRQ model was re-calibrated and simulated for the period 2003 – 2010. It was noted 
that although the base run model TRQ tracked the actual supply and demand, the other 
parameters (i.e., exchange rate, world price, growth rate in supply) over the period 1995 – 2004 
have changed. The re-calibrated model had modifications in the domestic and world price, 
exchange rate, quota, and in the in-quota and out-quota tariffs. Several versions of the re-
calibrated model that were developed looked at various policy scenarios and the parameters 
associated with each experiment have been discussed in Chapter 4.  
The first model is our 2003 – 2010 Baseline Model wherein the assumption was that the 
present TRQ system would be continued (i.e. the 2005 quota level is carried through until 2010, 
and in-quota and out-quota tariffs remain at 35% and 50%). The results of the Baseline Model 
are presented in Table 5.2. The results of the policy experiments are compared with the Baseline 
Model results. The simulation results of the 38 policy experiments are in Appendix A, as 
Appendix Tables A.1 – A.15. 
                                                 
8 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) is made up of three components, the text of the 
Agreement, the Country Schedules submitted to the WTO that included base year data and the commitments, and 
the "modality" documents of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture. The Modalities Agreement, although not legally 
binding were agreed to by the negotiating parties and serves as the suggested set of general objectives, procedures to 
use to calculate various indicators and commitments (including numerical targets as well as rules) and the way to 
achieve them. For example, with regards to tariff reductions, a modality for developing countries would be an 
average reduction of 24% with a minimum 10 % reduction per tariff line, over ten years (WTO, 2006c). 
   
 57 
Policy Experiments # 1 – # 3(Individual TRQ Components) 
The results of policy experiments #1 to #3 illustrate the effect of the individual TRQ 
parameter on the Philippine corn market (Tables 5.3 – 5.5). In policy experiment #1, the import 
quota is the sole policy instrument in use. The results are compared to those from the Baseline 
Model. The comparisons show that the introduction of a TRQ would have no significant impact 
on the quantity of supply or domestic production – an increase of 0.5% in 2005 to 2.7% in 2010, 
respectively. The effect of the quota, however, is that there is a pronounced drop on the quantity 
of demand (or a contraction of the corn market). The volumes of imports that enter the country 
are at levels just equal to the quota, hence, consumer, producer and net surplus, and total 
revenues fall. The quota affects domestic prices in favor of producers (but to the detriment of 
consumers) as they increase from a 3% in 2005 to 17.5% by 2010, respectively, when compared 
to the Baseline Model results. Usually, when imports decline, production must be increased in 
order to meet domestic demand, but no increases were noted in the simulation for this scenario. 
Consumer surplus registered declines (24% in 2005 to 67% in 2010) at a bigger rate compared to 
producer surplus (23% in 2005 to 66% in 2010). Overall, net surplus registered an overall 
decline if quotas were to be the norm of the day for the corn market (42% in 2005 to 89% in 
2010).  
In policy experiment #2 the quota and the in-quota tariff were removed and the out-quota 
tariff becomes the operative parameter as it determines domestic prices. It also implies that there 
is a de facto liberalization of corn market at the out-quota tariff rate of 50%. Results of the 
simulation suggests that this scenario is no different from the present system of TRQ that is in 
place as there is no change in the quantities of supply, demand, imports, consumer, producer and 
net surpluses, and prices, compared to the baseline. However, there is a large change in total 
revenues that would go to the government (an 11% increase by 2010 from corn imports) since a 
higher tariff of 50% would be applied to all imports.  
In policy experiment #3, the quota and the out-quota tariff are removed and the in-quota 
tariff becomes the operative parameter and the in-quota tariff determines domestic prices. 
Similar to policy experiment #2, it also implies that there is a de facto liberalization of corn 
market at the in-quota tariff rate of 35%. Results of the simulation suggest that the policy have 
effects on demand, imports, consumer, producer and net surpluses, prices, total revenues and per 
unit quota rents. The effect of the policy on the quantity of supply is minimal, but it reflects a 
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decline of about 2% per year just the same. An increase in the quantity of demand (2.5% by 
2010) is expected with the decline in prices (10%). To make up for the shortfall between the 
quantity of supply and quantity of demand, import levels increase (about 38% by 2010). 
Revenues collected by the government increase, and although the government continues to 
collect revenues from the corn imports, the lower tariff of 35% also meant that collections would 
decline (as much as 22% in 2010 compared to the baseline). There are consumer and net surplus 
gains – in terms of lower prices and increase in corn demand.  
It is recognized that a limitation of the model is that the policy or policies are introduced 
as a complete measure at one time such that the effect looks like a kink on a line. However, the 
effects observed in terms of direction are correct and follow economic logic – quantities of 
supply and demand change with respect to changes in prices; and in terms of changes in 
magnitude, the results are reasonable and within reasonable bounds when compared to actual 
data. Another limitation is that the model treated as partial equilibrium model and does not 
consider the effect and impact of the policies on related sectors like the livestock and poultry 
industry – the main importers of corn in the Philippines, and the rest of the economy. Hence, this 
should be kept in mind when the magnitude of the change in consumer, producer, and net surplus 
are discussed. 
Policy Experiments # 4 – # 25(Variations in the Combinations of the Components) 
Policy experiments #4 - #25 are variations of the combination quota – tariff scheme, 
where different tariff reductions in the out-quota and in-quota tariffs are analyzed while the quota 
is fixed at 2005 levels. The scenarios and the parameters associated with each experiment have 
been discussed in Chapter 4 earlier.  
Policy experiments #4 – # 8 (Fixed Quota, 10-percentage Point Differences in the Out-quota 
Tariff, and 5% Fixed In-quota Tariff) 
 Policy experiments #4 - #8 are cases where all three policy instruments are in place, with 
the quota fixed at 2005 levels, the out-quota tariffs are reduced by 10 percentage points, and the 
in-quota rate steady at 5% (Tables 5.3 – 5.5). Results of policy experiment #4 reveal that it is in 
many ways similar to the baseline. Dropping the in-quota tariff rate to 5% beginning in 2005 had 
no significant effect on the quantities of supply, demand, imports, consumer, producer and net 
surplus, and prices. The effect, however, there is an effect on the government revenues and in the 
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quota rents. Government revenues from the out-quota tariffs remain the same since the out-quota 
tariff is also 50%. The lower in-quota tariff, however, translates to lower revenues from imports 
that come in within the quota, and thus, total revenues register a decline (59.3% in 2005 to 
22.3% in 2010). The large difference between the in-quota and out-quota tariffs also translates to 
higher quota rents, about 200% higher compared to the baseline.9 Recall that the out-quota tariff 
determines the domestic market price when imports are above the quota, if these are reduced as 
simulated in each experiment, domestic prices decrease as a result.  
Policy experiments #5 – #8 are similar in some respects. Lowering the in-quota tariff to 
5% negatively affects the quantity of supply – about 1% in policy experiment #5 to 4% in policy 
experiment #8 in 2010. Demand on the other hand shows a more responsive to the decline in the 
out-quota tariff – there is about a 1.7% increase in policy experiment #5 to a 6.7% increase in 
policy experiment #8 in 2010. The result is that imports increase in large proportions compared 
to the baseline. In policy experiment #5 imports increase by 25%, in policy experiment #6 by 
51%, in policy experiment #7 by 76%, and in policy experiment #8 by as much as 101% in 2010. 
The percent change in consumer, producer and net surpluses are higher in these experiments 
compared to the baseline, with policy experiment #8, which is by-far the most liberal, registering 
the highest level of difference in net surplus (295% in 2010). In terms of revenue, all four 
experiments registered decreasing revenues for the government, and as expected policy 
experiment #8 proved to be the lowest collector of revenues as the difference from the baseline 
was 59% below the baseline. Policy experiment #5 registered the highest difference in the level 
of quota rents (133%) compared to the baseline among the four experiments and this is due to the 
wide gap between the out-quota and in-quota tariffs. 
The next four sets of policy experiments (#9 – #13, #14 – #19, #20 – #23, #24 – #25) are 
similar to the above set of scenarios where the quota is fixed at 2005 levels. The out-quota tariff 
is kept at 50%, 40%, 30%, and 20%, respectively for each set. Within each set, the in-quota tariff 
rate is reduced by 5 percentage points from 30% to 10%, 25%-10%, and 15% to 10%, 
respectively. 
                                                 
9 Please see Figure 5.3 for an illustration of how the difference between the out-quota and in-quota tariff rates 
affects the quota rents. 
 60 
Policy experiments #9 – #13 (Fixed Quota, Out-quota Tariff Fixed at 50%, and In-quota 
Tariff Reduced by 5-percentage Points from 30% to 10%) 
Policy experiments #9 – #13 are simulations where the quota is fixed at 2005 levels 
(217,000 MT), and the out-quota tariff is kept at 50%, while the in-quota tariff rate is reduced by 
5 percentage points from 30% to 10%. In general, reducing the in-quota tariff rates by 5 
percentage points negatively  affect the quantity of supply – about 2% in policy experiment #9 to 
around 4% in policy experiment #13 in 2010. The quantity of demand, however, is affected more 
as increases are noted in all experiments compared to the baseline. As expected imports increase 
considerably. Prices in this set of experiments are not affected because the out-quota tariff of the 
baseline and this set are the same at 50% (Tables 5.6 – 5.8). 
Increases over the baseline are noted for the consumer, producer and net surpluses for 
experiments #9 - #13. Policy experiment #13, which is relatively the most liberal in this set of 
experiments, registered the highest difference in the level of net surplus (295% in 2010). In terms 
of revenue, the five experiments registered increasing revenues for the government even if 
reduced collections were noted from the in-quota tariff. Surprisingly, policy experiment #13 
provides the government the biggest source of revenue, and this come mainly from the out-quota 
tariffs slapped on larger levels of imports. Policy experiment #13 registered the highest level of 
quota rents among the five due to the wide gap between the out-quota and in-quota tariffs, 50% 
and 10%, respectively. 
Policy experiments #14 – #19 (Fixed Quota, Out-quota Tariff Fixed at 40%, and In-quota 
Tariff Reduced by 5-percentage Points from 30% to 10%)  
Policy experiments #14 – #19 are distinguished from experiments #9 – #13 through 
differences in their out-quota tariff levels. The former’s out-quota tariff is set at 40% while for 
the latter it is set at 50% which is similar to the baseline model. Due to this difference in out-
quota tariff rates, it is expected that domestic prices in policy experiments #14 – #19 would be 
lower. Results of the simulations show that bringing down the out-quota tariff rate to 40% would 
have similar impact in magnitude on the quantities of supply, demand and imports compared to 
the baseline (Tables 5.6 – 5.8 and 5.9 – 5.11) as in policy experiments #9 – #13.  
In policy experiments #14 – #15 the lower domestic price (from the reduction of the out-
quota rate) and keeping the in-quota rate at 35% or 30%, had the effect of reducing the quota 
rents, compared to the baseline. What happened in these two experiments was that a reduction in 
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the difference between the in-quota and out-quota rates took place. However, if the reductions in 
the in-quota rates were continued beyond 30% (i.e. policy experiments #16 – #19) and the out-
quota is kept constant, the differences increase between tariffs and the trend is reversed; as a 
consequence the per unit quota rents increase. This behavior in the quota rents is noted in all the 
other experiments where the differences between the out-quota and in-quota tariffs increase or 
decrease.  
Increases over the baseline are noted for the consumer, producer and net surpluses for 
these experiments. Policy experiment #14, which is relatively the ‘least’ liberal in this set of five 
experiments, registered a large difference in net surplus of 88.5% in 2010 compared to the 
baseline. Policy experiment #19 on the other hand shows a difference with the baseline of 295% 
in 2010. 
Policy experiments #20 – #23 (Fixed Quota, Out-quota Tariff Fixed at 30%, and In-quota 
Tariff Reduced by 5-percentage Points from 25% to 10%) 
Policy experiments #20 – #23 have the out-quota tariff set at 30% while for the in-quota 
tariff is reduced from 25% to 10%, with the quota fixed at 217,000 MT. The 30% out-quota tariff 
rate translates to lower domestic prices (13.3%) compared to the baseline. Results of the 
simulations show that bringing down the out-quota tariff rate to 30% from 50% and reducing the 
in-quota tariffs would have almost similar outcomes as with the scenario discussed in the 
previous set (i.e. policy experiments #14 – #19) when compared to the baseline (Tables 5.9 – 
5.11).  
Obviously, there would be a decrease in the total revenues as the out-quota tariff and in-
quota tariffs are reduced. Revenues from the in-quota tariff declined in all cases from 28.6% to 
71.4%. The impact on revenues from the out-quota tariff is less pronounced although the trend is 
also declining. Increases over the baseline are noted for the consumer, producer and net surpluses 
for these experiments. This means that welfare as a result of changing from the existing TRQ 
system to a more liberalized setting is positive as consumers are gaining more than what 
producers are losing. Policy experiment #23, which is relatively the ‘most’ liberal in this set of 
four experiments, registered the highest level of change in net surplus at 295% in 2010 when 
compared to the baseline.  
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Policy experiments #24 - #25(Fixed Quota, Out-quota Tariff Fixed at 20%, and In-quota 
Tariff Reduced at 15% and 10%) 
Policy experiments #24 – #25 simulate conditions where the quota is fixed at 2005 levels, 
and the out-quota tariff is kept at 20%, while the in-quota tariff rate is reduced to 15% and 10%, 
respectively. The 20% out-quota tariff rates translate to lower domestic prices (20.0%) compared 
to the baseline (Tables 5.9 – 5.11 and Tables 5.12 – 5.14). Results of the simulations show that 
bringing down the out-quota tariff rate to 20% from 50% and reducing the in-quota tariffs would 
have almost similar outcomes as with the scenario discussed in the previous set (i.e. policy 
experiments #14 – #19) when compared to the baseline. 
Total revenues declined as expected since the revenues from both tariff sources went 
down. In all cases, revenues from the in-quota tariff declined compared to the baseline. Overall 
welfare showed improvement over the baseline, as the consumer surplus is greater than the 
losses incurred by producers. Per unit quota rents declined in both experiments as the gap 
between the out-quota and in-quota have lessened considerably. Figure 5.5 illustrates how the 
differences in the out-quota and in-quota tariffs affect the rents generated by the system. 
Policy Experiments # 26 – # 37 (Increase in Quota, Fixed Out-quota and In-quota 
Tariff Rates) 
The next sets of policy experiments investigate scenarios where the corn market is 
liberalized by increasing the quotas while the out-quota and in-quota tariffs are fixed. Several 
proposals have been put forth about increasing market access through the liberalization of 
quotas. Josling and Rae suggested increasing minimum access by a proportion of consumption – 
say 1% of consumption each year. We instead simulate the effects of increasing the quota 
volume from 217,000 MT to 317,000 MT (policy experiments #26 – #29), from 5% of 
consumption to 10% (policy experiments #30 – #33), and from 5% of consumption to 15% 
(policy experiments #34 – #37).  
Policy experiments #26 - #29 (Quota Increased to 317,000 MT, Out-quota Tariff Fixed (from 
50% to 20%), and In-quota Tariff Reduced by 5-percentage Points from 35% to 10%) 
Policy experiments #26 – #29 simulate the alternative method of liberalizing the corn 
market by increasing the quotas (in this set the quota is increased by 100,000 MT above the 2004 
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level), while the out-quota tariff is kept at 50%, 40%, 30%, and 20%, respectively in each case. 
The in-quota tariff rate is set at 35%, 30%, 20%, and 10%, respectively.  
Results of the simulations for policy experiment #26 when compared to the baseline 
reveal that simply increasing the quota by 100,000 MT will not make any difference in most of 
the parameters that we have been looking at. What is obvious though is that total government 
revenues shrink as a result of more import quantities being charged at the lower in-quota rate and 
less that are taxed at the out-quota rate (Tables 5.12 – 5.14).  
Policy experiments #30 - #33(Quota Increased to 434,000 MT, Out-quota Tariff Fixed (from 
50% to 20%), and In-quota Tariff Reduced by 5-percentage Points from 35% to 10%) 
Policy experiments #30 – #33 simulate the corn market when the quota for the TRQ is 
raised to 10% of domestic consumption to 434,000 MT, while the out-quota tariff is set at 50%, 
40%, 30%, and 20%, respectively in each case (Tables 5.12 – 5.14 and Tables 5.15 – 5.17). The 
in-quota tariff rate is set at 35%, 30%, 20%, and 10%, respectively. Increasing the TRQ quota to 
10% of consumption may be a far fetched idea at the moment, but the simulation results indicate 
that imports would not be increasing beyond what the market can absorb. Results of the 
experiments are similar in trend to those in policy experiments #34 – #37. 
Policy experiments #34 - #37`(Quota Increased to 651,000 MT, Out-quota Tariff Fixed (from 
50% to 20%), and In-quota Tariff Reduced by 5-percentage Points from 35% to 10%) 
Policy experiments #34 – #37 are models of the corn market when the quota for the TRQ 
is raised to 15% of domestic consumption or to 651,000 MT, while the out-quota tariff is set at 
50%, 40%, 30%, and 20%, respectively in each case. Similar to earlier experiments where the 
quota is increased, the quantity of corn supply is negatively influenced by the increase in quota 
(Tables 5.15 – 5.17). Corn supply decreased in all experiments and but the decline was at a shade 
close to 3% (i.e. policy experiment #37) when the out-quota tariff was 20% and the in-quota was 
10%. Quantity of corn demand increased at a faster rate such that required imports increased. 
Consumer surplus and net surplus increased as tariffs were decreased progressively, but the 
increase in imports also caused an increase in the loss of producer surplus. The contraction in the 
difference between the in-quota and out-quota tariffs led to a decline in quota rents. 
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Policy experiments #26, 30, and #34 (Quota Increased to 317,000 MT, 434,000 MT and 
651,000 MT; Out-quota Tariff Fixed at 50%, and In-quota Tariff is 35%) 
Another comparison was made between the baseline and policy experiments #26, #30 
and #34 to look at what would happen if the present tariff structure was retained and only the 
quotas were increased. Taken together, these comparisons illustrate to what extent the quota can 
serve as a tool for liberalizing the corn market in the Philippines. These three experiments have 
different quota levels for the TRQ while the out-quota tariff and in-quota tariffs are fixed at 50% 
and 35%, respectively. The results suggest that only increasing the TRQ quotas will have no 
significant impact in liberalizing the corn market.  
Increasing the quota by 100,000 MT (policy experiment #26) will not make any 
difference in most of the parameters that we have been looking at compared to the baseline 
model. What was obvious though was that total government revenues decline compared to the 
baseline, as a result of more import quantities being charged at the lower in-quota rate and less 
that are taxed at the out-quota rate (Tables 5.18 and 5.19). When the quota was raised to 434,000 
MT in policy experiment #30 and to 651,000 MT in policy experiment #34, the revenues from 
the in-quota tariff increased by 100% and up to 200%, respectively. However, the simulations 
show there would be periods when there are no revenues from the out-quota tariffs, and this 
happen when the level of imports do not go beyond the quotas. When the quota was increased to 
651,000 MT (policy experiment #34), the results show that imports are less than the quota in 
2005 – 2007 (see Table A.13), and hence domestic prices were lower – i.e. at a level between the 
world price plus the in-quota or out-quota rates.10 An increase in consumer surplus was noted 
although there was a corresponding increase in the surplus losses incurred by producers. The loss 
in producer surplus was due to the increase in imports but the overall effect on net surplus was 
still positive and increasing if combined with reductions in tariffs.  
Reductions in the out-quota rate lead to larger changes in most parameters that are being 
investigated. The quantities of supply, demand and imports increase when the tariffs are adjusted 
downward and consumer and net surplus follow suit. A loss in producer surplus are expected 
with the increase in imports, but coupled with liberalizing the market is also an increase in 
demand that producers can take advantage of in the long run. 
                                                 
10 Please refer to Chapter 4 – Static Impacts and Chapter 5 – The 1994 – 2005 base model results, for a 
discussion of how prices are determined 
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Policy Experiment # 38 (Free Market) 
The final experiment was to simulate a free market situation – no quotas, and no tariffs in 
place. Quantity of supply under free market showed a decrease of 5%, while demand increased 
by about 8.5% (Tables 5.15 – 5.17 and Table 5.20). Imports under free market were about two 
and a half times above the baseline which translates to about the same difference in producer 
surplus, in reference with the baseline. Gains in consumer surplus were still more than the loss of 
producer surplus that leads to almost a four fold difference in net surplus in 2010 compared to 
the baseline. The domestic price was lower by 33% compared to the baseline, as it reflects the 
world price without any tariff. No tariffs also mean that there were no revenues for the 
government to collect. Furthermore, there were also no rents to distribute or fight for among corn 
importers because there was no wedge between tariffs.  
Other Comparisons – Free Market with other experiments 
In this section some comparisons between experiment #38 (free market) and the other 
experiments was made to further illustrate some points. If the results of policy experiment #1 
(absolute quota) were compared with the free market, it would clearly show that the quota is a 
very restrictive trade policy instrument. Quotas have the effect of severely restricting imports (as 
much as -66.6% in 2010) and the consequence is that the domestic price is higher by 17.5% in 
2010. Quotas also has the effect of stifling market demand (-4.4% in 2010), although it 
encouraged supply (2.7%). The outcome of such conditions translates to lower consumer and net 
surpluses. The producer surplus under a quota regime is also much less compared to free market. 
Tables 5.18 and 5.19 provide the results of the comparisons between the ‘Free Market’ and other 
policy experiments.  
Policy experiment #2 (de facto liberalization at the level of the out-quota rate) was also 
compared with the free market and it too would show that the out-quota tariff of 50% is a 
restrictive policy instrument to liberalize trade. Compared to free market, the quantity of corn 
supply and quantity of demand are static at zero. Domestic corn prices are likewise static at zero, 
compared to the baseline than the free market price which may explain why imports are less by 
38% in 2010. Policy experiment #3 (de facto liberalization at the level of the in-quota rate) also 
pale in comparison to the free market, and still restricts trade.  
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When policy experiment # 8 was compared to #38, the results show that it is the most 
‘liberal’ or superior trade policy instrument among the experiments since it comes closest to the 
results of free market conditions. The difference in price between baseline and experiment #38 
(free market) was 10% and imports were only 7.6% apart. Experiment #8 estimates for supply 
and demand were also just slightly off from free market by 0.37% and 1.5%, respectively. 
 When policy experiments #26, #30, and #34 were compared to #38 (Free Market), the 
results show that increasing the quotas are also inferior instruments in liberalizing the corn 
market. Prices were still 50% - 35% higher in most years (that is if the out-quota tariff is kept at 
50%). Imports were about 40% lower and demand was suppressed by as much as 7% even when 
the quota was increased to 15% of consumption. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the differences 
between the policy experiments and the baseline and free market for supply and demand, 
respectively. 
Finally, the baseline was compared to the free market situation and the results were the 
same as when the corn market was liberalized at the level of the out-quota tariff of 50%. It would 
therefore be prudent to say that the binding or redundant policy instrument is the out-quota tariff. 
Table 5.20 provide the results of the comparisons between the ‘Free Market’ and the baseline. 
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Table 5.1. Philippines: Corn market under Present TRQ system, 1995 – 2004. 
Year/ (In-quota 
: Out-Quota 
Tariffs) 
Quantity of 
Supply in 
1000 MT 
Quantity of 
Demand in 
1000 MT 
Quantity of 
Imports in 
1000 MT 
Market price 
in P/kg 
($/Kg) 
Below Quota 
Price in P/Kg 
($/Kg) 
Per Unit 
Quota Rent in 
P/Kg ($/Kg) 
1995 (35:100) 
4213.157 4343.317 130.16 
5.524  
(0.221) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
1.035  
(0.041) 
1996 (35:100) 
4319.361 4457.121 137.76 
5.690  
(0.228) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
1.201  
(0.048) 
1997   (35:80) 
4427.302 4573.112 145.81 
5.868  
(0.235) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
1.379  
(0.055) 
1998   (35:80) 
4526.421 4706.807 180.386 
5.985  
(0.239) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
1.496  
(0.060) 
1999   (35:80) 
4608.518 4871.445 262.927 
5.985 
(0.239) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
1.496  
(0.060) 
2000   (35:65) 
4618.178 5153.070 534.892 
5.486  
(0.219) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
0.997  
(0.040) 
2001   (35:65) 
4700.275 5333.949 633.674 
5.486  
(0.219) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
0.997  
(0.040) 
2002   (35:50) 
4709.935 5636.958 927.023 
4.987  
(0.199) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
0.498  
(0.020) 
2003   (35:50) 
4792.031 5835.589 1043.558 
4.987  
(0.199) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
0.498  
(0.020) 
2004   (35:50) 
4874.128 6042.539 1168.411 
4.987  
(0.199) 
4.489 
(0.180) 
0.498  
(0.020) 
Source: Model simulations. 
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Table 5.2. Philippines: Corn market parameters if the present TRQ system is continued. 
 
Quantity of 
Supply     
(000 MT) 
Quantity of 
Demand   
(000 MT) 
Quantity of 
Imports    
(000 MT) 
∆ Consumer 
Surplus ($ M) 
∆ Producer 
Surplus ($ M) 
Net Surplus 
($ M) 
2003 5006.394 5211.364 204.970 69.243 -67.866 1.378 
2004 5111.490 5340.090 228.600 77.262 -75.587 1.675 
2005 5206.044 5490.855 284.811 96.374 -93.836 2.538 
2006 5300.598 5646.861 346.263 117.311 -113.648 3.663 
2007 5395.152 5808.324 413.172 140.155 -135.063 5.092 
2008 5489.706 5975.471 485.765 164.987 -158.115 6.872 
2009 5584.260 6148.541 564.281 191.908 -182.853 9.055 
2010 5678.814 6327.782 648.968 221.000 -209.307 11.693 
 
Prices ($/Kg) In-Quota Tariff 
Revenues ($ M) 
Out-Quota Tariff 
Revenues ($ M) 
Total Revenues 
($ M) 
Per Unit Quota 
Rents ($/Kg) 
2003 0.163 7.891 0.000 7.891 0.014 
2004 0.165 8.352 0.641 8.993 0.016 
2005 0.165 8.355 3.730 12.084 0.016 
2006 0.165 8.355 7.109 15.464 0.016 
2007 0.165 8.355 10.789 19.144 0.016 
2008 0.165 8.355 14.782 23.137 0.016 
2009 0.165 8.355 19.100 27.455 0.016 
2010 0.165 8.355 23.758 32.113 0.016 
Source: Model simulations. 
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Table 5.3. Percentage changes in quantity of supply, demand, imports, and consumer surplus 
from the baseline model, policy experiments 1 – 8.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Qty of 
Supply 
        
2005 0.49% 0.00% -1.66% 0.00% -1.10% -2.21% -3.31% -4.42% 
2006 0.90% 0.00% -1.63% 0.00% -1.09% -2.17% -3.26% -4.34% 
2007 1.32% 0.00% -1.60% 0.00% -1.07% -2.13% -3.20% -4.26% 
2008 1.76% 0.00% -1.57% 0.00% -1.05% -2.10% -3.14% -4.19% 
2009 2.21% 0.00% -1.54% 0.00% -1.03% -2.06% -3.09% -4.12% 
2010 2.67% 0.00% -1.52% 0.00% -1.01% -2.03% -3.04% -4.05% 
Qty of 
Demand 
        
2005 -0.77% 0.00% 2.64% 0.00% 1.76% 3.52% 5.27% 7.03% 
2006 -1.45% 0.00% 2.62% 0.00% 1.74% 3.49% 5.23% 6.98% 
2007 -2.15% 0.00% 2.59% 0.00% 1.73% 3.46% 5.19% 6.92% 
2008 -2.88% 0.00% 2.57% 0.00% 1.71% 3.43% 5.14% 6.86% 
2009 -3.64% 0.00% 2.55% 0.00% 1.70% 3.40% 5.10% 6.80% 
2010 -4.43% 0.00% 2.53% 0.00% 1.68% 3.37% 5.05% 6.74% 
Qty of 
Imports 
        
2005 -23.81% 0.00% 81.14% 0.00% 54.09% 108.19% 162.28% 216.37% 
2006 -37.33% 0.00% 67.58% 0.00% 45.05% 90.10% 135.15% 180.20% 
2007 -47.48% 0.00% 57.35% 0.00% 38.23% 76.46% 114.69% 152.93% 
2008 -55.33% 0.00% 49.40% 0.00% 32.93% 65.86% 98.80% 131.73% 
2009 -61.54% 0.00% 43.07% 0.00% 28.71% 57.43% 86.14% 114.85% 
2010 -66.56% 0.00% 37.93% 0.00% 25.29% 50.58% 75.86% 101.15% 
∆ CS         
2005 -23.93% 0.00% 82.05% 0.00% 54.62% 109.56% 164.79% 220.27% 
2006 -37.51% 0.00% 68.39% 0.00% 45.53% 91.31% 137.32% 183.53% 
2007 -47.70% 0.00% 58.09% 0.00% 38.67% 77.55% 116.61% 155.82% 
2008 -55.58% 0.00% 50.08% 0.00% 33.34% 66.85% 100.50% 134.29% 
2009 -61.81% 0.00% 43.69% 0.00% 29.09% 58.32% 87.67% 117.12% 
2010 -66.84% 0.00% 38.51% 0.00% 25.64% 51.40% 77.25% 103.19% 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table 5.4. Percentage changes in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-
quota tariff revenue from the baseline model, policy experiments 1 – 8.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
∆ PS         
2005 -23.45% 0.00% 78.18% 0.00% 52.42% 103.64% 153.66% 202.47% 
2006 -36.77% 0.00% 64.85% 0.00% 43.48% 85.97% 127.46% 167.94% 
2007 -46.78% 0.00% 54.79% 0.00% 36.74% 72.64% 107.70% 141.91% 
2008 -54.52% 0.00% 46.98% 0.00% 31.50% 62.28% 92.34% 121.67% 
2009 -60.67% 0.00% 40.76% 0.00% 27.33% 54.03% 80.11% 105.55% 
2010 -65.63% 0.00% 35.71% 0.00% 23.94% 47.34% 70.18% 92.47% 
NS         
2005 -41.80% 0.00% 225.30% 0.00% 136.08% 328.47% 576.19% 878.32% 
2006 -60.53% 0.00% 178.38% 0.00% 109.18% 257.21% 443.44% 667.22% 
2007 -72.21% 0.00% 145.41% 0.00% 89.96% 207.76% 352.92% 524.97% 
2008 -79.84% 0.00% 121.23% 0.00% 75.67% 171.88% 288.27% 424.49% 
2009 -85.02% 0.00% 102.86% 0.00% 64.68% 144.88% 240.33% 350.76% 
2010 -88.64% 0.00% 88.53% 0.00% 56.02% 124.01% 203.74% 295.02% 
IQTR         
2005 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% 
2006 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% 
2007 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% 
2008 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% 
2009 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% 
2010 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% -85.71% 
OQTR         
2005 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 0.00% 161.75% 232.63% 212.63% 101.75% 
2006 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 0.00% 76.54% 104.81% 84.81% 16.54% 
2007 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 0.00% 44.42% 56.63% 36.63% -15.58% 
2008 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 0.00% 27.62% 31.42% 11.42% -32.38% 
2009 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 0.00% 17.32% 15.98% -4.02% -42.68% 
2010 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 0.00% 10.39% 5.59% -14.41% -49.61% 
Source: Model simulations; PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table 5.5. Percentage changes in total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent from the baseline 
model, policy experiments 1 – 8.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
TTR         
2005 -100.00% 29.63% 64.37% -59.26% -9.34% 12.54% 6.37% -27.85% 
2006 -100.00% 23.15% 44.46% -46.31% -11.12% 1.88% -7.31% -38.70% 
2007 -100.00% 18.70% 30.74% -37.41% -12.37% -5.49% -16.76% -46.19% 
2008 -100.00% 15.48% 20.76% -30.95% -13.31% -10.87% -23.65% -51.64% 
2009 -100.00% 13.04% 13.21% -26.08% -14.03% -14.96% -28.88% -55.77% 
2010 -100.00% 11.15% 7.32% -22.30% -14.61% -18.16% -32.96% -59.00% 
Prices         
2005 2.93% 0.00% -10.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -26.67% 
2006 5.52% 0.00% -10.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -26.67% 
2007 8.27% 0.00% -10.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -26.67% 
2008 11.20% 0.00% -10.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -26.67% 
2009 14.29% 0.00% -10.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -26.67% 
2010 17.54% 0.00% -10.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -26.67% 
TQR         
2005 262.75% 233.45% 133.45% 200.11% 133.45% 66.78% 0.00% -66.67% 
2006 288.70% 233.45% 133.45% 200.11% 133.45% 66.78% 0.00% -66.67% 
2007 316.22% 233.45% 133.45% 200.11% 133.45% 66.78% 0.00% -66.67% 
2008 345.53% 233.45% 133.45% 200.11% 133.45% 66.78% 0.00% -66.67% 
2009 376.40% 233.45% 133.45% 200.11% 133.45% 66.78% 0.00% -66.67% 
2010 408.95% 233.45% 133.45% 200.11% 133.45% 66.78% 0.00% -66.67% 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents.  
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Table 5.6. Percentage changes in quantity of supply, demand, imports, and consumer surplus 
from the baseline model, policy experiments 9 – 16.  
 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Qty of 
Supply 
        
2005 -2.21% -2.76% -3.31% -3.87% -4.42% -1.66% -2.21% -2.76% 
2006 -2.17% -2.71% -3.26% -3.80% -4.34% -1.63% -2.17% -2.71% 
2007 -2.13% -2.67% -3.20% -3.73% -4.26% -1.60% -2.13% -2.67% 
2008 -2.10% -2.62% -3.14% -3.67% -4.19% -1.57% -2.10% -2.62% 
2009 -2.06% -2.57% -3.09% -3.60% -4.12% -1.54% -2.06% -2.57% 
2010 -2.03% -2.53% -3.04% -3.54% -4.05% -1.52% -2.03% -2.53% 
Qty of 
Demand 
        
2005 3.52% 4.40% 5.27% 6.15% 7.03% 2.64% 3.52% 4.40% 
2006 3.49% 4.36% 5.23% 6.10% 6.98% 2.62% 3.49% 4.36% 
2007 3.46% 4.32% 5.19% 6.05% 6.92% 2.59% 3.46% 4.32% 
2008 3.43% 4.29% 5.14% 6.00% 6.86% 2.57% 3.43% 4.29% 
2009 3.40% 4.25% 5.10% 5.95% 6.80% 2.55% 3.40% 4.25% 
2010 3.37% 4.21% 5.05% 5.90% 6.74% 2.53% 3.37% 4.21% 
Qty of 
Imports 
        
2005 108.19% 135.23% 162.28% 189.32% 216.37% 81.14% 108.19% 135.23% 
2006 90.10% 112.63% 135.15% 157.68% 180.20% 67.58% 90.10% 112.63% 
2007 76.46% 95.58% 114.69% 133.81% 152.93% 57.35% 76.46% 95.58% 
2008 65.86% 82.33% 98.80% 115.26% 131.73% 49.40% 65.86% 82.33% 
2009 57.43% 71.78% 86.14% 100.49% 114.85% 43.07% 57.43% 71.78% 
2010 50.58% 63.22% 75.86% 88.51% 101.15% 37.93% 50.58% 63.22% 
∆ CS         
2005 109.56% 166.14% 164.79% 192.50% 220.27% 82.05% 109.56% 137.14% 
2006 91.31% 114.29% 137.32% 160.40% 183.53% 68.39% 91.31% 114.29% 
2007 77.55% 97.06% 116.61% 136.20% 155.82% 58.09% 77.55% 97.06% 
2008 66.85% 83.66% 100.50% 117.38% 134.29% 50.08% 66.85% 83.66% 
2009 58.32% 72.98% 87.67% 102.38% 117.12% 43.69% 58.32% 72.98% 
2010 51.40% 64.31% 77.25% 90.21% 103.19% 38.51% 51.40% 64.31% 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table 5.7. Percentage changes in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-
quota tariff revenue from the baseline model, policy experiments 9 – 16. 
 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
∆ PS         
2005 103.64% 154.91% 153.66% 178.22% 202.47% 78.18% 103.64% 128.80% 
2006 85.97% 106.84% 127.46% 147.83% 167.94% 64.85% 85.97% 106.84% 
2007 72.64% 90.27% 107.70% 124.91% 141.91% 54.79% 72.64% 90.27% 
2008 62.28% 77.40% 92.34% 107.10% 121.67% 46.98% 62.28% 77.40% 
2009 54.03% 67.15% 80.11% 92.91% 105.55% 40.76% 54.03% 67.15% 
2010 47.34% 58.83% 70.18% 81.40% 92.47% 35.71% 47.34% 58.83% 
NS         
2005 328.47% 581.17% 576.19% 720.51% 878.32% 225.30% 328.47% 445.47% 
2006 257.21% 345.59% 443.44% 550.68% 667.22% 178.38% 257.21% 345.59% 
2007 207.76% 276.95% 352.92% 435.61% 524.97% 145.41% 207.76% 276.95% 
2008 171.88% 227.57% 288.27% 353.92% 424.49% 121.23% 171.88% 227.57% 
2009 144.88% 190.71% 240.33% 293.69% 350.76% 102.86% 144.88% 190.71% 
2010 124.01% 162.42% 203.74% 247.95% 295.02% 88.53% 124.01% 162.42% 
IQTR         
2005 -14.29% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% 0.00% -14.29% -28.57% 
2006 -14.29% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% 0.00% -14.29% -28.57% 
2007 -14.29% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% 0.00% -14.29% -28.57% 
2008 -14.29% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% 0.00% -14.29% -28.57% 
2009 -14.29% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% 0.00% -14.29% -28.57% 
2010 -14.29% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% 0.00% -14.29% -28.57% 
OQTR         
2005 454.38% 567.98% 681.58% 795.17% 908.77% 252.63% 343.51% 434.39% 
2006 241.36% 301.69% 362.03% 422.37% 482.71% 124.81% 173.08% 221.36% 
2007 161.04% 201.30% 241.57% 281.83% 322.09% 76.63% 108.84% 141.04% 
2008 119.04% 148.80% 178.56% 208.32% 238.08% 51.42% 75.23% 99.04% 
2009 93.31% 116.63% 139.96% 163.29% 186.61% 35.98% 54.65% 73.31% 
2010 75.98% 94.98% 113.97% 132.97% 151.96% 25.59% 40.79% 55.98% 
Source: Model simulations; PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table 5.8. Percentage changes in total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent from the baseline 
model, policy experiments 9 – 16. 
 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
TTR         
2005 130.36% 155.55% 180.73% 205.91% 231.10% 77.97% 96.14% 114.31% 
2006 103.24% 123.27% 143.29% 163.31% 183.33% 57.38% 71.86% 86.33% 
2007 84.53% 100.99% 117.44% 133.90% 150.36% 43.19% 55.10% 67.02% 
2008 70.90% 84.75% 98.61% 112.46% 126.32% 32.86% 42.91% 52.96% 
2009 60.57% 72.45% 84.33% 96.21% 108.09% 25.03% 33.67% 42.31% 
2010 52.50% 62.84% 73.17% 83.51% 93.85% 18.93% 26.46% 33.98% 
Prices         
2005 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -6.66% -6.66% -6.66% 
2006 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -6.66% -6.66% -6.66% 
2007 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -6.66% -6.66% -6.66% 
2008 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -6.66% -6.66% -6.66% 
2009 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -6.66% -6.66% -6.66% 
2010 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -6.66% -6.66% -6.66% 
TQR         
2005 33.33% 66.78% 100.11% 133.45% 166.78% -66.67% -33.33% 0.11% 
2006 33.33% 66.78% 100.11% 133.45% 166.78% -66.67% -33.33% 0.11% 
2007 33.33% 66.78% 100.11% 133.45% 166.78% -66.67% -33.33% 0.11% 
2008 33.33% 66.78% 100.11% 133.45% 166.78% -66.67% -33.33% 0.11% 
2009 33.33% 66.78% 100.11% 133.45% 166.78% -66.67% -33.33% 0.11% 
2010 33.33% 66.78% 100.11% 133.45% 166.78% -66.67% -33.33% 0.11% 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents.  
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Table 5.9. Percentage changes in quantity of supply, demand, imports, and consumer surplus 
from the baseline model, policy experiments 17 – 24. 
 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Qty of 
Supply 
        
2005 -3.31% -3.87% -4.42% -2.76% -3.31% -3.87% -4.42% -3.87% 
2006 -3.26% -3.80% -4.34% -2.71% -3.26% -3.80% -4.34% -3.80% 
2007 -3.20% -3.73% -4.26% -2.67% -3.20% -3.73% -4.26% -3.73% 
2008 -3.14% -3.67% -4.19% -2.62% -3.14% -3.67% -4.19% -3.67% 
2009 -3.09% -3.60% -4.12% -2.57% -3.09% -3.60% -4.12% -3.60% 
2010 -3.04% -3.54% -4.05% -2.53% -3.04% -3.54% -4.05% -3.54% 
Qty of 
Demand 
        
2005 5.27% 6.15% 7.03% 4.40% 5.27% 6.15% 7.03% 6.15% 
2006 5.23% 6.10% 6.98% 4.36% 5.23% 6.10% 6.98% 6.10% 
2007 5.19% 6.05% 6.92% 4.32% 5.19% 6.05% 6.92% 6.05% 
2008 5.14% 6.00% 6.86% 4.29% 5.14% 6.00% 6.86% 6.00% 
2009 5.10% 5.95% 6.80% 4.25% 5.10% 5.95% 6.80% 5.95% 
2010 5.05% 5.90% 6.74% 4.21% 5.05% 5.90% 6.74% 5.90% 
Qty of 
Imports 
        
2005 162.28% 189.32% 216.37% 135.23% 162.28% 189.32% 216.37% 189.32% 
2006 135.15% 157.68% 180.20% 112.63% 135.15% 157.68% 180.20% 157.68% 
2007 114.69% 133.81% 152.93% 95.58% 114.69% 133.81% 152.93% 133.81% 
2008 98.80% 115.26% 131.73% 82.33% 98.80% 115.26% 131.73% 115.26% 
2009 86.14% 100.49% 114.85% 71.78% 86.14% 100.49% 114.85% 100.49% 
2010 75.86% 88.51% 101.15% 63.22% 75.86% 88.51% 101.15% 88.51% 
∆ CS         
2005 
164.79% 192.50% 220.27% 137.14% 164.79% 192.50% 220.27% 192.50% 
2006 
137.32% 160.40% 183.53% 114.29% 137.32% 160.40% 183.53% 160.40% 
2007 
116.61% 136.20% 155.82% 97.06% 116.61% 136.20% 155.82% 136.20% 
2008 
100.50% 117.38% 134.29% 83.66% 100.50% 117.38% 134.29% 117.38% 
2009 
87.67% 102.38% 117.12% 72.98% 87.67% 102.38% 117.12% 102.38% 
2010 
77.25% 90.21% 103.19% 64.31% 77.25% 90.21% 103.19% 90.21% 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table 5.10. Percentage changes in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-
quota tariff revenue from the baseline model, policy experiments 17 – 24. 
 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
∆ PS         
2005 
153.66% 178.22% 202.47% 128.80% 153.66% 178.22% 202.47% 178.22% 
2006 
127.46% 147.83% 167.94% 106.84% 127.46% 147.83% 167.94% 147.83% 
2007 
107.70% 124.91% 141.91% 90.27% 107.70% 124.91% 141.91% 124.91% 
2008 
92.34% 107.10% 121.67% 77.40% 92.34% 107.10% 121.67% 107.10% 
2009 
80.11% 92.91% 105.55% 67.15% 80.11% 92.91% 105.55% 92.91% 
2010 
70.18% 81.40% 92.47% 58.83% 70.18% 81.40% 92.47% 81.40% 
NS         
2005 
576.19% 720.51% 878.32% 445.47% 576.19% 720.51% 878.32% 720.51% 
2006 
443.44% 550.68% 667.22% 345.59% 443.44% 550.68% 667.22% 550.68% 
2007 
352.92% 435.61% 524.97% 276.95% 352.92% 435.61% 524.97% 435.61% 
2008 
288.27% 353.92% 424.49% 227.57% 288.27% 353.92% 424.49% 353.92% 
2009 
240.33% 293.69% 350.76% 190.71% 240.33% 293.69% 350.76% 293.69% 
2010 
203.74% 247.95% 295.02% 162.42% 203.74% 247.95% 295.02% 247.95% 
IQTR         
2005 
-42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -57.14% 
2006 
-42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -57.14% 
2007 
-42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -57.14% 
2008 
-42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -57.14% 
2009 
-42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -57.14% 
2010 
-42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -28.57% -42.86% -57.14% -71.43% -57.14% 
OQTR         
2005 
525.26% 616.14% 707.02% 300.79% 368.95% 437.10% 505.26% 258.07% 
2006 
269.63% 317.90% 366.17% 141.02% 177.22% 213.42% 249.63% 108.95% 
2007 
173.25% 205.46% 237.67% 80.78% 104.94% 129.10% 153.25% 52.73% 
2008 
122.85% 146.66% 170.47% 49.28% 67.14% 84.99% 102.85% 23.33% 
2009 
91.97% 110.63% 129.29% 29.98% 43.98% 57.97% 71.97% 5.32% 
2010 
71.18% 86.38% 101.57% 16.99% 28.38% 39.78% 51.18% -6.81% 
Source: Model simulations; PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table 5.11. Percentage changes in total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent from the 
baseline model, policy experiments 17 – 24. 
 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
TTR         
2005 
132.49% 150.66% 168.83% 73.08% 84.24% 95.40% 106.56% 40.14% 
2006 
100.81% 115.28% 129.75% 49.40% 58.32% 67.25% 76.18% 19.22% 
2007 
78.94% 90.86% 102.78% 33.06% 40.44% 47.82% 55.20% 4.78% 
2008 
63.01% 73.07% 83.12% 21.17% 27.42% 33.67% 39.92% -5.73% 
2009 
50.94% 59.58% 68.21% 12.16% 17.55% 22.94% 28.33% -13.69% 
2010 
41.51% 49.04% 56.56% 5.13% 9.85% 14.57% 19.28% -19.91% 
Prices         
2005 
-6.66% -6.66% -6.66% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -20.00% 
2006 
-6.66% -6.66% -6.66% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -20.00% 
2007 
-6.66% -6.66% -6.66% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -20.00% 
2008 
-6.66% -6.66% -6.66% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -20.00% 
2009 
-6.66% -6.66% -6.66% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -20.00% 
2010 
-6.66% -6.66% -6.66% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -13.33% -20.00% 
TQR         
2005 
33.45% 66.78% 100.11% -66.55% -33.22% 0.11% 33.45% -66.67% 
2006 
33.45% 66.78% 100.11% -66.55% -33.22% 0.11% 33.45% -66.67% 
2007 
33.45% 66.78% 100.11% -66.55% -33.22% 0.11% 33.45% -66.67% 
2008 
33.45% 66.78% 100.11% -66.55% -33.22% 0.11% 33.45% -66.67% 
2009 
33.45% 66.78% 100.11% -66.55% -33.22% 0.11% 33.45% -66.67% 
2010 
33.45% 66.78% 100.11% -66.55% -33.22% 0.11% 33.45% -66.67% 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents.  
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Table 5.12. Percentage changes in quantity of supply, demand, imports, and consumer surplus 
from the baseline model, policy experiments 25 – 31. 
 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
Qty of 
Supply 
       
2005 
-4.42% -0.23% -1.10% -2.21% -3.31% -1.07% -1.10% 
2006 
-4.34% 0.00% -1.09% -2.17% -3.26% -0.61% -1.09% 
2007 
-4.26% 0.00% -1.07% -2.13% -3.20% -0.14% -1.07% 
2008 
-4.19% 0.00% -1.05% -2.10% -3.14% 0.00% -1.05% 
2009 
-4.12% 0.00% -1.03% -2.06% -3.09% 0.00% -1.03% 
2010 
-4.05% 0.00% -1.01% -2.03% -3.04% 0.00% -1.01% 
Qty of 
Demand 
       
2005 
7.03% 0.37% 1.76% 3.52% 5.27% 1.70% 1.76% 
2006 
6.98% 0.00% 1.74% 3.49% 5.23% 0.98% 1.74% 
2007 
6.92% 0.00% 1.73% 3.46% 5.19% 0.23% 1.73% 
2008 
6.86% 0.00% 1.71% 3.43% 5.14% 0.00% 1.71% 
2009 
6.80% 0.00% 1.70% 3.40% 5.10% 0.00% 1.70% 
2010 
6.74% 0.00% 1.68% 3.37% 5.05% 0.00% 1.68% 
Qty of 
Imports  
       
2005 
216.37% 11.30% 54.09% 108.19% 162.28% 52.38% 54.09% 
2006 
180.20% 0.00% 45.05% 90.10% 135.15% 25.34% 45.05% 
2007 
152.93% 0.00% 38.23% 76.46% 114.69% 5.04% 38.23% 
2008 
131.73% 0.00% 32.93% 65.86% 98.80% 0.00% 32.93% 
2009 
114.85% 0.00% 28.71% 57.43% 86.14% 0.00% 28.71% 
2010 
101.15% 0.00% 25.29% 50.58% 75.86% 0.00% 25.29% 
∆ CS        
2005 220.27% 11.38% 54.62% 109.56% 164.79% 52.89% 54.62% 
2006 183.53% 0.00% 45.53% 91.31% 137.32% 25.57% 45.53% 
2007 155.82% 0.00% 38.67% 77.55% 116.61% 5.09% 38.67% 
2008 134.29% 0.00% 33.34% 66.85% 100.50% 0.00% 33.34% 
2009 117.12% 0.00% 29.09% 58.32% 87.67% 0.00% 29.09% 
2010 103.19% 0.00% 25.64% 51.40% 77.25% 0.00% 25.64% 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table 5.13. Percentage changes in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-
quota tariff revenue from the baseline model, policy experiments 25 – 31. 
 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
∆ PS        
2005 
202.47% 11.05% 52.42% 103.64% 153.66% 50.78% 52.42% 
2006 
167.94% 0.00% 43.48% 85.97% 127.46% 24.57% 43.48% 
2007 
141.91% 0.00% 36.73% 72.64% 107.70% 4.89% 36.74% 
2008 
121.67% 0.00% 31.50% 62.28% 92.34% 0.00% 31.50% 
2009 
105.55% 0.00% 27.33% 54.03% 80.11% 0.00% 27.33% 
2010 
92.47% 0.00% 23.94% 47.34% 70.18% 0.00% 23.94% 
NS        
2005 
878.32% 23.73% 136.08% 328.47% 576.19% 130.91% 136.08% 
2006 
667.22% 0.00% 109.18% 257.21% 443.44% 56.58% 109.18% 
2007 
524.97% 0.00% 89.95% 207.76% 352.92% 10.25% 89.96% 
2008 
424.49% 0.00% 75.67% 171.88% 288.27% 0.00% 75.67% 
2009 
350.76% 0.00% 64.68% 144.88% 240.33% 0.00% 64.68% 
2010 
295.02% 0.00% 56.02% 124.01% 203.74% 0.00% 56.02% 
IQTR        
2005 
-71.43% 46.08% 25.21% -16.52% -58.26% 100.00% 71.43% 
2006 
-71.43% 46.08% 25.21% -16.52% -58.26% 100.00% 71.43% 
2007 
-71.43% 46.08% 25.21% -16.52% -58.26% 100.00% 71.43% 
2008 
-71.43% 46.08% 25.21% -16.52% -58.26% 100.00% 71.43% 
2009 
-71.43% 46.08% 25.21% -16.52% -58.26% 100.00% 71.43% 
2010 
-71.43% 46.08% 25.21% -16.52% -58.26% 100.00% 71.43% 
OQTR        
2005 
303.51% -100.00% 43.78% 144.15% 153.64% -100.00% -94.25% 
2006 
133.09% -77.36% 14.65% 58.40% 53.87% -100.00% -57.76% 
2007 
68.84% -50.98% 3.64% 26.04% 16.24% -100.00% -44.08% 
2008 
35.23% -37.21% -2.15% 9.10% -3.46% -80.74% -36.98% 
2009 
14.65% -28.80% -5.71% -1.29% -15.53% -62.49% -32.67% 
2010 
0.79% -23.15% -8.13% -8.30% -23.67% -50.24% -29.80% 
Source: Model simulations; PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table 5.14. Percentage changes in total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent from the 
baseline model, policy experiments 25 – 31. 
 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
TTR        
2005 
44.29% 1.00% 30.94% 33.07% 7.14% 38.27% 20.29% 
2006 
22.60% -10.67% 20.36% 17.92% -6.71% 8.05% 12.04% 
2007 
7.62% -8.62% 13.05% 7.47% -16.28% -12.72% 6.33% 
2008 
-3.28% -7.13% 7.73% -0.15% -23.25% -15.48% 2.17% 
2009 
-11.55% -6.01% 3.70% -5.93% -28.54% -13.04% -0.99% 
2010 
-18.00% -5.14% 0.55% -10.44% -32.67% -11.15% -3.46% 
Prices        
2005 
-20.00% -1.40% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -6.45% -6.66% 
2006 
-20.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -3.75% -6.66% 
2007 
-20.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -0.88% -6.66% 
2008 
-20.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% 0.00% -6.66% 
2009 
-20.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% 0.00% -6.66% 
2010 
-20.00% 0.00% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% 0.00% -6.66% 
TQR        
2005 
-33.33% -13.98% -33.33% -33.22% -33.33% -64.54% -33.33% 
2006 
-33.33% 0.00% -33.33% -33.22% -33.33% -37.47% -33.33% 
2007 
-33.33% 0.00% -33.33% -33.22% -33.33% -8.84% -33.33% 
2008 
-33.33% 0.00% -33.33% -33.22% -33.33% 0.00% -33.33% 
2009 
-33.33% 0.00% -33.33% -33.22% -33.33% 0.00% -33.33% 
2010 
-33.33% 0.00% -33.33% -33.22% -33.33% 0.00% -33.33% 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents.  
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Table 5.15. Percentage changes in quantity of supply, demand, imports, and consumer surplus 
from the baseline model, policy experiments 32 – 38. 
 
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
Qty of 
Supply 
       
2005 
-2.21% -3.31% -1.66% -2.21% -2.63% -3.31% -5.52% 
2006 
-2.17% -3.26% -1.63% -2.12% -2.17% -3.26% -5.43% 
2007 
-2.13% -3.20% -1.60% -1.61% -2.13% -3.20% -5.33% 
2008 
-2.10% -3.14% -1.08% -1.08% -2.10% -3.14% -5.24% 
2009 
-2.06% -3.09% -0.55% -1.03% -2.06% -3.09% -5.15% 
2010 
-2.03% -3.04% -0.01% -1.01% -2.03% -3.04% -5.06% 
Qty of 
Demand 
       
2005 
3.52% 5.27% 2.64% 3.52% 4.18% 5.27% 8.79% 
2006 
3.49% 5.23% 2.62% 3.41% 3.49% 5.23% 8.72% 
2007 
3.46% 5.19% 2.59% 2.60% 3.46% 5.19% 8.65% 
2008 
3.43% 5.14% 1.77% 1.77% 3.43% 5.14% 8.57% 
2009 
3.40% 5.10% 0.91% 1.70% 3.40% 5.10% 8.50% 
2010 
3.37% 5.05% 0.02% 1.68% 3.37% 5.05% 8.42% 
Qty of 
Imports 
       
2005 
108.19% 162.28% 81.14% 108.19% 128.57% 162.28% 270.46% 
2006 
90.10% 135.15% 67.58% 88.01% 90.10% 135.15% 225.25% 
2007 
76.46% 114.69% 57.35% 57.56% 76.46% 114.69% 191.16% 
2008 
65.86% 98.80% 34.02% 34.02% 65.86% 98.80% 164.66% 
2009 
57.43% 86.14% 15.37% 28.71% 57.43% 86.14% 143.56% 
2010 
50.58% 75.86% 0.31% 25.29% 50.58% 75.86% 126.44% 
∆ CS        
2005 
109.56% 164.79% 82.05% 109.56% 130.34% 164.79% 275.97% 
2006 
91.31% 137.32% 68.39% 89.18% 91.31% 137.32% 229.91% 
2007 
77.55% 116.61% 58.09% 58.30% 77.55% 116.61% 195.18% 
2008 
66.85% 100.50% 34.44% 34.44% 66.85% 100.50% 168.18% 
2009 
58.32% 87.67% 15.55% 29.09% 58.32% 87.67% 146.67% 
2010 
51.40% 77.25% 0.32% 25.64% 51.40% 77.25% 129.21% 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table 5.16. Percentage changes in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-
quota tariff revenue from the baseline model, policy experiments 32 – 38. 
 
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
∆ PS        
2005 
103.64% 153.66% 78.18% 103.64% 122.63% 153.66% 250.06% 
2006 
85.97% 127.46% 64.85% 84.01% 85.97% 127.46% 207.42% 
2007 
72.64% 107.70% 54.79% 54.99% 72.64% 107.70% 175.26% 
2008 
62.28% 92.34% 32.53% 32.53% 62.28% 92.34% 150.27% 
2009 
54.03% 80.11% 14.71% 27.33% 54.03% 80.11% 130.37% 
2010 
47.34% 70.18% 0.30% 23.94% 47.34% 70.18% 114.21% 
NS        
2005 
328.47% 576.19% 225.30% 328.47% 415.39% 576.19% 1233.94% 
2006 
257.21% 443.44% 178.38% 249.48% 257.21% 443.44% 927.89% 
2007 
207.76% 352.92% 145.41% 146.07% 207.76% 352.92% 723.44% 
2008 
171.88% 288.27% 78.51% 78.51% 171.88% 288.27% 580.20% 
2009 
144.88% 240.33% 32.67% 64.68% 144.88% 240.33% 475.90% 
2010 
124.01% 203.74% 0.62% 56.02% 124.01% 203.74% 397.63% 
IQTR        
2005 
71.43% 14.29% 137.74% 134.21% 71.43% -14.29% -100.00% 
2006 
71.43% 14.29% 167.40% 157.14% 71.43% -14.29% -100.00% 
2007 
71.43% 14.29% 199.59% 157.14% 71.43% -14.29% -100.00% 
2008 
71.43% 14.29% 200.00% 157.14% 71.43% -14.29% -100.00% 
2009 
71.43% 14.29% 200.00% 157.14% 71.43% -14.29% -100.00% 
2010 
71.43% 14.29% 200.00% 157.14% 71.43% -14.29% -100.00% 
OQTR        
2005 
40.63% 84.63% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -43.37% -100.00% 
2006 
4.09% 17.66% -100.00% -100.00% -96.64% -49.49% -100.00% 
2007 
-9.74% -7.62% -100.00% -100.00% -76.11% -51.87% -100.00% 
2008 
-17.02% -20.87% -100.00% -100.00% -65.46% -53.17% -100.00% 
2009 
-21.51% -29.01% -100.00% -82.65% -59.00% -54.00% -100.00% 
2010 
-24.55% -34.50% -100.00% -69.98% -54.69% -54.60% -100.00% 
Source: Model simulations; PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table 5.17. Percentage changes in total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent from the 
baseline model, policy experiments 32 – 38. 
 
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
TTR        
2005 
61.92% 36.00% 64.37% 61.92% 18.52% -23.26% -100.00% 
2006 
40.47% 15.84% 44.46% 38.92% -5.84% -30.47% -100.00% 
2007 
25.68% 1.94% 30.74% 12.22% -11.73% -35.47% -100.00% 
2008 
14.92% -8.18% 8.33% -7.15% -16.03% -39.13% -100.00% 
2009 
6.77% -15.84% -8.71% -9.68% -19.31% -41.92% -100.00% 
2010 
0.42% -21.81% -21.95% -10.89% -21.88% -44.11% -100.00% 
Prices        
2005 
-13.33% -20.00% -10.00% -13.33% -15.84% -20.00% -33.33% 
2006 
-13.33% -20.00% -10.00% -13.03% -13.33% -20.00% -33.33% 
2007 
-13.33% -20.00% -10.00% -10.04% -13.33% -20.00% -33.33% 
2008 
-13.33% -20.00% -6.89% -6.89% -13.33% -20.00% -33.33% 
2009 
-13.33% -20.00% -3.57% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -33.33% 
2010 
-13.33% -20.00% -0.08% -6.66% -13.33% -20.00% -33.33% 
TQR        
2005 
-33.22% -33.33% -100.00% -100.00% -58.39% -33.33% -100.00% 
2006 
-33.22% -33.33% -100.00% -96.98% -33.22% -33.33% -100.00% 
2007 
-33.22% -33.33% -100.00% -67.11% -33.22% -33.33% -100.00% 
2008 
-33.22% -33.33% -68.90% -35.57% -33.22% -33.33% -100.00% 
2009 
-33.22% -33.33% -35.68% -33.33% -33.22% -33.33% -100.00% 
2010 
-33.22% -33.33% -0.78% -33.33% -33.22% -33.33% -100.00% 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents. 
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Table 5.18. Percent differences in the quantity of supply, demand, imports and consumer surplus 
from the free market model (#38), various policy experiments. 
 
#1 #2 #3 #8 #26 #30 #34 
Qty of 
Supply 
       
2005 6.36% 5.85% 4.09% 1.17% 5.60% 4.71% 4.09% 
2006 6.69% 5.74% 4.02% 1.15% 5.74% 5.09% 4.02% 
2007 7.03% 5.63% 3.94% 1.13% 5.63% 5.48% 3.94% 
2008 7.39% 5.53% 3.87% 1.11% 5.53% 5.53% 4.39% 
2009 7.76% 5.43% 3.80% 1.09% 5.43% 5.43% 4.85% 
2010 8.14% 5.33% 3.73% 1.07% 5.33% 5.33% 5.32% 
Qty of 
Demand 
      
 
2005 -8.79% -8.08% -5.66% -1.62% -7.74% -6.52% -5.66% 
2006 -9.35% -8.02% -5.61% -1.60% -8.02% -7.12% -5.61% 
2007 -9.94% -7.96% -5.57% -1.59% -7.96% -7.75% -5.57% 
2008 -10.55% -7.90% -5.53% -1.58% -7.90% -7.90% -6.26% 
2009 -11.19% -7.83% -5.48% -1.57% -7.83% -7.83% -6.99% 
2010 -11.86% -7.77% -5.44% -1.55% -7.77% -7.77% -7.75% 
Qty of 
Imports 
      
 
2005 -79.43% -73.01% -51.10% -14.60% -69.96% -58.87% -51.10% 
2006 -80.73% -69.25% -48.48% -13.85% -69.25% -61.46% -48.48% 
2007 -81.96% -65.65% -45.96% -13.13% -65.65% -63.92% -45.96% 
2008 -83.12% -62.22% -43.55% -12.44% -62.22% -62.22% -49.36% 
2009 -84.21% -58.94% -41.26% -11.79% -58.94% -58.94% -52.63% 
2010 -85.23% -55.84% -39.09% -11.17% -55.84% -55.84% -55.70% 
∆ CS        
2005 -79.77% -73.40% -51.58% -14.82% -70.37% -59.34% -51.58% 
2006 -81.06% -69.69% -48.96% -14.06% -69.69% -61.94% -48.96% 
2007 -82.28% -66.12% -46.44% -13.33% -66.12% -64.40% -46.44% 
2008 -83.44% -62.71% -44.04% -12.64% -62.71% -62.71% -49.87% 
2009 -84.52% -59.46% -41.75% -11.98% -59.46% -59.46% -53.15% 
2010 -85.53% -56.37% -39.57% -11.35% -56.37% -56.37% -56.23% 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table 5.19. Percent differences in producer surplus, net surplus, and prices from the free market 
model (#38), various policy experiments. 
 
#1 #2 #3 #8 #26 #30        #34 
∆ PS        
2005 -78.13% -71.43% -49.10% -13.59% -68.28% -56.93% -49.10% 
2006 -79.43% -67.47% -46.38% -12.84% -67.47% -59.48% -46.38% 
2007 -80.67% -63.67% -43.77% -12.12% -63.67% -61.89% -43.77% 
2008 -81.83% -60.04% -41.27% -11.43% -60.04% -60.04% -47.05% 
2009 -82.93% -56.59% -38.90% -10.77% -56.59% -56.59% -50.21% 
2010 -83.95% -53.32% -36.65% -10.15% -53.32% -53.32% -53.18% 
NS        
2005 -95.64% -92.50% -75.61% -26.66% -90.72% -82.69% -75.61% 
2006 -96.16% -90.27% -72.92% -25.36% -90.27% -84.77% -72.92% 
2007 -96.63% -87.86% -70.20% -24.10% -87.86% -86.61% -70.20% 
2008 -97.04% -85.30% -67.48% -22.89% -85.30% -85.30% -73.76% 
2009 -97.40% -82.64% -64.78% -21.73% -82.64% -82.64% -76.96% 
2010 -97.72% -79.90% -62.11% -20.62% -79.90% -79.90% -79.78% 
Prices        
2005 50.77% 50.00% 35.01% 10.00% 47.90% 40.32% 35.01% 
2006 54.39% 50.00% 35.01% 10.00% 50.00% 44.38% 35.01% 
2007 58.29% 50.00% 35.01% 10.00% 50.00% 48.67% 35.01% 
2008 62.41% 50.00% 35.01% 10.00% 50.00% 50.00% 39.67% 
2009 66.81% 50.00% 35.01% 10.00% 50.00% 50.00% 44.65% 
2010 71.44% 50.00% 35.01% 10.00% 50.00% 50.00% 49.88% 
Source: Model simulations; PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus. 
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Table 5.20. Philippines: Percent differences in the corn market parameters – Free Market with 
Baseline Model. 
 
Quantity of 
Supply 
Quantity of 
Demand  
Quantity of 
Imports  
∆Consumer 
Surplus  
∆ Producer 
Surplus  
Net Surplus  Prices  
2005 
-5.52% 8.79% 270.46% 275.97% 250.06% 1233.94% -33.33% 
2006 
-5.43% 8.72% 225.25% 229.91% 207.42% 927.89% -33.33% 
2007 
-5.33% 8.65% 191.16% 195.18% 175.26% 723.44% -33.33% 
2008 
-5.24% 8.57% 164.66% 168.18% 150.27% 580.20% -33.33% 
2009 
-5.15% 8.50% 143.56% 146.67% 130.37% 475.90% -33.33% 
2010 
-5.06% 8.42% 126.44% 129.21% 114.21% 397.63% -33.33% 
Source: Model simulations. 
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Figure 5.5. Static impacts when the out-quota tariff is binding. 
 
( c ) in the final year of implementation, the out-quota tariff is reduced 
down to a level close to the in-quota tariff; the rent becomes smaller 
and in some instances may disappear outright when the in-quota and 
out-quota tariff are unified.
( b ) in the intermeidate period, the out-quota tariff is reduced; the effect 
is a reduction in the size of the rent and the out-quota tariff revenue for 
the government
( a ) at the initial period of implementation the out-quota tariff is 
relatively high and rent is noticeably large
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusion and Summary 
In this study, an existing TRQ model was utilized to determine how effective TRQs are 
as a trade policy instrument in facilitating trade liberalization and increasing market access. An 
empirical assessment of the effects of TRQs on the Philippine corn market was conducted and 
the economics and implications of its implementation were presented. The purpose of the study 
has been to address several key questions that have come up as a result of the implementation of 
TRQs in agricultural trade: (1) is the TRQ an appropriate transition mechanism? (2) How is the 
TRQ serving as a transition mechanism? (3) To what magnitude is the TRQ liberalizing trade? 
And (4) what are the effects of the TRQ on liberalizing trade?  
The results of the base model simulation demonstrate that the present TRQ system for 
corn leads to two different trade regimes: (1) an effective quota regime (Case 1), and (2) an 
effective out-quota tariff regime (Case 2). In the first three years, total imports were about equal 
to the volumes allowed under the TRQ, and the TRQ acts like a quota. The out-quota tariff was 
at its highest levels (100%) during this time and it was not profitable to import. In the years 
(1998 to 1999), the out-quota tariffs were adjusted down to 80% and the model results show that 
imports would increase beyond the TRQ quota – from the fourth to the tenth year of corn TRQ 
model, the out-quota tariff was binding. The discrepancy in growth between demand and supply 
make imports profitable despite the relatively high tariffs in the beginning and this was further 
confirmed by higher per unit quota rents. Changes in the size of the rent were noted – the further 
apart the in-quota and out-quota tariffs, the greater the amount of rents created, the greater the 
incentive to seek these rents (Boughner and de Gorter). As the out-quota rate was progressively 
reduced, market prices declined together with per unit quota rents. In the final year of 
implementation, the level of imports was sufficiently large and the domestic equilibrium price 
was close to the in-quota price.  
The number of policy experiments that can be set up can become very large given the 
wide range of possible combinations of the three components of the TRQ. In this study, the 38 
policy experiments that were selected is not exhaustive, but these experiments provide a good 
representation of possible scenarios that show the individual and combined effects of the 
components of the TRQ that may be of interest to policy makers. The results will show that as 
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the trade regimes evolve, with reductions in the out-quota and in-quota tariff rates, there are 
increases in the quotas, and changes in world market prices or in the exchange rates, they 
become more interesting.  
Results from the different policy experiments have given us some important insights into 
the workings of the TRQ and the effect of each component as a mechanism for trade 
liberalization. We get these by comparing the parameters of the different policy experiments with 
a baseline model of the present TRQ regime. We have learned that keeping the present TRQ 
system puts pressure on consumer surplus and dampens supply and demand in the corn market. 
Presently, the Philippine corn market is restricted by the out-quota tariff and it determines to a 
large extent, domestic prices paid for by consumers and importers.  
An experiment that mimics a de facto liberalization at the level of the out-quota rate of 
50% was compared with the baseline of the present TRQ regime, and the outcome was 
analogous. Bringing down the tariff to 35% or to the level of the in-quota rate does not do much 
to liberalize the corn market either. Abbott (2002) and Skully (2001c) noted that the reduction of 
the out-quota tariff rates were preferable, since when it is not binding – then it makes no 
difference, and when it is binding, the effect is that it is trade enhancing. Reducing the out-quota 
rate, which is in essence the MFN rate, also brings the TRQ system nearer to being phased-out. 
In experiments where the quota was fixed but both the in-quota and out-quota tariffs were 
progressively reduced, a steady increase in the quantities of supply, demand and imports were 
observed when compared to the baseline. Although government revenues would be affected as a 
result of the lower tariffs, by progressively reducing the out-quota tariff, incremental increases in 
consumer surplus together with relatively smaller losses in producer surplus lead to positive net 
surpluses. The quota rents were observed to decline as a result of the smaller gap between the in-
quota and out-quota tariffs. Skully (2001c), however, pointed out that the in-quota tariff should 
not be reduced too much if in doing so would increase the gap between tariff rates and likely 
result is an increase of the quota rents. It is thus important for policy makers to find a workable 
tariff level that would serve the interest of stakeholders in the sector – producers, consumers and 
government.  
The alternative of increasing the TRQ quotas will have no significant impact in 
liberalizing the corn market as it is the out-quota tariff that determines domestic market prices. It 
was shown that even increasing the quota to levels of up to 15% of consumption does not 
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improve consumer and net surplus, and only have marginal downward effects on prices. The 
increase in the level of imports hurt producer surplus in all cases.  
In Chapter 5, it was shown that there is another issue with using the TRQ as a 
liberalization mechanism – the quota portion of the TRQ. To illustrate, as a result of 
implementing the quota, rents were created and inefficient procedures for the distribution of 
those rents have surfaced. Bougner and de Gorter and Monnich (2003b) have suggested that rent 
seeking was induced by varying methods of allocation of rights to import (or export), resulting in 
the possible dissipation of those rents. Imperfect competition and non-tradability of quotas and 
licenses lead to potential loses in economic efficiency, and low quota fill rates often keep 
domestic markets insulated. 
This study of the implementation of TRQs gives policy makers and trade negotiators a 
better understanding of how the TRQ operate and there are important policy implications that 
emerge from this analysis of the TRQ as a mechanism for trade liberalization. The analysis of the 
Philippine corn market reveals that the impact of TRQ implementation is quite similar to that of 
traditional quantitative restrictions. Quota rents are prevalent and efficiency losses occur. The 
TRQ model of Philippine corn sector further revealed that, depending upon the regime in which 
the country is trading, an increase in the import quota and/or a decrease in the out-quota tariff 
would have different impacts on consumer, producer and net surplus.  
This is an important point that needs to be emphasized in the ongoing negotiations on 
TRQ reform and market access in the WTO. A clear understanding and knowledge of the regime 
in which the country is trading can help policy makers determine which individual or 
combination of the policy components of the TRQ – the in-quota and out-quota tariff and the 
import quota, should be used in order to increase market access or to address the concerns of 
stakeholders in the corn sector – producers and consumers.  
It must be pointed out that there is no single trade instrument that can be used in all cases 
– no one size fits all. Boughner commented that in principle, “if it was shown that the out-quota 
tariffs were effective, then the elimination of quotas should have no significant effect on the level 
of supply, demand and imports and so the out-quota tariffs can be reduced from their current 
levels. On the other hand, if it was the in-quota tariffs that were effective, then they should be 
reduced to the tariff equivalent created by the import quota and further reduced from there. This 
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could be done if the quota was not set beyond the free trade level of imports. If quotas were 
effective, then the quotas should be replaced with their tariff equivalents and reduced.”  
Some future areas of study could cover an expansion of the model coverage to include 
the other inter-related sectors with the corn industry – i.e. the swine and chicken industries. The 
swine and chicken industries are equally important in Philippine agriculture since they are largest 
users of corn in the market; pork and chicken meat are also governed by the TRQ system. The 
model could also be expanded to come up with band estimates of quantities of supply, demand 
and imports. Rice market may also be considered since this is a complementary commodity with 
corn, and they both affect the food security of the country. The impact of the implementation of 
TRQs cannot be generalized and unique outcomes are expected from different commodities and 
markets; some areas for future research are to look at the effects of implementation and 
administration of TRQs across the different commodities covered by the TRQ – e.g. sugar 
market. 
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Appendix A - Appendix Tables 
Table A.1. Quantity of supply, demand, imports, and change in consumer surplus, policy 
experiments 1 – 8. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Qty of 
Supply 
        
2005 5231.360 5206.044 5119.769 5206.044 5148.527 5091.011 5033.494 4975.978 
2006 5348.259 5300.598 5214.323 5300.598 5243.081 5185.565 5128.048 5070.532 
2007 5466.581 5395.152 5308.877 5395.152 5337.635 5280.119 5222.602 5165.086 
2008 5586.339 5489.706 5403.431 5489.706 5432.190 5374.673 5317.156 5259.640 
2009 5707.544 5584.260 5497.985 5584.260 5526.744 5469.227 5411.711 5354.194 
2010 5830.209 5678.814 5592.539 5678.814 5621.298 5563.781 5506.265 5448.748 
Qty of 
Demand 
        
2005 5448.360 5490.855 5635.673 5490.855 5587.400 5683.945 5780.490 5877.035 
2006 5565.259 5646.861 5794.574 5646.861 5745.337 5843.812 5942.288 6040.764 
2007 5683.581 5808.324 5958.991 5808.324 5908.769 6009.214 6109.659 6210.104 
2008 5803.339 5975.471 6129.152 5975.471 6077.925 6180.379 6282.833 6385.287 
2009 5924.544 6148.541 6305.296 6148.541 6253.044 6357.547 6462.050 6566.553 
2010 6047.209 6327.782 6487.672 6327.782 6434.375 6540.969 6647.562 6754.155 
Qty of 
Imports 
        
2005 217.000 284.811 515.904 284.811 438.873 592.934 746.996 901.057 
2006 217.000 346.263 580.251 346.263 502.256 658.247 814.240 970.232 
2007 217.000 413.172 650.114 413.172 571.134 729.095 887.057 1045.018 
2008 217.000 485.765 725.721 485.765 645.735 805.706 965.677 1125.647 
2009 217.000 564.281 807.311 564.281 726.300 888.320 1050.339 1212.359 
2010 217.000 648.968 895.133 648.968 813.077 977.188 1141.297 1305.407 
∆ CS         
2005 73.312 96.374 175.450 96.374 149.012 201.961 255.186 308.654 
2006 73.304 117.311 197.541 117.311 170.722 224.431 278.406 332.615 
2007 73.296 140.155 221.564 140.155 194.355 248.842 303.584 358.549 
2008 73.289 164.991 247.605 164.991 219.996 275.278 330.803 386.540 
2009 73.281 191.908 275.752 191.908 247.737 303.829 360.152 416.677 
2010 73.274 221.000 306.098 221.000 277.668 334.587 391.724 449.052 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus.
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Table A.2. Change in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-quota tariff 
revenue, policy experiments 1 – 8. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
∆ PS         
2005 -71.835 -93.836 -167.194 -93.836 -143.020 -191.086 -238.023 -283.823 
2006 -71.859 -113.648 -187.344 -113.648 -163.060 -211.346 -258.500 -304.512 
2007 -71.881 -135.063 -209.067 -135.063 -184.682 -233.170 -280.520 -326.724 
2008 -71.903 -158.118 -232.402 -158.118 -207.924 -256.594 -304.120 -350.496 
2009 -71.925 -182.853 -257.385 -182.853 -232.826 -281.656 -329.337 -375.864 
2010 -71.945 -209.307 -284.053 -209.307 -259.424 -308.394 -356.208 -402.863 
NS         
2005 1.477 2.538 8.256 2.538 5.992 10.875 17.163 24.831 
2006 1.446 3.663 10.197 3.663 7.662 13.085 19.906 28.103 
2007 1.415 5.092 12.497 5.092 9.673 15.672 23.064 31.825 
2008 1.385 6.873 15.203 6.873 12.072 18.684 26.683 36.044 
2009 1.357 9.055 18.368 9.055 14.911 22.173 30.815 40.814 
2010 1.329 11.693 22.045 11.693 18.243 26.193 35.516 46.189 
IQTR         
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 
2006 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 
2007 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 
2008 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 
2009 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 
2010 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 1.194 
OQTR         
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.730 9.762 12.406 11.660 7.525 
2006 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.109 12.551 14.561 13.139 8.286 
2007 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.789 15.582 16.899 14.741 9.108 
2008 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.782 18.864 19.427 16.471 9.995 
2009 0.000 0.000 0.000 19.100 22.409 22.154 18.333 10.949 
2010 0.000 0.000 0.000 23.758 26.227 25.086 20.335 11.972 
Source: Model simulations PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table A.3. Total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent, policy experiments 1 – 8. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
TTR         
2005 0.000 15.665 19.862 4.923 10.956 13.599 12.853 8.718 
2006 0.000 19.044 22.340 8.303 13.745 15.755 14.333 9.479 
2007 0.000 22.724 25.029 11.983 16.775 18.093 15.935 10.302 
2008 0.000 26.717 27.940 15.976 20.058 20.621 17.664 11.189 
2009 0.000 31.035 31.081 20.294 23.603 23.347 19.527 12.142 
2010 0.000 35.693 34.463 24.952 27.421 26.280 21.528 13.166 
Prices         
2005 0.170 0.165 0.149 0.165 0.154 0.143 0.132 0.121 
2006 0.174 0.165 0.149 0.165 0.154 0.143 0.132 0.121 
2007 0.179 0.165 0.149 0.165 0.154 0.143 0.132 0.121 
2008 0.183 0.165 0.149 0.165 0.154 0.143 0.132 0.121 
2009 0.189 0.165 0.149 0.165 0.154 0.143 0.132 0.121 
2010 0.194 0.165 0.149 0.165 0.154 0.143 0.132 0.121 
TQR         
2005 0.060 0.055 0.039 0.050 0.039 0.028 0.016 0.005 
2006 0.064 0.055 0.039 0.050 0.039 0.028 0.016 0.005 
2007 0.069 0.055 0.039 0.050 0.039 0.028 0.016 0.005 
2008 0.073 0.055 0.039 0.050 0.039 0.028 0.016 0.005 
2009 0.079 0.055 0.039 0.050 0.039 0.028 0.016 0.005 
2010 0.084 0.055 0.039 0.050 0.039 0.028 0.016 0.005 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents. 
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Table A.4. Quantity of supply, demand, imports, and change in consumer surplus, policy 
experiments 9 – 16. 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Qty of 
Supply 
        
2005 5091.011 5062.252 5033.494 5004.736 4975.978 5119.769 5091.011 5062.252 
2006 5185.565 5156.807 5128.048 5099.290 5070.532 5214.323 5185.565 5156.807 
2007 5280.119 5251.361 5222.602 5193.844 5165.086 5308.877 5280.119 5251.361 
2008 5374.673 5345.915 5317.156 5288.398 5259.640 5403.431 5374.673 5345.915 
2009 5469.227 5440.469 5411.711 5382.952 5354.194 5497.985 5469.227 5440.469 
2010 5563.781 5535.023 5506.265 5477.506 5448.748 5592.539 5563.781 5535.023 
Qty of 
Demand 
        
2005 5683.945 5732.217 5780.490 5828.762 5877.035 5635.673 5683.945 5732.217 
2006 5843.812 5893.050 5942.288 5991.526 6040.764 5794.574 5843.812 5893.050 
2007 6009.214 6059.437 6109.659 6159.882 6210.104 5958.991 6009.214 6059.437 
2008 6180.379 6231.606 6282.833 6334.060 6385.287 6129.152 6180.379 6231.606 
2009 6357.547 6409.799 6462.050 6514.302 6566.553 6305.296 6357.547 6409.799 
2010 6540.969 6594.265 6647.562 6700.859 6754.155 6487.672 6540.969 6594.265 
Qty of 
Imports 
        
2005 592.934 669.965 746.996 824.026 901.057 515.904 592.934 669.965 
2006 658.247 736.243 814.240 892.236 970.232 580.251 658.247 736.243 
2007 729.095 808.076 887.057 966.038 1045.018 650.114 729.095 808.076 
2008 805.706 885.691 965.677 1045.662 1125.647 725.721 805.706 885.691 
2009 888.320 969.330 1050.339 1131.350 1212.359 807.311 888.320 969.330 
2010 977.188 1059.242 1141.297 1223.353 1305.407 895.133 977.188 1059.242 
∆ CS         
2005 201.961 256.490 255.186 281.891 308.654 175.450 201.961 228.541 
2006 224.431 251.387 278.406 305.483 332.615 197.541 224.431 251.387 
2007 248.842 276.183 303.584 331.040 358.549 221.564 248.842 276.183 
2008 275.278 303.012 330.803 358.647 386.540 247.605 275.278 303.012 
2009 303.829 331.964 360.152 388.392 416.677 275.752 303.829 331.964 
2010 334.587 363.130 391.724 420.367 449.052 306.098 334.587 363.130 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table A.5. Change in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-quota tariff 
revenue, policy experiments 9 – 16. 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
∆ PS         
2005 -191.086 -239.201 -238.023 -261.065 -283.823 -167.194 -191.086 -214.696 
2006 -211.346 -235.065 -258.500 -281.649 -304.512 -187.344 -211.346 -235.065 
2007 -233.170 -256.988 -280.520 -303.766 -326.724 -209.067 -233.170 -256.988 
2008 -256.594 -280.500 -304.120 -327.452 -350.496 -232.402 -256.594 -280.500 
2009 -281.656 -305.641 -329.337 -352.745 -375.864 -257.385 -281.656 -305.641 
2010 -308.394 -332.445 -356.208 -379.681 -402.863 -284.053 -308.394 -332.445 
NS         
2005 10.875 17.289 17.163 20.826 24.831 8.256 10.875 13.845 
2006 13.085 16.322 19.906 23.834 28.103 10.197 13.085 16.322 
2007 15.672 19.195 23.064 27.275 31.825 12.497 15.672 19.195 
2008 18.684 22.512 26.683 31.195 36.044 15.203 18.684 22.512 
2009 22.173 26.323 30.815 35.646 40.814 18.368 22.173 26.323 
2010 26.193 30.685 35.516 40.686 46.189 22.045 26.193 30.685 
IQTR         
2005 7.161 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 8.355 7.161 5.968 
2006 7.161 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 8.355 7.161 5.968 
2007 7.161 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 8.355 7.161 5.968 
2008 7.161 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 8.355 7.161 5.968 
2009 7.161 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 8.355 7.161 5.968 
2010 7.161 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 8.355 7.161 5.968 
OQTR         
2005 20.676 24.913 29.150 33.386 37.623 13.152 16.541 19.930 
2006 24.269 28.558 32.848 37.138 41.428 15.983 19.415 22.847 
2007 28.165 32.509 36.853 41.197 45.541 19.057 22.532 26.007 
2008 32.379 36.778 41.177 45.576 49.976 22.384 25.903 29.422 
2009 36.923 41.378 45.834 50.289 54.745 25.974 29.538 33.103 
2010 41.810 46.323 50.836 55.349 59.862 29.838 33.448 37.059 
Source: Model simulations PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table A.6. Total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent, policy experiments 9 – 16. 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
TTR         
2005 27.837 30.881 33.924 36.967 40.010 21.506 23.702 25.898 
2006 31.430 34.526 37.622 40.718 43.815 24.338 26.576 28.814 
2007 35.326 38.477 41.627 44.778 47.928 27.412 29.693 31.975 
2008 39.540 42.746 45.951 49.157 52.363 30.738 33.064 35.390 
2009 44.084 47.346 50.608 53.870 57.132 34.328 36.699 39.070 
2010 48.971 52.291 55.610 58.930 62.249 38.192 40.609 43.026 
Prices         
2005 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.154 0.154 0.154 
2006 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.154 0.154 0.154 
2007 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.154 0.154 0.154 
2008 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.154 0.154 0.154 
2009 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.154 0.154 0.154 
2010 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.154 0.154 0.154 
TQR         
2005 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.039 0.044 0.005 0.011 0.017 
2006 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.039 0.044 0.005 0.011 0.017 
2007 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.039 0.044 0.005 0.011 0.017 
2008 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.039 0.044 0.005 0.011 0.017 
2009 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.039 0.044 0.005 0.011 0.017 
2010 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.039 0.044 0.005 0.011 0.017 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents. 
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Table A.7. Quantity of supply, demand, imports, and change in consumer surplus, policy 
experiments 17 – 24. 
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Qty of 
Supply 
        
2005 5033.494 5004.736 4975.978 5062.252 5033.494 5004.736 4975.978 5004.736 
2006 5128.048 5099.290 5070.532 5156.807 5128.048 5099.290 5070.532 5099.290 
2007 5222.602 5193.844 5165.086 5251.361 5222.602 5193.844 5165.086 5193.844 
2008 5317.156 5288.398 5259.640 5345.915 5317.156 5288.398 5259.640 5288.398 
2009 5411.711 5382.952 5354.194 5440.469 5411.711 5382.952 5354.194 5382.952 
2010 5506.265 5477.506 5448.748 5535.023 5506.265 5477.506 5448.748 5477.506 
Qty of 
Demand 
        
2005 5780.490 5828.762 5877.035 5732.217 5780.490 5828.762 5877.035 5828.762 
2006 5942.288 5991.526 6040.764 5893.050 5942.288 5991.526 6040.764 5991.526 
2007 6109.659 6159.882 6210.104 6059.437 6109.659 6159.882 6210.104 6159.882 
2008 6282.833 6334.060 6385.287 6231.606 6282.833 6334.060 6385.287 6334.060 
2009 6462.050 6514.302 6566.553 6409.799 6462.050 6514.302 6566.553 6514.302 
2010 6647.562 6700.859 6754.155 6594.265 6647.562 6700.859 6754.155 6700.859 
Qty of 
Imports 
        
2005 255.186 281.891 308.654 228.541 255.186 281.891 308.654 281.891 
2006 278.406 305.483 332.615 251.387 278.406 305.483 332.615 305.483 
2007 303.584 331.040 358.549 276.183 303.584 331.040 358.549 331.040 
2008 330.803 358.647 386.540 303.012 330.803 358.647 386.540 358.647 
2009 360.152 388.392 416.677 331.964 360.152 388.392 416.677 388.392 
2010 391.724 420.367 449.052 363.130 391.724 420.367 449.052 420.367 
∆ CS         
2005 255.186 281.891 308.654 228.541 255.186 281.891 308.654 281.891 
2006 278.406 305.483 332.615 251.387 278.406 305.483 332.615 305.483 
2007 303.584 331.040 358.549 276.183 303.584 331.040 358.549 331.040 
2008 330.803 358.647 386.540 303.012 330.803 358.647 386.540 358.647 
2009 360.152 388.392 416.677 331.964 360.152 388.392 416.677 388.392 
2010 391.724 420.367 449.052 363.130 391.724 420.367 449.052 420.367 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table A.8. Change in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-quota tariff 
revenue, policy experiments 17 – 24. 
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
∆ PS         
2005 -238.023 -261.065 -283.823 -214.696 -238.023 -261.065 -283.823 -261.065 
2006 -258.500 -281.649 -304.512 -235.065 -258.500 -281.649 -304.512 -281.649 
2007 -280.520 -303.766 -326.724 -256.988 -280.520 -303.766 -326.724 -303.766 
2008 -304.120 -327.452 -350.496 -280.500 -304.120 -327.452 -350.496 -327.452 
2009 -329.337 -352.745 -375.864 -305.641 -329.337 -352.745 -375.864 -352.745 
2010 -356.208 -379.681 -402.863 -332.445 -356.208 -379.681 -402.863 -379.681 
NS         
2005 17.163 20.826 24.831 13.845 17.163 20.826 24.831 20.826 
2006 19.906 23.834 28.103 16.322 19.906 23.834 28.103 23.834 
2007 23.064 27.275 31.825 19.195 23.064 27.275 31.825 27.275 
2008 26.683 31.195 36.044 22.512 26.683 31.195 36.044 31.195 
2009 30.815 35.646 40.814 26.323 30.815 35.646 40.814 35.646 
2010 35.516 40.686 46.189 30.685 35.516 40.686 46.189 40.686 
IQTR         
2005 4.774 3.581 2.387 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 3.581 
2006 4.774 3.581 2.387 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 3.581 
2007 4.774 3.581 2.387 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 3.581 
2008 4.774 3.581 2.387 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 3.581 
2009 4.774 3.581 2.387 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 3.581 
2010 4.774 3.581 2.387 5.968 4.774 3.581 2.387 3.581 
OQTR         
2005 23.320 26.709 30.099 14.948 17.490 20.032 22.574 13.355 
2006 26.279 29.710 33.142 17.135 19.709 22.283 24.857 14.855 
2007 29.483 32.958 36.433 19.506 22.112 24.718 27.325 16.479 
2008 32.942 36.461 39.980 22.067 24.706 27.346 29.985 18.231 
2009 36.667 40.231 43.796 24.827 27.500 30.174 32.847 20.116 
2010 40.669 44.280 47.890 27.794 30.502 33.210 35.917 22.140 
Source: Model simulations PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table A.9. Total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent, policy experiments 17 – 24. 
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
TTR         
2005 28.094 30.290 32.486 20.915 22.264 23.612 24.961 16.935 
2006 31.053 33.291 35.529 23.103 24.483 25.863 27.244 18.436 
2007 34.257 36.538 38.820 25.473 26.886 28.299 29.712 20.059 
2008 37.716 40.042 42.367 28.034 29.480 30.926 32.372 21.811 
2009 41.441 43.812 46.183 30.794 32.274 33.754 35.234 23.696 
2010 45.443 47.860 50.277 33.761 35.276 36.790 38.304 25.720 
Prices         
2005 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.132 
2006 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.132 
2007 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.132 
2008 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.132 
2009 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.132 
2010 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.132 
TQR         
2005 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.005 
2006 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.005 
2007 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.005 
2008 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.005 
2009 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.005 
2010 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.005 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents. 
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Table A. 10. Quantity of supply, demand, imports, and change in consumer surplus, policy 
experiments 25 – 31. 
 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
Qty of 
Supply 
       
2005 4975.978 5194.027 5148.527 5091.011 5033.494 5150.347 5148.527 
2006 5070.532 5300.598 5243.081 5185.565 5128.048 5268.248 5243.081 
2007 5165.086 5395.152 5337.635 5280.119 5222.602 5387.568 5337.635 
2008 5259.640 5489.706 5432.190 5374.673 5317.156 5489.706 5432.190 
2009 5354.194 5584.260 5526.744 5469.227 5411.711 5584.260 5526.744 
2010 5448.748 5678.814 5621.298 5563.781 5506.265 5678.814 5621.298 
Qty of 
Demand 
       
2005 5877.035 5511.027 5587.400 5683.945 5780.490 5584.347 5587.400 
2006 6040.764 5646.861 5745.337 5843.812 5942.288 5702.248 5745.337 
2007 6210.104 5808.324 5908.769 6009.214 6109.659 5821.568 5908.769 
2008 6385.287 5975.471 6077.925 6180.379 6282.833 5975.471 6077.925 
2009 6566.553 6148.541 6253.044 6357.547 6462.050 6148.541 6253.044 
2010 6754.155 6327.782 6434.375 6540.969 6647.562 6327.782 6434.375 
Qty of 
Imports 
       
2005 901.057 317.000 438.873 592.934 746.996 434.000 438.873 
2006 970.232 346.263 502.256 658.247 814.240 434.000 502.256 
2007 1045.018 413.172 571.134 729.095 887.057 434.000 571.134 
2008 1125.647 485.765 645.735 805.706 965.677 485.765 645.735 
2009 1212.359 564.281 726.300 888.320 1050.339 564.281 726.300 
2010 1305.407 648.968 813.077 977.188 1141.297 648.968 813.077 
∆ CS        
2005 308.654 107.345 149.012 201.961 255.186 147.342 149.012 
2006 332.615 117.311 170.722 224.431 278.406 147.313 170.722 
2007 358.549 140.155 194.349 248.842 303.584 147.284 194.355 
2008 386.540 164.991 219.996 275.278 330.803 164.991 219.996 
2009 416.677 191.908 247.737 303.829 360.152 191.908 247.737 
2010 449.052 221.000 277.668 334.587 391.724 221.000 277.668 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table A. 11. Change in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-quota tariff 
revenue, policy experiments 25 – 31. 
 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
∆ PS        
2005 -283.823 -104.204 -143.020 -191.086 -238.023 -141.482 -143.020 
2006 -304.512 -113.648 -163.060 -211.346 -258.500 -141.577 -163.060 
2007 -326.724 -135.063 -184.676 -233.170 -280.520 -141.670 -184.682 
2008 -350.496 -158.118 -207.924 -256.594 -304.120 -158.118 -207.924 
2009 -375.864 -182.853 -232.826 -281.656 -329.337 -182.853 -232.826 
2010 -402.863 -209.307 -259.424 -308.394 -356.208 -209.307 -259.424 
NS        
2005 24.831 3.140 5.992 10.875 17.163 5.861 5.992 
2006 28.103 3.663 7.662 13.085 19.906 5.736 7.662 
2007 31.825 5.092 9.672 15.672 23.064 5.614 9.673 
2008 36.044 6.873 12.072 18.684 26.683 6.873 12.072 
2009 40.814 9.055 14.911 22.173 30.815 9.055 14.911 
2010 46.189 11.693 18.243 26.193 35.516 11.693 18.243 
IQTR        
2005 2.387 12.205 10.461 6.974 3.487 16.709 14.322 
2006 2.387 12.205 10.461 6.974 3.487 16.709 14.322 
2007 2.387 12.205 10.461 6.974 3.487 16.709 14.322 
2008 2.387 12.205 10.461 6.974 3.487 16.709 14.322 
2009 2.387 12.205 10.461 6.974 3.487 16.709 14.322 
2010 2.387 12.205 10.461 6.974 3.487 16.709 14.322 
OQTR        
2005 15.049 0.000 5.362 9.106 9.460 0.000 0.214 
2006 16.571 1.609 8.151 11.261 10.939 0.000 3.003 
2007 18.216 5.289 11.182 13.599 12.541 0.000 6.034 
2008 19.990 9.282 14.464 16.127 14.271 2.847 9.316 
2009 21.898 13.600 18.009 18.854 16.133 7.165 12.861 
2010 23.945 18.258 21.827 21.786 18.135 11.823 16.679 
Source: Model simulations PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table A. 12. Total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent, policy experiments 25 – 31. 
 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
TTR        
2005 17.436 12.205 15.823 16.080 12.947 16.709 14.536 
2006 18.958 13.814 18.612 18.235 14.426 16.709 17.325 
2007 20.603 17.494 21.643 20.573 16.028 16.709 20.356 
2008 22.377 21.487 24.925 23.101 17.758 19.556 23.638 
2009 24.285 25.805 28.470 25.828 19.620 23.874 27.183 
2010 26.332 30.463 32.288 28.760 21.622 28.532 31.001 
Prices        
2005 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 
2006 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 
2007 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 
2008 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 
2009 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 
2010 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 
Total QR        
2005 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.011 
2006 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 
2007 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.015 0.011 
2008 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.011 
2009 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.011 
2010 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.011 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents. 
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Table A.13. Quantity of supply, demand, imports, and change in consumer surplus, policy 
experiments 32 – 38. 
 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
Qty of 
Supply 
       
2005 5091.011 5033.494 5119.769 5091.011 5069.333 5033.494 4918.461 
2006 5185.565 5128.048 5214.323 5188.237 5185.565 5128.048 5013.015 
2007 5280.119 5222.602 5308.877 5308.555 5280.119 5222.602 5107.569 
2008 5374.673 5317.156 5430.297 5430.297 5374.673 5317.156 5202.123 
2009 5469.227 5411.711 5553.475 5526.744 5469.227 5411.711 5296.677 
2010 5563.781 5506.265 5678.102 5621.298 5563.781 5506.265 5391.231 
Qty of 
Demand 
       
2005 5683.945 5780.490 5635.673 5683.945 5720.333 5780.490 5973.579 
2006 5843.812 5942.288 5794.574 5839.237 5843.812 5942.288 6139.239 
2007 6009.214 6109.659 5958.991 5959.555 6009.214 6109.659 6310.549 
2008 6180.379 6282.833 6081.297 6081.297 6180.379 6282.833 6487.741 
2009 6357.547 6462.050 6204.475 6253.044 6357.547 6462.050 6671.057 
2010 6540.969 6647.562 6329.102 6434.375 6540.969 6647.562 6860.748 
Qty of 
Imports 
       
2005 592.934 746.996 515.904 592.934 651.000 746.996 1055.118 
2006 658.247 814.240 580.251 651.000 658.247 814.240 1126.224 
2007 729.095 887.057 650.114 651.000 729.095 887.057 1202.980 
2008 805.706 965.677 651.000 651.000 805.706 965.677 1285.618 
2009 888.320 1050.339 651.000 726.300 888.320 1050.339 1374.380 
2010 977.188 1141.297 651.000 813.077 977.188 1141.297 1469.517 
∆ CS        
2005 201.961 255.186 175.450 201.961 221.991 255.186 362.334 
2006 224.431 278.406 197.541 221.929 224.431 278.406 387.027 
2007 248.842 303.584 221.564 221.870 248.842 303.584 413.708 
2008 275.278 330.803 221.812 221.812 275.278 330.803 442.461 
2009 303.829 360.152 221.755 247.737 303.829 360.152 473.376 
2010 334.587 391.724 221.700 277.668 334.587 391.724 506.542 
Source: Model simulations; CS – Consumer surplus. 
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Table A.14. Change in producer surplus, net surplus, in-quota tariff revenue, and out-quota tariff 
revenue, policy experiments 32 – 38. 
 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
∆ PS        
2005 -191.086 -238.023 -167.194 -191.086 -208.909 -238.023 -328.477 
2006 -211.346 -258.500 -187.344 -209.128 -211.346 -258.500 -349.375 
2007 -233.170 -280.520 -209.067 -209.339 -233.170 -280.520 -371.776 
2008 -256.594 -304.120 -209.544 -209.544 -256.594 -304.120 -395.716 
2009 -281.656 -329.337 -209.742 -232.826 -281.656 -329.337 -421.231 
2010 -308.394 -356.208 -209.934 -259.424 -308.394 -356.208 -448.355 
NS        
2005 10.875 17.163 8.256 10.875 13.081 17.163 33.857 
2006 13.085 19.906 10.197 12.801 13.085 19.906 37.651 
2007 15.672 23.064 12.497 12.530 15.672 23.064 41.931 
2008 18.684 26.683 12.268 12.268 18.684 26.683 46.745 
2009 22.173 30.815 12.013 14.911 22.173 30.815 52.145 
2010 26.193 35.516 11.765 18.243 26.193 35.516 58.188 
IQTR        
2005 14.322 9.548 19.862 19.567 14.322 7.161 0.000 
2006 14.322 9.548 22.340 21.483 14.322 7.161 0.000 
2007 14.322 9.548 25.029 21.483 14.322 7.161 0.000 
2008 14.322 9.548 25.064 21.483 14.322 7.161 0.000 
2009 14.322 9.548 25.064 21.483 14.322 7.161 0.000 
2010 14.322 9.548 25.064 21.483 14.322 7.161 0.000 
OQTR        
2005 5.245 6.886 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.112 0.000 
2006 7.400 8.365 0.000 0.000 0.239 3.591 0.000 
2007 9.738 9.967 0.000 0.000 2.577 5.193 0.000 
2008 12.266 11.697 0.000 0.000 5.105 6.923 0.000 
2009 14.993 13.559 0.000 3.313 7.832 8.785 0.000 
2010 17.925 15.561 0.000 7.131 10.764 10.787 0.000 
Source: Model simulations PS – Producer surplus, NS – Net surplus, IQTR – In-quota tariff revenue,  
OQTR – Out-quota tariff revenue. 
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Table A.15. Total tariff revenue, prices and total quota rent, policy experiments 32 – 38. 
 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
TTR        
2005 19.567 16.434 19.862 19.567 14.322 9.273 0.000 
2006 21.722 17.913 22.340 21.483 14.561 10.752 0.000 
2007 24.060 19.515 25.029 21.483 16.899 12.354 0.000 
2008 26.588 21.245 25.064 21.483 19.427 14.084 0.000 
2009 29.315 23.107 25.064 24.796 22.154 15.946 0.000 
2010 32.247 25.109 25.064 28.614 25.086 17.948 0.000 
Prices        
2005 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.110 
2006 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.110 
2007 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.110 
2008 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.110 
2009 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.110 
2010 0.132 0.121 0.149 0.143 0.132 0.121 0.110 
TQR        
2005 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.011 0.000 
2006 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.011 0.000 
2007 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.000 
2008 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.000 
2009 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.000 
2010 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.000 
Source: Model simulations; TTR – Total Tariff Revenue, TQR – Tariff Quota Rents. 
 
